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Trina

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Unanimous consent has nothing to do with how the vote is taken

If a formal motion is made to suspend the rule in question if one member votes NO the motion is lost.

But.... unanimous consent, as defined on page 54 (agreement without objection when no vote is taken), is not the same as a unanimous vote, to which you actually seem to be alluding.

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So if a timely point of order is made that previous notice wasn't given the chair should rule that point of order is well taken but the chair can also point out that since all members present the rule can be suspended by unanimous consent.

Not exactly. This analysis mixes up two different rules. You seem to be thinking of the provision that "no rule protecting a minority of a particular size can be suspended in the face of a negative vote as large as the minority protected by the rule." RONR (11th ed.), p. 261. However, a rule requiring previous notice does not protect "a minority of a particular size;" it protects absentees. The relevant provision is therefore "Rules protecting absentees cannot be suspended . . . when any member is absent." RONR (11th ed.), p. 263-64. I do not mean to challenge Dan Honemann's conclusion that when there are no absentees there is in fact no need to suspend the rule requiring previous notice in order to act without it. But in any case, when no member is absent a motion to suspend the rules requiring previous notice (supposing it were needed or in order) would require no more than the usual 2/3.

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Not exactly. This analysis mixes up two different rules. You seem to be thinking of the provision that "no rule protecting a minority of a particular size can be suspended in the face of a negative vote as large as the minority protected by the rule." RONR (11th ed.), p. 261. However, a rule requiring previous notice does not protect "a minority of a particular size;" it protects absentees. The relevant provision is therefore "Rules protecting absentees cannot be suspended . . . when any member is absent." RONR (11th ed.), p. 263-64. I do not mean to challenge Dan Honemann's conclusion that when there are no absentees there is in fact no need to suspend the rule requiring previous notice in order to act without it. But in any case, when no member is absent a motion to suspend the rules requiring previous notice (supposing it were needed or in order) would require no more than the usual 2/3.

But does previous notice only protect absentees or does it also protect the right of an individual member to not have certain matters considered without it

IMO it's the latter

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But does previous notice only protect absentees or does it also protect the right of an individual member to not have certain matters considered without it

IMO it's the latter

Well, Alan H., let's keep in mind that we are focusing on the rules in RONR.

If we are considering the previous notice requirement in the bylaw provision on page 588, lines 13-16, you will find no support whatsoever for your opinion in RONR. In fact, just the opposite is true. As noted on page 581, lines 12-15, the object of that notice requirement is "to alert the members to the proposed amendment so that all those interested can arrange to be present at its consideration." Therefore, if we find the same (or substantially the same) notice requirement in the bylaws of an organization, and those bylaws also adopt RONR as the organization's parliamentary authority, I respectfully submit that RONR's advice concerning its meaning carries greater weight than does your opinion.

However, if we are considering some other notice requirement, let's say one written by Alan H. specifically to protect the right of individual members of his club not to have a certain matter considered without it, then I think your opinion is well worth noting, but that is really none of our concern here in this forum. :)

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Well, Alan H., let's keep in mind that we are focusing on the rules in RONR.

If we are considering the previous notice requirement in the bylaw provision on page 588, lines 13-16, you will find no support whatsoever for your opinion in RONR. In fact, just the opposite is true. As noted on page 581, lines 12-15, the object of that notice requirement is "to alert the members to the proposed amendment so that all those interested can arrange to be present at its consideration." Therefore, if we find the same (or substantially the same) notice requirement in the bylaws of an organization, and those bylaws also adopt RONR as the organization's parliamentary authority, I respectfully submit that RONR's advice concerning its meaning carries greater weight than does your opinion.

However, if we are considering some other notice requirement, let's say one written by Alan H. specifically to protect the right of individual members of his club not to have a certain matter considered without it, then I think your opinion is well worth noting, but that is really none of our concern here in this forum. :)

I continue to object (as I did in the other thread where this was discussed) to this use of the sample bylaws in RONR. They are (I believe) just given as a sample -- the surrounding pages do not tell us what the exact intent of the hypothetical framers of these bylaws was, nor do the surrounding pages offer an authoritative interpretation of the sample bylaws. Why is it OK to interpret the sample bylaws, when we are told over and over that we should not interpret the bylaws of real-life organizations on this forum?

Also, why are we interpreting (considering intent) at all in this case? POI 1 (p. 588) starts by cautioning that 'an ambiguity must exist before there is any occasion for interpretation.' I fail to see any ambiguity whatsoever in the sample article on amendment of the bylaws (p. 588 ll. 13-16) with its clear description of required notice.

