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Motions that conflict with non-procedural laws


Shmuel Gerber

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Note: The initial posts in this topic were split off from the topics

Discretionary power of the chair in ruling conflicts of interest

and

Motion against an ordinance... limiting rights

in the General Discussion Forum.

 

Even if the motion violated the ordinance somehow, it would not necessarily be out of order.  Societies are free to adopt resolutions that violate the law.  Of course they'll have to suffer the consequences of doing so.   The rule that state law supersedes Robert's Rules applies to state laws that actually mandate certain rules of order, not to all state laws of any kind.

 

I think this is a very confused interpretation of things. Of course the provisions of state law supersede the provisions of Robert's Rules (unless the law itself states that they don't), and of course societies are not free to adopt resolutions that violate the law and suffer the consequences, any more than I am free to punch you in the gut and suffer the consequences.

The point is that unless such provisions are procedural in nature,* they are of effect because they are state law, not because of anything in Robert's Rules or parliamentary law, and therefore it is not within the chairman's power to rule a motion out of order on the basis that its adoption or execution would violate such provisions.

 

*And if they are not procedural in nature, then they almost certainly won't be in conflict with any provision in Robert's Rules of Order.

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The law against murder does not supersede your bylaws, in that a motion to commit murder is not out of order (nor is it, so far as I know, illegal, although the murder itself usually is).

 

I'm surprised you think that ordering a murder is not illegal, but that discussion is outside the scope of the forum.

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Fair enough re: Shmuel, it just strikes me as an odd result that a crime would be committed by an affirmative vote on the motion.  Who would be responsible for that, if it were adopted by voice-vote, for instance?  I'm not a lawyer, but it seems to me we can't have a free-floating crime, we need a criminal or group of criminals to conduct the crime.  In any case, I definitely hesitated before writing that, and then stuck in an apositive saying "so far as I know" which, as we all know, is not very far.

 

As for Mr. Martin, it may well be that my concerns are more about the wisdom of the law - after all, I did mention leaving the question itself to my betters.  I guess what I'm quibbling about is whether the effect of the law actually is to a) prohibit such a person from voting or B) require the assembly to prohibit such a person from voting. 

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How are you not free to punch me in the gut and suffer the consequences?  (I would advise against it, but I don't see why you aren't free to do so.)  Similarly, if the chairman can't rule the motion to hire an assassin out of order, in what sense is the society not free to hire an assassin and then suffer the consequences of the responsible parties (the court can sort out if its all the members, those who voted in the affirmative, those who actually hired the assassin - see my other post on this) going to prison?

 

This is what concerned me on the other post.  If the society adopts a motion to murder X, and the chair then, on behalf of the organization, hires a hitman, who murders X, who is going to jail?  Everyone?  All those present?  All those who voted for it?  What if it's by voice-vote and we don't know who voted for it?

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This feels rather like a dead horse, but I'll hazard two remarks:  statutes are understood in the context of the full body of law, and laws by themselves cannot tell you if a particular person is breaking them.  Judgment comes in, and saying that such an appeal just shouldn't be allowed, or whatever you propose, is simply substituting one person's interpretation of the application of the law to the facts for that of the deliberative assembly charged with making the relevant decisions.  There may or may not be consequences if they decide wrong, but it's still their decision.

 

Similarly, it is illegal to drive hazardously, but I don't expect my car to stop me from doing so, and even my passenger and I may reasonably disagree on whether a particular behavior is hazardous.  I get to decide, and if I'm wrong, there may well be consequences - either physical or legal.

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I think this is a very confused interpretation of things. Of course the provisions of state law supersede the provisions of Robert's Rules (unless the law itself states that they don't), and of course societies are not free to adopt resolutions that violate the law and suffer the consequences, any more than I am free to punch you in the gut and suffer the consequences.

The point is that unless such provisions are procedural in nature,* they are of effect because they are state law, not because of anything in Robert's Rules or parliamentary law, and therefore it is not within the chairman's power to rule a motion out of order on the basis that its adoption or execution would violate such provisions.

 

*And if they are not procedural in nature, then they almost certainly won't be in conflict with any provision in Robert's Rules of Order.

 

In what sense are you not free to punch me in the gut and suffer the consequences?  

 

Are you suggesting that if an organization wishes to debate a motion to use civil disobedience as a tactic to further its aims, it may not do so?

