Is the election valid?

[Dan Honemann]

44 minutes ago, J. J. said:

This is perhaps where I have a problem.  I feel if a rule can be suspended, the breach of that cannot be a breach of a continuing nature.  Likewise, if cannot be suspended, its violation creates a continuing breach. 

That is certainly implicit in RONR, as the section that  breaches of a continuing refers to the section on rules that cannot be suspended.  It has also been that the authorship team, collectively, have stated, saying, in regard to the 10th edition: 

"Answering that question [of what constitutes a continuing breach] did not require writing on a clean slate, since in the existing work there was already considerable similarity between specific rules listed as providing exceptions to the timeliness requirement and those described as rules that cannot be suspended. Indeed, there is considerable force to the argument that, in general, those rules of such importance that they cannot be suspended are also those whose violation is so consequential that they should be subject to even an untimely point of order.”

(“Significant Changes in RONR, Part II,” National Parliamentarian, 2st Quarter, 2001)

I see no changes between the 10th and 11th editions on this point.

You can also ask if that relationship between a breach and a suspension is an accurate reporting of the nebulous general parliamentary law.  I think it is. 

First of all, please note those words "in general" in the midst of that quote (I've taken the liberty of bolding them within the quote).

Secondly, it is an undeniable fact that, in the instant case, the only rule which was violated was the rule requiring a majority vote for adoption, which rule is, in and of itself, a rule which can be suspended. Violation of this rule will not, in and of itself, give rise to a breach of a continuing nature. Having said all that, I do understand your insistence that the result should be different if the rule establishing the vote required for adoption is coupled with a rule requiring a ballot vote. However, this seems to be based upon an assumption that every time the chair announces the result of a ballot vote there is an assumed request for unanimous consent to the suspension of any rule which may have been violated. I ain't buying it.   

But these are all points which have been made many times over in this thread, one way or another, and so I think it rather pointless to continue to hammer away at them.

[Gary Novosielski]

3 hours ago, Josh Martin said:

Based on...?

Hmmmm, have I been tricked again by assuming this was an election of officers?

[Dan Honemann]

7 minutes ago, Gary Novosielski said:

Hmmmm, have I been tricked again by assuming this was an election of officers?

I think it was an election of an officer.

[Gary Novosielski]

41 minutes ago, Daniel H. Honemann said:

I think it was an election of an officer.

In that case, the following would apply:

Quote

A plurality that is not a majority never chooses a proposition or elects anyone to office except by virtue of a special rule previously adopted. If such a rule is to apply to the election of officers, it must be prescribed in the bylaws.

§ 44:  Plurality voting

I assume the use of the word "never" would preclude suspending the rule. 

Edited February 7, 2018 at 07:07 PM by Gary Novosielski

[Dan Honemann]

5 minutes ago, Gary Novosielski said:

I assume the use of the word "never" would preclude suspending the rule. 

That assumption would be erroneous.

[Gary Novosielski]

1 minute ago, Daniel H. Honemann said:

That assumption would be erroneous.

I don't see why. 

The word "never" is clear enough, and the only exception is a special rule previously adopted.  Suspending a rule does not posess the virtue of having been previously adopted, it is an ad hoc suspension.  And in the case of officers the rule (also previously adopted)  must be in the bylaws.

I'm not sure how much stronger the language needs to be.  If that exact language were copied into the bylaws, I would certainly consider it to prohibit its own suspension.

[Dan Honemann]

1 hour ago, Gary Novosielski said:

I don't see why. 

The word "never" is clear enough, and the only exception is a special rule previously adopted.  Suspending a rule does not posess the virtue of having been previously adopted, it is an ad hoc suspension.  And in the case of officers the rule (also previously adopted)  must be in the bylaws.

I'm not sure how much stronger the language needs to be.  If that exact language were copied into the bylaws, I would certainly consider it to prohibit its own suspension.

There can be no doubt but that the book says that a plurality that is not a majority never adopts any proposition or elects anyone to office unless a special rule of order has been previously adopted saying so, and that if such a rule is to apply to the election of officers, it must be in the bylaws (a special rule of order will not suffice).

I gather you are saying that, even although this is itself a rule of order, it is a rule which cannot be suspended. However, I can't find this anywhere on pages 263-66, and I can't find it anywhere on page 251 either. 

And by the way, I think that if an organization's bylaws contain a provision adopting RONR as its parliamentary authority, the exact language of this rule should be regarded as being a part of its bylaws.

 

[J. J.]

