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Shmuel Gerber

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Everything posted by Shmuel Gerber

  1. To better understand paragraph 23:2(1), it would probably be helpful to also read the entire subsection Conditions Under Which Incidental Motions Take Precedence over, or Yield to, Other Motions (6:18–22), and especially this: "… incidental motions have no rank among themselves and cannot be assigned positions within the order of precedence of motions, although they have individual relationships to that order which are described in the sections dealing with these motions. With the exception of a Division of the Assembly, incidental motions yield to the privileged motions and generally yield to the motion to Lay on the Table, unless the incidental motion arose out of a motion of higher rank than the one to which it would otherwise yield … "In connection with motions that can be incidental to motions of any rank (such as Point of Order, Appeal, Suspend the Rules, Motions Relating to Voting, and certain types of Requests and Inquiries), whenever it is stated that one of these motions yields to “all motions” above a certain rank, the incidental motion nevertheless does not yield to any motion ranking below the one out of which it arises. For example, “A Point of Order yields to the motion to Lay on the Table, and to all privileged motions.” This statement is true without qualification if the point of order is in connection with a motion ranking lower than Lay on the Table (that is, a main motion or any other subsidiary motion); but a point of order arising from a motion to Recess would yield only to the two higher-ranking privileged motions—to Adjourn and to Fix the Time to Which to Adjourn."
  2. Whether the point of order is debatable or not (and in this case it's not), it yields to any privileged motion that is in order at the time according to the order of precedence of motions (based on the other motions that are pending besides the point of order). So unless a privileged motion to adjourn or to fix the time to which to adjourn is already pending (or the assembly is engaged in voting or verifying a vote, or there is some other reason a motion to adjourn is not in order), a privileged motion to adjourn would take precedence over the point of order and would be disposed of first.
  3. If an organization has adopted Robert's Rules of Order as the parliamentary authority, then it should follow every rule verbatim and word for word, including the parts that say there is often no need to follow every rule verbatim and word for word: - "In cases where there seems to be no opposition in routine business or on questions of little importance, time can often be saved by the procedure of unanimous consent, or as it was formerly also called, general consent. Action in this manner is in accord with the principle that rules are designed for the protection of the minority and generally need not be strictly enforced when there is no minority to protect. Under these conditions, the method of unanimous consent can be used either to adopt a motion without the steps of stating the question and putting the motion to a formal vote, or it can be used to take action without even the formality of a motion." (4:58) - "There is no acceptable alternative to parliamentary procedure for the conduct of business in a deliberative assembly; yet many presiding officers try to get along with a minimum of knowledge. This approach inevitably results in signs of unsureness. … The president should never be technical or more strict than is necessary for the good of the meeting. Good judgment is essential; the assembly may be of such a nature, through its unfamiliarity with parliamentary usage and its peaceable disposition, that strict enforcement of the rules, instead of assisting, would greatly hinder business. But in large assemblies where there is much work to be done, and especially where there is likelihood of trouble, the only safe course is to require a strict observance of the rules." (47:14–19)
  4. Yes, but amendments to the resolved clauses are considered first.
  5. At least until Saturday. Then there's a full moon and I can howl again. 🙂
  6. If you have to make the argument sillier to make the case, then it's a weak argument. However, to take up one of these points, if a rule provides that adoption of a particular type of motion requires a three-fourths vote during a waxing moon, a two-thirds vote during a waning moon, and unanimous consent during a full moon, I do not see any reason to conclude that this vote requirement may be suspended at any time by a two-thirds vote because no "minority of a particular size" is protected by the rule. On the contrary, the size of the minority protected by the rule is very particular. And by the way, for quite a while the rule in the U.S. House of Representatives was: "A rule may not be suspended except by a vote of two-thirds of the Members voting, a quorum being present. The Speaker may not entertain a motion that the House suspend the rules except on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays and during the last six days of a session of Congress."
  7. No, you've got it right. You said, "whenever 4 positions are to be filled, you [SG] are saying that the rule protects a minority of the same size as if a 4/5 vote were required for election, since a vote of this size will guarantee election." I had read "a vote of this size" to mean a 4/5 vote, but I see now that's not what you meant. I have indeed been saying that the vote of a minority of the same size protected by a rule requiring a 4/5 vote for election (i.e., more than 1/5) is protected by J.J.'s rule that "The ABC Committee shall consist of four members of the assembly, elected by cumulative voting," since a vote of this size (or rather, this particular size 🙂) will guarantee election of one candidate supported by this minority. But now that you've made me think about it some more, that is actually understating the case a bit. A rule requiring a 4/5 vote for election provides no protection at all to a minority of exactly 1/5, whereas cumulative voting in an election of 4 seats gives a minority of 1/5 the ability to guarantee either election of the minority's candidate or a stalemate (no election).