If we are to use interpretation of the sample bylaws as a tool in parsing the rules in RONR, are we to extend the analogy to the bylaws of other organizations? In that case, whenever some portion of an organization's bylaws reads substantially like the sample bylaws in RONR, I suppose we are obligated to assume the intent is the same as what is described in the relevant portions of pp. 570-583. That seems to be the logical extension of this approach. :huh: (Doesn't make sense to me, in case the emoticon is too cryptic).

On the other hand, if we can't use the sample bylaws to impute the intent of the writers of real-life bylaws, then I don't see how one can arrive at the conclusion that RONR clearly says that a rule requiring notice does not need to be suspended when all members are present.

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I continue to object (as I did in the other thread where this was discussed) to this use of the sample bylaws in RONR. They are (I believe) just given as a sample -- the surrounding pages do not tell us what the exact intent of the hypothetical framers of these bylaws was, nor do the surrounding pages offer an authoritative interpretation of the sample bylaws.

What in the world are you talking about? Page 581, lines 12-15, tells you the intended purpose of a previous notice requirement such as that found in Article IX of the sample bylaws.

The names of the "hypothetical" framers of these bylaws are listed on the title page, and the rest of the pages in the book are definitely authoritative when it comes to their interpretation.

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OK, if that's the case, then I certainly accept the interpretation of the sample bylaws as authoritative.

However, I still have difficulty grasping how that authoritative interpretation grows into a rule -- applied to the general case of a real-life assembly (with its own bylaws) that a bylaw or rule of that society which requires notice need not be suspended if all members are present at a meeting.

And I also don't understand why interpretation, and consideration of intent, is called for at all when there is no ambiguity in the language of the bylaw in question (p. 588 ll. 13-16).

May I ask... in your view is formal suspension of the rule requiring notice (when all members are present) simply unnecessary? Or is such a motion actually improper (dilatory, perhaps)?

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Well, Alan H., let's keep in mind that we are focusing on the rules in RONR.

If we are considering the previous notice requirement in the bylaw provision on page 588, lines 13-16, you will find no support whatsoever for your opinion in RONR. In fact, just the opposite is true. As noted on page 581, lines 12-15, the object of that notice requirement is "to alert the members to the proposed amendment so that all those interested can arrange to be present at its consideration." Therefore, if we find the same (or substantially the same) notice requirement in the bylaws of an organization, and those bylaws also adopt RONR as the organization's parliamentary authority, I respectfully submit that RONR's advice concerning its meaning carries greater weight than does your opinion.

However, if we are considering some other notice requirement, let's say one written by Alan H. specifically to protect the right of individual members of his club not to have a certain matter considered without it, then I think your opinion is well worth noting, but that is really none of our concern here in this forum. :)

Well, Alan H., let's keep in mind that we are focusing on the rules in RONR.

If we are considering the previous notice requirement in the bylaw provision on page 588, lines 13-16, you will find no support whatsoever for your opinion in RONR. In fact, just the opposite is true. As noted on page 581, lines 12-15, the object of that notice requirement is "to alert the members to the proposed amendment so that all those interested can arrange to be present at its consideration."

But it says the object not the sole object and I would also note that merely giving notice at the previous meeting does nothing for any absentees since their not present to hear it.

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But it says the object not the sole object...

Yes, it says "the object" not "an object". Interestingly enough, the very same sentence calls our attention to the significant difference between the two (RONR, 11th ed., p. 581, ll. 7-15).

...and I would also note that merely giving notice at the previous meeting does nothing for any absentees since their not present to hear it.

:rolleyes:

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Yes, it says "the object" not "an object". Interestingly enough, the very same sentence calls our attention to the significant difference between the two (RONR, 11th ed., p. 581, ll. 7-15).

No argument here. Well, almost none.

But -- p. 121 ll. 25-26 also states that the notice should (shall? must?) indicate the exact content of the motion. Other references in this section (p. 122 ll. 6-8; p. 122 ll. 22-27) and in other places (p. 4 ll. 24-25; p. 596 ll. 25-27) also refer or allude to the inclusion of content in the notice.

If the sole purpose of notice is to alert members to the introduction of a motion, why all these references to inclusion of the content if not to also alert members to what the motion will be introducing?

Even p. 581 ll. 13-15 more than hints at this with "to alert the members to the proposed amendment". I read that as not merely to announce that there is a proposed amendment, but to announce what the proposed amendment is (i.e. content). It does not say "to alert the members to a proposed amendment", but to "the proposed amendment" (i.e. content).

It seems that "the object" of notice is actually two-fold: An motion will be introduced, and the content of that motion is ________, thus giving the members time to consider the motion (i.e. content) in preparation of the meeting.

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...

