another p. 251(a) question

[Trina]

In this recent thread, a situation was described in which a board exceeded its bylaws-granted authority to raise dues. I'm not claiming to describe the details in that situation exactly, but, for the sake of discussion:

Dues in an organization are currently set at $40. The bylaws give the board authority to raise dues, by no more than 15%. Larger increases in dues, if needed, must be adopted by the general membership. The board goes ahead and adopts a motion to raise dues by $10, clearly acting in violation of bylaws, but no one notices that violation until a few weeks after the meeting is adjourned.

This sure sounds like a continuing breach, but does it actually fall under p. 251(a)?

One person on the other thread responded:

If the motion is adopted in violation of a rule that is not in the nature of a rule of order in the bylaws, it is null and void (p. 251, a.).

But, that's not what 251(a) actually says -- the actual words describe the situation 'when a main motion has been adopted that conflicts with the bylaws (or constitution) of the organization or assembly.' The words do not say 'when any action has been taken...' as the descriptions under ( c ), ( d ), and ( e ) on the same page do.

In this case, the adopted main motion "that dues be raised from $40 to $50" does not conflict with the bylaws. What conflicts is the fact that the board (rather than the general membership) adopted the motion. Does the fact that the wrong body adopted the motion 'adhere' to the motion somehow, putting the adopted motion in violation of p. 251(a)?

Is this more properly viewed as a different flavor of violation (maybe p. 251(d) or (e)), since the people who should have voted on the motion (general membership) were not given an opportunity to do so?

Following the recent discussions here and here, regarding the application of p. 251(a) to a flawed election, I feel less certain that I understand the full meaning of the language on p. 251 ll. 9-10...

[Robert B Fish]

The motion is null and void because the Board adopted a motion that was not allowed by the bylaws.

-Bob

[Trina]

The motion is null and void because the Board adopted a motion that was not allowed by the bylaws.

-Bob

But, my point is that the language of the adopted motion, standing on its own, is perfectly fine, and is not in violation of the bylaws.

The violation of the bylaws is due to an unauthorized body within the organization adopting the motion. Is this a p. 251(a) violation?

[Dan Honemann]

But, my point is that the language of the adopted motion, standing on its own, is perfectly fine, and is not in violation of the bylaws.

The violation of the bylaws is due to an unauthorized body within the organization adopting the motion. Is this a p. 251(a) violation?

I'm inclined to agree that this is not a 251 (a) violation. However, I have no doubt at all but that any motion adopted by a subordinate board in excess of its authority, as in the situation you described, is null and void.

[George Mervosh]

I'm inclined to agree that this is not a 251 (a) violation. However, I have no doubt at all but that any motion adopted by a subordinate board in excess of its authority, as in the situation you described, is null and void.

And do you also believe a point of order to that effect need not be timely? If you do believe that, what exception found in RONR to the timeliness requirement would be applicable, if not (a)?

[Guest Steve Britton]

Question: Could the board assess dues for a total of $46.00 (the full 15%) without further action; Or, is total nullity the consequence for adopting the motion?

[Dan Honemann]

And do you also believe a point of order to that effect need not be timely? If you do believe that, what exception found in RONR to the timeliness requirement would be applicable, if not (a)?

Since the motion which was adopted is null and void, a point of order concerning its invalidity may be raised at any time.

I don't think that this falls under any of the exceptions listed on page 251, but that list is not an exhaustive list. For (another) example, if a subordinate board adopts a motion after the membership's assembly has rejected the same (or substantially the same) motion, the motion adopted by the board is null and void (p. 483, ll. 6-9). This situation isn't one of those listed on page 251 either.

[Dan Honemann]

Question: Could the board assess dues for a total of $46.00 (the full 15%) without further action; Or, is total nullity the consequence for adopting the motion?

The board could adopt another motion raising dues within the prescribed limits, but the motion it previously adopted raising the dues to $50.00 is a nullity.

[George Mervosh]

Since the motion which was adopted is null and void, a point of order concerning its invalidity may be raised at any time.

I don't think that this falls under any of the exceptions listed on page 251, but that list is not an exhaustive list. For (another) example, if a subordinate board adopts a motion after the membership's assembly has rejected the same (or substantially the same) motion, the motion adopted by the board is null and void (p. 483, ll. 6-9). This situation isn't one of those listed on page 251 either.

Ok, thanks. Very very informative and the extra example was helpful.