  8. This argument seems a bit hair-splitting to me, and I don't find it persuasive. The rule protects a minority of a particular size voting in a particular way. If a minority of that size votes in that way, they get what they want because of this rule, regardless of how anyone else votes. If you take away the rule, then the majority can override their ability to do so, even if they were to coordinate to ensure their desired outcome — which obviously they have the right to do when protected by the rule.
  9. Almost. If I understand the math correctly myself: I don't think a 4/5 vote will guarantee election of all four seats of the majority's choice, but a vote of greater than 1/5 will guarantee election of one seat of the minority's choice. If the factions were split exactly 4/5 to 1/5, then the best the majority could do to prevent election of the minority's choice (and vice versa) is to create a tied vote so that no one is elected. I think the math will be easier with 100 voters instead of 120, so suppose there are 100 voters. A faction of 20 members cast all their votes for candidate A: 20*4=80. Now, in order to defeat candidate A, the rest of the voters must all (collectively) cast at least 80 votes for each of four other candidates. But in order to have enough votes for that, they also cannot cast more than 80 for any one, because then there would be less than 80 for another. So either the vote would be tied all around, or candidate A gets a seat.
  10. In 40:11, RONR states, "Before the presiding officer calls a meeting to order, it is his duty to determine, although he need not announce, that a quorum is present." And in section 48, the only suggestion that the minutes should explicitly reflect the presence of a quorum is with respect to entering the names of members present during a roll call vote. And while the form of the minutes is just a sample, I think it would be odd to contend that if these were real minutes taken and approved by the assembly, there cannot be a presumption that the actions were taken in the presence of a quorum because that fact is not noted. All in all, it seems pretty clear that RONR does not generally require or even suggest that the presence of a quorum be noted in the minutes. I am aware that many people are not happy with this fact, but that does not change the fact.
  11. Personally the last is my favorite. I don't like the idea of having to agree to disagree, as I can disagree without anyone's agreement. 🙂
  12. Sometimes people agree to agree, sometimes they disagree to agree, and sometimes they agree to disagree. And in this case we may have people disagreeing to disagree.
  13. In the example initially given in this thread, the rule protects a minority of greater than one fifth. If the number of members on the committee were different, then this fraction would be different. But since this committee is of a particular size, and is even stated that way in the rule, then the minority protected is also of a particular size. (I'm not conceding that if the number of seats varied then there would not be any minority of a particular size protected in each case where the rule is applied; but where the number of seats is fixed, as here, then I think there certainly is a minority of a particular size protected by the rule.) If there is a problem with the "greater than" part of this formulation, then the same problem would exist with a rule requiring a four-fifths vote for adoption of a motion, which protects not a minority of one fifth, but a minority of greater than one fifth. This is much in the same way that the requirement of a 2/3 vote to close debate on a motion protects a minority of greater than 1/3 but not of 1/3.
  14. I won't purport to read the mind of 25:2(7), but my answer is yes.
  15. In my opinion it's not helpful to be too particular about the meaning of particular. 🙂 I would note that in RONR, the rule describing cumulative voting itself depends on the number of seats to be filled: "In this form of voting, each member is entitled to cast one vote for each position, so that if, for example, three directors are to be elected, each member may cast three votes..." (46:43)
  16. I don't know where the number 5/24 is coming from. My formula to find the minority protected by a rule allowing cumulative voting is that it's the size of the minority that is guaranteed the ability, by coordinating their votes, to elect one candidate. This number is anything more than 1/(N+1), where N is the number of seats being elected. For 2 seats, it would be a minority greater than 1/3; for 3 seats, it would be greater than 1/4; and for 4 seats, greater than 1/5. (And for the trivial case of 1 seat, it's more than 1/2, which is not a minority.)
  17. Yes, I think J.J. has illustrated my point. The minority protected is any greater than 1/5. This is equivalent to 24/120. So with 120 voters in total, a minority of more than 24, by coordinating their votes in a cumulative-voting election for 4 seats, can be sure to elect one candidate.