But in any case, when no member is absent a motion to suspend the rules requiring previous notice (supposing it were needed or in order) would require no more than the usual 2/3.

If such a motion is adopted (supposing it were needed or in order, as you say) would it remain in effect until the purpose for which the rule was suspended is fully accomplished? Or would its effect end as soon as any member left the meeting room?

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It seems that "the object" of notice is actually two-fold: An motion will be introduced, and the content of that motion is ________, thus giving the members time to consider the motion (i.e. content) in preparation of the meeting.

But there is quite another explanation for requiring the content of the proposed motion to be noticed that is consistent with the RONR position that THE purpose of requiring notice is to alert members who might otherwise be absent that the motion will be considered at the relevant meeting -- one given in the discussion of the scope of notice requirement regarding amendments to bylaw amendments on page 595. The classic example cited there is of a proposed dues increase:

If the bylaws place the annual dues of members at $10 and an amendment is pending to strike out 10 and insert 25, an amendment to change the 25 to any number between 10 and 25 would be an order, but an amendment to change the number to less than 25 or greater than 25 would be out of order, even with unanimous consent. Had notice been given that it was proposed to increase the dues to more than $25 or to reduce them below $10, members who opposed such a change might have attended the meeting to vote against the amendment.
RONR (11th ed.), p. 595, ll. 11-17.

The point of requiring that the purport of a noticed motion be given is that it will enable members to decide whether they care enough whether the motion is adopted to make a special effort to attend. If the requirement were simply that notice that "a" motion would be considered at the next meeting, with no indication of its content, it would be pretty meaningless: how could a member judge whether or not the motion in question would be one he or she cared about?

The notion that, even when all members are present, they must be protected against acting without sufficient reflection smacks a little of the hackneyed movie device of the serial killer who scrawls on the apartment wall of the latest victim, "Stop me before I kill again." The assumption appears to be that the members will not have sufficient sense to postpone or refer to a committee a motion that could profit from further consideration before adoption, so they must have a rule restraining themselves from acting too quickly, at least on certain important motions. I suppose an alternate rationale could be constructed based on the argument that if a dissenting minority is automatically given time to come up with and perfect arguments or amendments, the majority might come to a different conclusion when presented with them, and this would best serve the organization. In any case, as has been pointed out before, nothing whatever prevents an assembly motivated by such concerns from constructing a bylaws provision or a special rule of order based on them. But neither rationale is the basis for the rule in RONR, and if an organization adopts both RONR as its parliamentary authority and language substantially similar to the bylaws notice language suggested in RONR, that provision is to be interpreted in accordance with RONR.

As in many other instances, it is helpful to remember the quotation used by General Robert in the preface to the first edition: "It is much more material that there should be a rule to go by, than what that rule is, that there may be a uniformity of proceeding in business, not subject to the caprice of the chairman, or captiousness of the members." On this point at least, the rule in RONR is clear: the only purpose of the previous notice requirement is the protection of absentees. Knowing that is the clear rule, each organization that judges it would be best served by a different rule can and ought to adopt it.

If such a motion is adopted (supposing it were needed or in order, as you say) would it remain in effect until the purpose for which the rule was suspended is fully accomplished? Or would its effect end as soon as any member left the meeting room?

See Post # 5 in this thread by Dan Honemann.

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Firstly, thanks for extensive reply.

But there is quite another explanation for requiring the content of the proposed motion to be noticed that is consistent with the RONR position that THE purpose of requiring notice is to alert members who might otherwise be absent that the motion will be considered at the relevant meeting -- one given in the discussion of the scope of notice requirement regarding amendments to bylaw amendments on page 595.

And yet, in the case at hand where there is no notice provided, there is also no scope of notice, right? So, I fail to see how that argument holds water in the case at hand.

The point of requiring that the purport of a noticed motion be given is that it will enable members to decide whether they care enough whether the motion is adopted to make a special effort to attend. If the requirement were simply that notice that "a" motion would be considered at the next meeting, with no indication of its content, it would be pretty meaningless: how could a member judge whether or not the motion in question would be one he or she cared about?

Well, this seems to support my argument that content of the motion is an inherent part of the notice. Without content, the notice is nearly meaningless in that if all the notice said was "a bylaw amendment (or a motion) will be introduced", how would a member be able to judge whether attendance was warranted?

The notion that, even when all members are present, they must be protected against acting without sufficient reflection smacks a little of the hackneyed movie device of the serial killer who scrawls on the apartment wall of the latest victim, "Stop me before I kill again."

This made me laugh in a welcome way. Of course, it would have been written in the red lipstick of the woman seen in the mirror laying lifeless across her bed.