[J. J.]

I was actually looking along the lines of the wording of the bylaws. If the bylaws were to say, "No motion shall be in order to increase dues more than 15%."

[Gary Novosielski]

In this case, the adopted main motion "that dues be raised from $40 to $50" does not conflict with the bylaws. What conflicts is the fact that the board (rather than the general membership) adopted the motion. Does the fact that the wrong body adopted the motion 'adhere' to the motion somehow, putting the adopted motion in violation of p. 251(a)?

If a body makes a motion which is prohibited (to them) by the bylaws, the fact that some other body, some other society, or some other country's parliament may have the right to move a similar motion is irrelevant. The motion conflicts with the bylaws if it's adopted by a body that the bylaws say can't adopt it.

[Guest Nancy N.]

... The motion conflicts with the bylaws if it's adopted by a body that the bylaws say can't adopt it.

But Gary, Trina knows that. Trina says that. Mr. Honemann emphasizes that. Trina's question is not whether it is so; Trina's question postulates that it is. Trina's routinely insightful question is whether it is p. 251 (a) that deals with it, and if not, what does. Are you telling her that it is p. 251 (a) that does? If not, then, are you telling her what does?

[J. J.]

For (another) example, if a subordinate board adopts a motion after the membership's assembly has rejected the same (or substantially the same) motion, the motion adopted by the board is null and void (p. 483, ll. 6-9). This situation isn't one of those listed on page 251 either.

Wouldn't this be, broadly, a violation of absentee rights (p. 251, e.)?

[Dan Honemann]

Wouldn't this be, broadly, a violation of absentee rights (p. 251, e.)?

No, I don't think so.

[J. J.]

No, I don't think so.

Why not? Seriously. The assembly has dealt with the issue and, because of the board action, it is being deprived of that ability. Unless the board would constitute the entire membership of the society, some absentees would exist. Those absentees are deprived of the right to renew the motion, which they would otherwise have.

[Dan Honemann]

Why not? Seriously. The assembly has dealt with the issue and, because of the board action, it is being deprived of that ability. Unless the board would constitute the entire membership of the society, some absentees would exist. Those absentees are deprived of the right to renew the motion, which they would otherwise have.

I'm afraid that I cannot make any sense out of this.

[Josh Martin]

Why not? Seriously. The assembly has dealt with the issue and, because of the board action, it is being deprived of that ability. Unless the board would constitute the entire membership of the society, some absentees would exist. Those absentees are deprived of the right to renew the motion, which they would otherwise have.

The term "absentees" in the sense it is used in pg. 251 (and in the sense it is generally used in RONR), seems to refer to members of the assembly that is meeting who are absent.

I don't have my book on me at the moment, but I suspect that the pages on a motion to Ratify are more applicable to this topic. Since the board has taken action in excess of its authority, the motion must be ratified by the general membership in order to be valid. Failing such ratification, the motion is null and void.

I'm also a little puzzled about what renewal has to do with this.

[J. J.]

I'm afraid that I cannot make any sense out of this.

Well, I'll try again.

The assembly entered into the issue, and defeated a main motion regarding the issue. The board then adopts the same motion, under the same circumstances.

If the board motion is valid, it would deny any member who is not a board member of the assembly the ability to renew the main motion. As the membership of the board would not likely include all the members of the assembly, it would disenfranchise some members of the assembly; they are absentees because they cannot participate in the board decision.

[Tim Wynn]

Well, I'll try again.

The assembly entered into the issue, and defeated a main motion regarding the issue. The board then adopts the same motion, under the same circumstances.

If the board motion is valid, it would deny any member who is not a board member of the assembly the ability to renew the main motion.

You mean… deny the right to renew, because the motion intended to be proposed had already been adopted? What would be the point of renewing, if not to adopt? Isn't that like saying a member is unfairly denied the right to become a member, because he was already accepted into membership?

As the membership of the board would not likely include all the members of the assembly, it would disenfranchise some members of the assembly; they are absentees because they cannot participate in the board decision.

Yes, those types of "absentees" have no rights… since they aren't members.

[Gary Novosielski]

But Gary, Trina knows that. Trina says that. Mr. Honemann emphasizes that. Trina's question is not whether it is so; Trina's question postulates that it is. Trina's routinely insightful question is whether it is p. 251 (a) that deals with it, and if not, what does. Are you telling her that it is p. 251 (a) that does? If not, then, are you telling her what does?