  18. As I said in the topic I referred to earlier, I don't really cotton to the notion that there is something special about a majority of the ballots cast in an election being done by cumulative voting. It does not represent a majority of the voters or of the votes cast. It is just some strange artifact of the rules relating to the way a ballot vote is conducted when a majority of the ballots cast represents a majority of the voters. However, simply for the purpose of this discussion, I'm willing to assume that in order to be among the winners, a candidate must not only be in the top 4 vote-getters (where there are 4 positions) but also must attain a number of "votes" (in the cumulative system, i.e., where a voter can assign multiple votes to a single candidate) that is a majority of the number of ballots cast. As I believe J.J. pointed out earlier, this means more than 60 votes, which then translates to 61 when dealing with whole numbers. I'm beginning to see where you're getting these numbers from — i.e., each voter can place 4 votes, so for a candidate to attain more than 1/2 the total ballots, the minimum number of voters who could yield this majority is more than 1/8 of the voters, all giving their total support (⅛ × 4 = ½). I don't think it's helpful to convert this into a particular number of votes, as it stems from a fraction that always applies, regardless of how it may translate into whole numbers under specific numbers of voters; but, yes, in the case of 120 members voting, 16 voters (all giving all of their votes to the same candidate) would be needed for a majority. But I don't agree that this is the number (or fraction) that is protected by the rules. As J.J. has noted, such a majority does not necessarily win an election even when cumulative voting is in effect. In fact, if a certain set of 4 candidates is supported by more than 4/5 of the voters, and a different candidate is supported by a minority of more than 1/8 (but not 1/5 — which cannot exist in this scenario, because the total minority remaining is not that large), then the minority candidate is sure to lose (assuming all the votes are well coordinated). I would think that if anything, where a majority vote is required with cumulative voting, the rules protect not the minority of more than 1/8, but rather the majority of 7/8, by ensuring that 1/8 or less cannot elect their choice (without additional support). But even that protection is not really necessary, because 4/5 (which is even less than 7/8) can get what they want regardless of the "majority" threshold. I still say that the minority that is protected by the rules is a minority of more than 1/5, which can always (with proper coordination) elect one candidate of its choice in a 4-seat election.
  19. Five just happens to be the number of candidates in JJ's example; there could have been more. There are still only four seats being elected.
  20. I would say yes, but apparently there's still some confusion (and I do not understand why) about what "total votes" means and how it affects the formula.
  21. I don't understand this at all. When we say "four-fifths vote," we are talking about four-fifths of the votes cast. That is the fraction which remains constant regardless of the number of votes cast.
  22. Suppose an election rule said directly that a 4/5 vote is required for a candidate to attain the position. Would you still say that something other than a four-fifths vote is needed to suspend the rules, because the election may be decided by one vote? Or that we cannot know what vote is needed because we won't know how many votes will be cast in the election until the actual vote on the election is taken? It seems that there are (at least) two separate discussions going on here. Dan Honemann has already agreed that if the fraction of votes necessary remains constant, then the vote to suspend the rules is dependent on that fraction regardless of how many actually vote. The way I see it, the rule in this case (cumulative voting that started the thread) protects a minority of greater than one fifth. If you want to argue that even if the fraction remains constant, there's no definite minority because the number changes depending on how many vote, that is another discussion.
  23. I don't understand any of these complicated calculations or where they're coming from. In an election of four committee members in which cumulative voting is allowed, a minority of more than 1/5 (that is, more than 1/(4+1), or 20% of the votes cast) is guaranteed election of one candidate of their choice if they put all of their votes on that choice. Therefore, it seems to me, suspending the rule permitting cumulative voting where there are four winners to be elected cannot be done by less than a 4/5 vote. As far as where a majority enters the calculation, I don't think a majority vote is generally needed for cumulative voting, but Mr Martin has opined here that if it is, what is required is for a candidate to obtain a number of votes that is more than half of the number of ballots cast. Here, if more than 1/5 of the voters cast each of their four votes for a single candidate, that candidate's votes will exceed 4/5 of the number of ballots cast, which is easily a majority. Now if there are some other calculations (which I don't understand) that show that even 20% or less can somehow be sure to elect a candidate depending on how many votes are cast, that certainly should not mean that the rule can be suspended by a 2/3 vote rather than a 4/5 vote! If someone can tell me where I've gone wrong, I would appreciate it. Although I would prefer to be told that I am absolutely correct. 🙂
  24. I was not able to follow that. You gave several numbers depending on "my scenario" (Dan) or "your scenario" J. J., but I don't see where those numbers are coming from.
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