The exceptions I am referring to are found in RONR (12th ed.) 25:7ff, which do not include rules that are "...clearly identifiable as in the nature of rules of order that are placed in the bylaws...", RONR (12th ed.) 2:21. Such unexcepted rules of order that are enshrined in the bylaws are clearly suspendable by a two-thirds vote. If a society is going to create a different species of unsuspendable rules that would otherwise be suspendable (2:21), then using the term of art, rules of order, to describe them is not proper, because rules of order are, with certain exceptions (25:7ff), inherently suspendable. Outside the set of the certain exceptions (25:7ff), no unsuspendabe rule can be properly called a rule of order.
The present case raises other very serious difficulties: for example, does even the smallest violation of one of these "unsuspendable rules of order" that results in the adoption of a main motion constitute a continuing breach per the exception found at RONR (12th ed.) 23:6, item (a)? It sure sounds like it. But, this is just silly.