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Well, Alan H., let's keep in mind that we are focusing on the rules in RONR.

If we are considering the previous notice requirement in the bylaw provision on page 588, lines 13-16, you will find no support whatsoever for your opinion in RONR. In fact, just the opposite is true. As noted on page 581, lines 12-15, the object of that notice requirement is "to alert the members to the proposed amendment so that all those interested can arrange to be present at its consideration." Therefore, if we find the same (or substantially the same) notice requirement in the bylaws of an organization, and those bylaws also adopt RONR as the organization's parliamentary authority, I respectfully submit that RONR's advice concerning its meaning carries greater weight than does your opinion.

...

What in the world are you talking about? Page 581, lines 12-15, tells you the intended purpose of a previous notice requirement such as that found in Article IX of the sample bylaws.

...

...

I suppose an alternate rationale could be constructed based on the argument that if a dissenting minority is automatically given time to come up with and perfect arguments or amendments, the majority might come to a different conclusion when presented with them, and this would best serve the organization. In any case, as has been pointed out before, nothing whatever prevents an assembly motivated by such concerns from constructing a bylaws provision or a special rule of order based on them. But neither rationale is the basis for the rule in RONR, and if an organization adopts both RONR as its parliamentary authority and language substantially similar to the bylaws notice language suggested in RONR, that provision is to be interpreted in accordance with RONR.

...

Reading these comments again, I note that the references are specifically to the notice requirements for amendment of the bylaws (p. 588 and p. 581). Are all the associated statements about the meaning of what is said on those pages similarly limited in their application -- i.e. does this interpretation of the rules only apply to an all-members-present meeting which wants to consider a bylaws amendment without previous notice?

Or is the scope of this interpretation of the rules broader than would be suggested by the specific pages cited?

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Reading these comments again, I note that the references are specifically to the notice requirements for amendment of the bylaws (p. 588 and p. 581). Are all the associated statements about the meaning of what is said on those pages similarly limited in their application -- i.e. does this interpretation of the rules only apply to an all-members-present meeting which wants to consider a bylaws amendment without previous notice?

Or is the scope of this interpretation of the rules broader than would be suggested by the specific pages cited?

Apparently what has been said in the responses quoted is unclear, so let me state it another way.

Let’s assume that an organization’s bylaws say that its officers are to be elected by majority vote, and adopt RONR as its parliamentary authority. If a question arises as to the meaning of “majority vote”, a member’s opinion that it means “50% plus one” is not as persuasive (to say the least) as is the definition found on page 400.

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In this extremely unusual circumstance, I think that one (or both) of two things will most likely happen. Either (1), a point of order regarding lack of notice will be raised and ruled on by the chair, or (2), a counted vote will be taken, and if so and all members present do not vote, the chair should direct the Secretary to note in the minutes the number of members present who did not vote. If none of these things occur, the chair should direct the secretary to record the number of members present.

First, I have no disagreement that, if all members are present, and a motion requiring, but lacking, notice is adopted, a breach of a continuing nature would not exist.

My question, in this case, is a timely point of order that notice is required, and the proper ruling of the chair (which would be subject to appeal). Obviously, this does not violate the principle on which the rule is based. Should the chair properly note this, and rule the Point of Order not well taken? Should the chair note that the rule requires notice of this type of motion, and rule the Point of Order well taken?

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First, I have no disagreement that, if all members are present, and a motion requiring, but lacking, notice is adopted, a breach of a continuing nature would not exist.

My question, in this case, is a timely point of order that notice is required, and the proper ruling of the chair (which would be subject to appeal). Obviously, this does not violate the principle on which the rule is based. Should the chair properly note this, and rule the Point of Order not well taken? Should the chair note that the rule requires notice of this type of motion, and rule the Point of Order well taken?

Let’s assume that at a meeting of a society whose bylaws are in all relevant respects substantially the same as RONR’s sample bylaws, a motion is made to amend Article III, Section 1, of the bylaws by striking out “two” and inserting “three” (increasing the maximum membership from two hundred to three hundred members). Previous notice had not been given, but all members are present. A point of order is raised that the motion is not in order because the required notice was not given.

In my opinion, the chair should rule that this point of order is not well taken, explaining that, since all members are present, the rule requiring previous notice has no applicability.

If an appeal is taken from this ruling, I do not think that the chair should disallow it on the grounds that there cannot possibly be another reasonable opinion. :)

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Is there a timeliness to the Point of Order here? That is, once the chair states the question, is it too late? Once debate commences (and the assembly has, by general consent, allowed the question), is it too late? At what point is the breach healed?

Have you spent any time at all thinking about these questions you're asking?

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