I meant that I believed that it would be 251 (a) that would apply.

[J. J.]

You mean… deny the right to renew, because the motion intended to be proposed had already been adopted? What would be the point of renewing, if not to adopt? Isn't that like saying a member is unfairly denied the right to become a member, because he was already accepted into membership?

No, because the member may wish the assembly, and not the board, to take the action. The member may wish the motion defeated by the assembly, perhaps with larger numbers.

Yes, those types of "absentees" have no rights… since they aren't members.

But they would have the right to renew the motion is the assembly where they are members.

[Dan Honemann]

But they would have the right to renew the motion is the assembly where they are members.

This is true but entirely irrelevant.

As Josh Martin noted in post #17 (and I'm quoting him almost word for word here), the term "absentees" as used on page 251 (and as generally used in RONR), refers to absent members of the assembly that is meeting, and thus, at a meeting of a society's executive board, it refers only to members of the board who are absent from that meeting.

[Trina]

Since the motion which was adopted is null and void, a point of order concerning its invalidity may be raised at any time.

I don't think that this falls under any of the exceptions listed on page 251, but that list is not an exhaustive list. For (another) example, if a subordinate board adopts a motion after the membership's assembly has rejected the same (or substantially the same) motion, the motion adopted by the board is null and void (p. 483, ll. 6-9). This situation isn't one of those listed on page 251 either.

This response, although surprising at first, made a lot of sense to me. One point common to the situation in the original post, and to the situation described by Mr. Honemann, is that the superior body which has the power to throw out the improper motion (i.e. the general membership) has no way to raise a timely point of order when the malfeasance occurs at a meeting of a different body (the board). Thus, a rule requiring a timely point of order would be a bad rule.

I'm a bit distressed that Mr. Novosielski feels clear that this is indeed a p. 251(a) violation, as I just can't understand that p.o.v. based on the language on p. 251. It's like being unable to see the alternate picture in one of those two-image optical illusions .

I was originally leaning toward a theory like J.J.'s (violation of rights of absentees; or possibly violation of some FPPL that I couldn't put my finger on). However, seeing it as a p. 251(e) violation seems to require too much redefinition of what 'absentee' means.

The perspective that the list on p. 251 is not exhaustive, although jarring, is more aesthetically pleasing, and makes more sense (to me anyway) than the alternative views presented.

[Sean Hunt]

This response, although surprising at first, made a lot of sense to me. One point common to the situation in the original post, and to the situation described by Mr. Honemann, is that the superior body which has the power to throw out the improper motion (i.e. the general membership) has no way to raise a timely point of order when the malfeasance occurs at a meeting of a different body (the board). Thus, a rule requiring a timely point of order would be a bad rule.

Without getting into any discussion as to the appropriateness of raising a Point of Order about something in a subordinate body, I don't think this is necessarily true, since if the Point of Order must be timely, it must be raised as soon as possible. If the matter which is being questioned occurred outside a meeting, then the timeliness requirement would not forbid the point being made at the body, merely that if it weren't made in a timely fashion (such as at the outset of the first meeting after the matter occurred), then it would be out of order.

[Dan Honemann]

This response, although surprising at first, made a lot of sense to me. One point common to the situation in the original post, and to the situation described by Mr. Honemann, is that the superior body which has the power to throw out the improper motion (i.e. the general membership) has no way to raise a timely point of order when the malfeasance occurs at a meeting of a different body (the board). Thus, a rule requiring a timely point of order would be a bad rule.

I'm a bit distressed that Mr. Novosielski feels clear that this is indeed a p. 251(a) violation, as I just can't understand that p.o.v. based on the language on p. 251. It's like being unable to see the alternate picture in one of those two-image optical illusions .

I was originally leaning toward a theory like J.J.'s (violation of rights of absentees; or possibly violation of some FPPL that I couldn't put my finger on). However, seeing it as a p. 251(e) violation seems to require too much redefinition of what 'absentee' means.

The perspective that the list on p. 251 is not exhaustive, although jarring, is more aesthetically pleasing, and makes more sense (to me anyway) than the alternative views presented.

Well, if it helps any, let’s just declare it to be a fundamental principle of parliamentary law that a society’s subordinate board may not take any action in excess of its authority, or any action that alters or conflicts with any decision made by the society’s assembly, and that any action so taken is null and void.