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Inconsistency with privilege of vacancies


Sean Hunt

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Suppose that the society has an officer (the Happiness Officer) who no longer wishes to serve. While it's acknowledged that the Happiness Officer is not vital to the functioning of the society or its assembly, another member (Bob) considers it to be extremely vital to him personally that that the office Happiness Officer be filled.

Notice have been given of the resignation and the impending election to fill the vacancy, Bob views that considering the matter during New Business is far too long a wait. Now, Bob looks at p. 291, ll. 14-20, and concludes that the Happiness Officer's resignation, not being essential to the society, is not a privileged matter (by applying Principle of Interpretation 4). However; he turns to page p. 653, l. 34 to p. 654, l. 4; and realizes that if he instead makes a motion to remove the Happiness Officer, that motion is in fact privileged, as is the motion to fill the vacancy. As such, at the first opportunity, he moves to remove the Happiness Officer before his resignation has time to be accepted, and Bob proceeds to be elected Happiness Officer himself as punishment.

So, my question is why the inconsistency between vacancy-filling created by removal and by resignation? Is a motion to fill a vacancy that arose automatically (by death of its incumbent, perhaps) privileged or not?

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Suppose that the society has an officer (the Happiness Officer) who no longer wishes to serve. While it's acknowledged that the Happiness Officer is not vital to the functioning of the society or its assembly, another member (Bob) considers it to be extremely vital to him personally that that the office Happiness Officer be filled.

Notice have been given of the resignation and the impending election to fill the vacancy, Bob views that considering the matter during New Business is far too long a wait. Now, Bob looks at p. 291, ll. 14-20, and concludes that the Happiness Officer's resignation, not being essential to the society, is not a privileged matter (by applying Principle of Interpretation 4). However; he turns to page p. 653, l. 34 to p. 654, l. 4; and realizes that if he instead makes a motion to remove the Happiness Officer, that motion is in fact privileged, as is the motion to fill the vacancy. As such, at the first opportunity, he moves to remove the Happiness Officer before his resignation has time to be accepted, and Bob proceeds to be elected Happiness Officer himself as punishment.

So, my question is why the inconsistency between vacancy-filling created by removal and by resignation? Is a motion to fill a vacancy that arose automatically (by death of its incumbent, perhaps) privileged or not?

I think that the rule on pg. 291 is controlling regardless of the reason for the vacancy and the rule on pgs. 653-654 needs to be clarified, but I'm open to other interpretations.

In a situation like Bob's, however, it may be more practical (and just as easy) to simply Suspend the Rules and take up the motion immediately, except in the rare case where Bob can manage a majority of the entire membership on his side but not a 2/3 vote.

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Suppose that the society has an officer (the Happiness Officer) who no longer wishes to serve. While it's acknowledged that the Happiness Officer is not vital to the functioning of the society or its assembly, another member (Bob) considers it to be extremely vital to him personally that that the office Happiness Officer be filled.

It ought to be obvious that, aside from the Librarian, the Happiness Officer is the person whose duties are the most essential to the functioning of a society.

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