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How are you not free to punch me in the gut and suffer the consequences?

 

In what sense are you not free to punch me in the gut and suffer the consequences?

 

In the sense that it is illegal to do so.

 

I'm flattered that you guys think I ought to be free to punch you in the gut, but but I'm not really very good at gut-punching, so you're not missing much. I don't know what the law is about punching people in the gut who have said that people are free to do so, but I'm pretty sure that in general it is illegal to punch someone in the gut while chanting, "It's OK folks, I'm willing to suffer the consequences for this."

 

RONR says that a deliberative assembly "is a group of people, having or assuming freedom to act in concert, meeting to determine, in full and free discussion, courses of action to be taken in the name of the entire group" (11th ed., p. 1) and that "Fundamentally, under the rules of parliamentary law, a deliberative body is a free agent—free to do what it wants to do with the greatest measure of protection to itself and of consideration for the rights of its members" (p. lii).

 

This is why, under the rules of parliamentary law, the chairman of a deliberative assembly does not have the power to rule a motion out of order on the grounds that it violates some (non-procedural) state law.

 

But you seem to be implying that the rules of parliamentary law have some higher status than the rules of society at large, which I find a bit disconcerting. Just as individuals have an obligation to comply with state laws, so does the organization as a whole. So while the assembly is "free" in its deliberative process to determine for itself the actions it will take so long as the process comports with the rules of parliamentary law, the organization (a.k.a. society) for which that assembly acts is certainly not "free" to take actions that violate state laws.

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If the society adopts a motion to murder X, and the chair then, on behalf of the organization, hires a hitman, who murders X, who is going to jail?  Everyone?  All those present?  All those who voted for it?  What if it's by voice-vote and we don't know who voted for it?

 

I'm not a lawyer, but I assume that the hit man, the chair, and all those who voted for the motion will find themselves most in trouble. After that, probably it will be those who were present and abstained, followed by everyone who knew about the plan and didn't report it to the proper authorities.

 

RONR says, "In any decision made, the opinion of each member present has equal weight as expressed by vote—through which the voting member joins in assuming direct personal responsibility for the decision, should his or her vote be on the prevailing side." (p. 2)

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But you seem to be implying that the rules of parliamentary law have some higher status than the rules of society at large, which I find a bit disconcerting. Just as individuals have an obligation to comply with state laws, so does the organization as a whole. So while the assembly is "free" in its deliberative process to determine for itself the actions it will take so long as the process comports with the rules of parliamentary law, the organization (a.k.a. society) for which that assembly acts is certainly not "free" to take actions that violate state laws.

***

I don't think that's what I'm saying (and I don't think it's what Gary's saying either, but I have less knowledge about that).  When I said you were free to punch me in the gut and suffer the consequences, I included among those consequences things like being arrested and charged with assault.  I'd say the same about the organization - it is free to take actions that break the law, and to then have its members (and itself, I guess, if it's incorporated) punished for doing so.  

 

I don't know, it strike me as self-evident that a person is 'free' to break the law and go to jail.  What it means for something to be illegal (unless you happen to teach at Chicago Law) is that the state will punish you if you do it.  Compliance with the law is a choice; the only choice that isn't available is not complying and also not being punished (unless you get asylum in Russia).  Doing so is usually a bad idea, but not always - as Gary points out, civil rights groups presumably adopted motions to do illegal things, then did them, their members went to jail (MLK's famous letter isn't "Letter From Somewhere That Isn't a Birmingham Jail"), and the society advanced as a result.

 

There is this more recent situation where people try to avoid going to jail by saying "I was doing civil disobedience!" which strikes me as quite odd, since the whole idea of civil disobedience includes being punished by legal institutions - and King said that doing so was showing the highest respect for the law.  Then there's the even odder situation of protesters getting permits to protest...

 

In any case, how should the law differentiate between those voting in favor, those voting against, and those abstaining, in the case of a voice vote?

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But you seem to be implying that the rules of parliamentary law have some higher status than the rules of society at large, which I find a bit disconcerting. Just as individuals have an obligation to comply with state laws, so does the organization as a whole. So while the assembly is "free" in its deliberative process to determine for itself the actions it will take so long as the process comports with the rules of parliamentary law, the organization (a.k.a. society) for which that assembly acts is certainly not "free" to take actions that violate state laws.