1 hour ago, Daniel H. Honemann said:

That assumption would be erroneous.

I would not see why.  This not appear to be a rule in the nature of rule of order, as it could not be adopted as a rule of order.

In earlier editions, it very clearly was a rule in the nature of rule of order, because it was specifically stated that a special rule

could permit it. 

All that said, the position was listed as "chairman," which doesn't tell us if this is an officer position or not. 

 

[J. J.]

3 hours ago, Daniel H. Honemann said:

 

Secondly, it is an undeniable fact that, in the instant case, the only rule which was violated was the rule requiring a majority vote for adoption, which rule is, in and of itself, a rule which can be suspended. Violation of this rule will not, in and of itself, give rise to a breach of a continuing nature. Having said all that, I do understand your insistence that the result should be different if the rule establishing the vote required for adoption is coupled with a rule requiring a ballot vote. However, this seems to be based upon an assumption that every time the chair announces the result of a ballot vote there is an assumed request for unanimous consent to the suspension of any rule which may have been violated. I ain't buying it.   

 

 I do not agree with the bolded part.  The rule being suspended is not, "a rule requiring a majority vote for adoption." 

The rule that is being suspended this situation is:  "a rule requiring a majority vote taken by ballot for adoption."

At the time the chair makes his announcement, it is the above rule.  The circumstances have added another function to that rule.  I do not believe, at that point, the ballot requirement can be separated from the rule requiring a majority vote.

I can at least one other example were, because of a change in circumstances, something that would normally be void is is fine; it is not specific to this situation.

"However, this seems to be based upon an assumption that every time the chair announces the result of a ballot vote there is an assumed request for unanimous consent to the suspension of any rule which may have been violated."  No, but believe that this virtually happened. 

As to the  "in general," I cannot find anything in text that would lead me to believe that this is the exception to that rule. 

 

[Gary Novosielski]

43 minutes ago, Daniel H. Honemann said:

There can be no doubt but that the book says that a plurality that is not a majority never adopts any proposition or elects anyone to office unless a special rule of order has been previously adopted saying so, and that if such a rule is to apply to the election of officers, it must be in the bylaws (a special rule of order will not suffice).

I gather you are saying that, even although this is itself a rule of order, it is a rule which cannot be suspended. However, I can't find this anywhere on pages 263-66, and I can't find it anywhere on page 251 either. 

And by the way, I think that if an organization's bylaws contain a provision adopting RONR as its parliamentary authority, the exact language of this rule should be regarded as being a part of its bylaws.

 

I would find that argument more persuasive in the case of an ordinary proposition, but not in the case of election  of officers.  When RONR says that a particular rule must be in the bylaws, i.e., that a special rule of order will not suffice, then allowing it to be suspended by a vote no greater than that adopting a special rule of order leads me to ask what purpose this language serves.  On the principle that it was included for some reason, I must assume that it means what it says, and that a reduction of the requirement to a mere plurality, if not prescribed in the bylaws, may not occur. 

Clearly some effort was made here to set a higher bar for the case of the election of officers than in the case of an ordinary motion or lesser election. But if it may be freely suspended in either case,  the bar is equally low for both, and the language fails to achieve anything.  I continue to wonder how much stronger the language must be than "never...except" and "must be prescribed in the bylaws" before it can be counted on to mean what it says.

I'm with you on considering the language to be a part of the bylaws already.  That was to be my next point if my earlier remark was at all persuasive.

[Gary Novosielski]

44 minutes ago, J. J. said:

 I do not agree with the bolded part.  The rule being suspended is not, "a rule requiring a majority vote for adoption." 

The rule that is being suspended this situation is:  "a rule requiring a majority vote taken by ballot for adoption."

While I do not believe that the rule requiring a majority vote to elect an officer is suspendible, I do agree with those who hold that in the absence of a timely point of order, the announcement of the chair stands.

The rule requiring a ballot vote was not violated.  The ballot vote was held, and the chair announced the result of the ballot vote was the election of Mr. Sixvotes. 

The chair did not declare that Mr. Sixvotes was elected notwithstanding the results of the ballot. The chair declared that Mr. Sixvotes was elected as a result of the ballot.  Those members who are upset that he was elected by less than a majority should look in the mirror to find those responsible.  Somebody could have raised a point of order and, it could be argued, had a duty to do so, if the chair erred in announcing the result.  It also occurs to me that if the recommended format of the Tellers' Report had been used, this would have not have happened, since the number needed to elect is clearly listed above the individual vote counts.