Discipline in a Representative Body

[Sean Hunt]

Suppose for a moment that you have yourself a large (more than a dozen members) elected representative body to manage the affairs of an organization. While many of its members are not involved in the day-to-day affairs - those being left to a subset of executive members, also elected by the organization at large - they are responsible for ensuring that those executive members are, in fact, competently running the day-to-day affairs and also to approve certain decisions, such as the expenditures of large sums as money. A Westminster parliament (without a single-party majority) is an excellent example of such a scenario.

Now, this situation is not entirely theoretical, but I'm trying to eliminate the specifics of this as it leads to interesting theoretical questions, I think. What is the most appropriate way for the elected body to handle discipline of the executive members? Some actions may simply be overturned, while others may have physical evidence that they were performed, and thus it is easy to for the assembly to quickly come to a decision with all the relevant evidence. At the same time, though, for issues that are of a less clear-cut nature, such as behavior issues, it is not obvious what the ideal procedure is.

At the same time, many of the principles espoused in the trial system - in particular of RONR - are quite inappropriate for this sort of body. Confidentiality would, if taken to the full extreme, defeat the purpose of a representative body's ability to effectively criticize the executive. The rule suspending a member's rights while a trial is in progress, as it is inappropriate of the elected body to have the power to strip full membership rights, and the damage caused by such suspension of rights - even if a replacement can be found - is potentially quite high. Time is also a factor - uncertainty is a bad thing to have in any elected body, and prolonging it is quite damaging.

I'm curious to hear your thoughts,

Sean

[Josh Martin]

Suppose for a moment that you have yourself a large (more than a dozen members) elected representative body to manage the affairs of an organization. While many of its members are not involved in the day-to-day affairs - those being left to a subset of executive members, also elected by the organization at large - they are responsible for ensuring that those executive members are, in fact, competently running the day-to-day affairs and also to approve certain decisions, such as the expenditures of large sums as money. A Westminster parliament (without a single-party majority) is an excellent example of such a scenario.

Now, this situation is not entirely theoretical, but I'm trying to eliminate the specifics of this as it leads to interesting theoretical questions, I think. What is the most appropriate way for the elected body to handle discipline of the executive members? Some actions may simply be overturned, while others may have physical evidence that they were performed, and thus it is easy to for the assembly to quickly come to a decision with all the relevant evidence. At the same time, though, for issues that are of a less clear-cut nature, such as behavior issues, it is not obvious what the ideal procedure is.

At the same time, many of the principles espoused in the trial system - in particular of RONR - are quite inappropriate for this sort of body. Confidentiality would, if taken to the full extreme, defeat the purpose of a representative body's ability to effectively criticize the executive. The rule suspending a member's rights while a trial is in progress, as it is inappropriate of the elected body to have the power to strip full membership rights, and the damage caused by such suspension of rights - even if a replacement can be found - is potentially quite high. Time is also a factor - uncertainty is a bad thing to have in any elected body, and prolonging it is quite damaging.

The organization should follow its own rules for discipline in its Bylaws, or if the Bylaws are silent, follow the rules in the parliamentary authority (presumably, RONR). If the question is about what sorts of rules an assembly of this nature should adopt in its Bylaws, the question is beyond the scope of RONR and this forum. The organization in question may wish to consult a professional parliamentarian for assistance in developing such rules and/or contact other organizations of a similar nature to see how they address such issues.

[Dan Honemann]

Suppose for a moment that you have yourself a large (more than a dozen members) elected representative body to manage the affairs of an organization. While many of its members are not involved in the day-to-day affairs - those being left to a subset of executive members, also elected by the organization at large - they are responsible for ensuring that those executive members are, in fact, competently running the day-to-day affairs and also to approve certain decisions, such as the expenditures of large sums as money. A Westminster parliament (without a single-party majority) is an excellent example of such a scenario.

Now, this situation is not entirely theoretical, but I'm trying to eliminate the specifics of this as it leads to interesting theoretical questions, I think. What is the most appropriate way for the elected body to handle discipline of the executive members? Some actions may simply be overturned, while others may have physical evidence that they were performed, and thus it is easy to for the assembly to quickly come to a decision with all the relevant evidence. At the same time, though, for issues that are of a less clear-cut nature, such as behavior issues, it is not obvious what the ideal procedure is.

At the same time, many of the principles espoused in the trial system - in particular of RONR - are quite inappropriate for this sort of body. Confidentiality would, if taken to the full extreme, defeat the purpose of a representative body's ability to effectively criticize the executive. The rule suspending a member's rights while a trial is in progress, as it is inappropriate of the elected body to have the power to strip full membership rights, and the damage caused by such suspension of rights - even if a replacement can be found - is potentially quite high. Time is also a factor - uncertainty is a bad thing to have in any elected body, and prolonging it is quite damaging.

I'm curious to hear your thoughts,

Sean

You seem to be referring to an organization's executive board exercising disciplinary powers which they will have only by virtue of provisions contained in the organization's governing documents. As a consequence, we can't be of any help in this forum. As far as RONR is concerned, executive boards may protect themselves against breaches of order by board members at board meetings, but that is the extent of their power in this regard.

[Sean Hunt]

The organization should follow its own rules for discipline in its Bylaws, or if the Bylaws are silent, follow the rules in the parliamentary authority (presumably, RONR). If the question is about what sorts of rules an assembly of this nature should adopt in its Bylaws, the question is beyond the scope of RONR and this forum. The organization in question may wish to consult a professional parliamentarian for assistance in developing such rules and/or contact other organizations of a similar nature to see how they address such issues.

Ah, okay. I thought this would be an excellent forum to discuss the theoretical parliamentary issues, but I guess not.

Thanks.