 

This strikes me as a battle of semantics which I'm quite sure the General may have enjoyed outside his little tome.

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This strikes me as a battle of semantics which I'm quite sure the General may have enjoyed outside his little tome.

 

I don't know what you mean by that, but let me try to state what I am saying more simply. When one person needs to make a decision, the deliberative process takes please inside his or her own mind. When an organization (what RONR often refers to as a society) needs to make a decision, the deliberative process takes place inside the assembly of its members, and the rules of parliamentary procedure are the rules by which the assembly operates in making its decisions. Thus, as stated in the preface to the 10th edition of RONR, "rules of parliamentary procedure are concerned with the process by which a deliberative assembly arrives at a decision, and not with the wisdom, or even legality, of the decision itself."

 

But it strikes me as absurd to therefore say that an assembly is free to decide that the society should act illegally, and just as absurd to say that individuals within a larger civilized society are free to act illegally. The whole point of having laws is to restrict the actions that people (whether individually or in groups) may take, or to compel them to take certain actions, so as to make possible an orderly society, not simply to punish lawbreakers after the fact.

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In any case, how should the law differentiate between those voting in favor, those voting against, and those abstaining, in the case of a voice vote?

 

I would say that that is simply a question of determining the facts, and doesn't affect the essential question of law at all. But again, I am not a lawyer.

 

However, all that is totally beside the point I am trying to get across, which is that even when illegal actions are not out of order under the rules of parliamentary procedure, that doesn't make them any less illegal, and that doesn't make them perfectly fine and dandy in societies that have adopted RONR.

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Well, the example used here (ordering a murder) was somewhat absurdly extreme, and is probably not the best way to illustrate the point Godel Fan was trying to make. . . . No rule in RONR prohibits a society from adopting a motion in violation of a rule in applicable law which is not procedural in nature.

 

The law still prohibits this, of course, and a society which violates the law may still find itself in a great deal of trouble. In certain circumstances, however, the society may decide that this is worth the risk. The example I like to use to illustrate this point is civil rights organizations in the 50's and 60's, which often organized demonstrations despite local laws prohibiting this.

 

As a consequence, the chair cannot rule a motion out of order on the basis that it conflicts with a non-procedural rule in applicable law. He can only persuade the assembly that it's a bad idea.

 

Personally, I prefer the example of the Bank Robbers' Association. But anyway, I think this is still somewhat beside the point. For one thing, if local laws prohibiting demonstrations are in conflict with the United States Constitution, then such laws are themselves illegal, so that a motion to organize a demonstration would be legal.

More to the point, during the '50s and '60s (and '70s and beyond), Robert's Rules of Order said that motions conflicting with the laws of the state are out of order and, if adopted, are null and void. So here's the shocker: Suppose that organizing the demonstration does violate a valid local law; in order to adopt the motion and organize the demonstration, the society would have to not only break the local law, but also, if an older edition of Robert's Rules is the parliamentary authority, they would have to violate Robert's Rules too. Oh, heavens, how did they ever manage do that? :unsure:

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Well, the court ruled in Delgado that findings of unconstitutionality are not retroactive, to my understand (not an attorney).  While I take your point about the demonstration - that someone planning to break the law would probably find it acceptable to violate their rules of order also - I disagree.  They are violating the law, in this instance, out of civil disobedience.  They have no reason to think that their parliamentary authority is unjust, and so no reason to civilly disobey it.

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While I take your point about the demonstration - that someone planning to break the law would probably find it acceptable to violate their rules of order also - I disagree.  They are violating the law, in this instance, out of civil disobedience.  They have no reason to think that their parliamentary authority is unjust, and so no reason to civilly disobey it.

 

I still don't think we are understanding each other. Are you saying that there were organizations that had intended to break a substantive law (i.e., one unrelated to parliamentary procedure), but you think they refrained from doing so for the sole reason that their parliamentary authority was an edition of Robert's Rules earlier than the 10th, and they didn't want to disobey the rule in the parliamentary authority that no motion is in order that conflicts with a state or local law?

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I would say that that is simply a question of determining the facts, and doesn't affect the essential question of law at all. But again, I am not a lawyer.

 

However, all that is totally beside the point I am trying to get across, which is that even when illegal actions are not out of order under the rules of parliamentary procedure, that doesn't make them any less illegal, and that doesn't make them perfectly fine and dandy in societies that have adopted RONR.

 

No, it doesn't make the actions any less illegal, but they do remain in order to be moved and debated.   They are, of course, not "fine and dandy"--a point that would no doubt be brought up in debate and one that would likely be driven home by the consequences, if adopted and carried out.

 

The same logic applies to gut punching.  Saying that you are free to punch me (or Gödel Fan) in the gut and suffer the consequences is not the same as giving you permission.  It is merely saying that it is possible for you to do so even without permission.  Whether the act is illegal or not would not be determined at the time, but rather in a court of law.  Depending on the circumstances, it could constitute assault and battery, or it might be found completely justified.  

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Well, no, I have no reason to think such organizations exist, I just don't think such a thing would be absurd.

 

You don't think it is absurd for an organization to determine that an action is of such great importance that it should violate rules in applicable law, potentially facing severe penalties such as fines or jail time, but heaven forbid that the organization violate the rules in its parliamentary authority?

 

That seems pretty absurd to me. :)

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Not if it's a criminal organization. There is nothing stopping a criminal organization (perhaps an unscrupulous corporation) from using parliamentary procedure to decide which illegal actions to perform, but such an organization would surely wish to adhere to the rules of order for exactly the same reasons that any other organization would.

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Mr. Hunt, I concur entirely.

 

As to whether a more good-natured organization might also do this - the example being engaging in civil disobedience - groups engaging in civil disobedience are usually pretty clear as to the reason, and that they will only refuse to obey unjust laws.  Unless they happen to find parliamentary procedure to be unjust, it would seem reasonable that they'd be quite careful to follow it, at the risk of destroying their example if they don't.  If their parliamentary authority made illegal motions out of order, they'd have to engage in them some other way - that doesn't involve adopting an out of order motion.

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You don't think it is absurd for an organization to determine that an action is of such great importance that it should violate rules in applicable law, potentially facing severe penalties such as fines or jail time, but heaven forbid that the organization violate the rules in its parliamentary authority?

 

That seems pretty absurd to me. :)

 

I agree that it's absurd to think that all organizations that seek to violate the law would necessarily consider violating RONR as being beyond the pale.

 

However the question as I understand it is whether it is possible for them to decide to carry out an action that violates the letter of the law without violating the letter of RONR.  And it appears that the 11th edition makes that possible.

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Not if it's a criminal organization. There is nothing stopping a criminal organization (perhaps an unscrupulous corporation) from using parliamentary procedure to decide which illegal actions to perform, but such an organization would surely wish to adhere to the rules of order for exactly the same reasons that any other organization would.

I admit that this is not a possibility I had considered.

As to whether a more good-natured organization might also do this - the example being engaging in civil disobedience - groups engaging in civil disobedience are usually pretty clear as to the reason, and that they will only refuse to obey unjust laws. Unless they happen to find parliamentary procedure to be unjust, it would seem reasonable that they'd be quite careful to follow it, at the risk of destroying their example if they don't. If their parliamentary authority made illegal motions out of order, they'd have to engage in them some other way - that doesn't involve adopting an out of order motion.

I'm afraid I don't quite follow why a society which felt that a law was unjust would not also feel that a parliamentary rule which prohibits it from adopting a motion which conflicts with that law is unjust, at least as applied to that particular situation, but yes, I suppose the assembly could have gone through the formal procedure of adopting a special rule of order on the subject instead.

However the question as I understand it is whether it is possible for them to decide to carry out an action that violates the letter of the law without violating the letter of RONR. And it appears that the 11th edition makes that possible.

Yes, it is is entirely correct that, under the 11th edition, an assembly may adopt a motion which violates non-procedural rules in applicable law without violating any rule in RONR.

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Procedural rules are just that - procedural.  Their justice or injustice stems from protecting the rights of minorities, majorities, absentees, etc.  They don't become unjust based on their outcomes.  Substantive rules have their justice evaluated precisely by what they prohibit or require.  That's why I don't see a contradiction in thinking a substantive law is unjust, but not a procedural rule (or even law) which makes it difficult to protest it.  

 

Heck, I can go further if you want.  I think certain laws are so unjust that they justify protesting in the streets, but don't think that laws against protesting in the streets are unjust.

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