Trials of members

[Guest harper]

My organization held its first-ever general assembly trial of a member this week and expelled a member.

Apparently (I wasn't present), the 'managers' and chair (who is openly hostile to the accused; he made multiple

statements in front of witnesses prior to the meeting declaring that he's 'going to get that guy') added a charge

to the charge list just prior to the meeting on the day of the meeting which the accused and his counsel hadn't

been informed of in advance.

The managers also didn't respond to a written offer by me to provide evidence challenging one of the three other

charges that had been sent to the accused by registered mail.

Please offer advice: Is the expulsion invalid because the managers changed the charge list from those included

in the formal notification? And also wouldn't consider evidence to exonerate the accused of at least one charge?

What internal recourse does the expelled member have? Or, since ours is a quasi-professional organization,

should he turn elsewhere?

Is our organization, by not following the rules (and on disciplinary matters we follow Robert's Rules), exposed

legally?

Thank you.

"If the society adopts resolutions ordering trial before the assembly

or a committee, the secretary should immediately send to the accused

by registered mail a letter notifying him of the date, hour and place of

the trial, containing an exact copy of the charges and specifications

with date of their adoption...

"The trial is a formal hearing on the validity of the charges..."

[Rob Elsman]

My organization held its first-ever general assembly trial of a member this week and expelled a member.

Apparently (I wasn't present), the 'managers' and chair (who is openly hostile to the accused; he made multiple

statements in front of witnesses prior to the meeting declaring that he's 'going to get that guy') added a charge

to the charge list just prior to the meeting on the day of the meeting which the accused and his counsel hadn't

been informed of in advance.

The managers also didn't respond to a written offer by me to provide evidence challenging one of the three other

charges that had been sent to the accused by registered mail.

Please offer advice: Is the expulsion invalid because the managers changed the charge list from those included

in the formal notification? And also wouldn't consider evidence to exonerate the accused of at least one charge?

What internal recourse does the expelled member have? Or, since ours is a quasi-professional organization,

should he turn elsewhere?

Is our organization, by not following the rules (and on disciplinary matters we follow Robert's Rules), exposed

legally?

Thank you.

"If the society adopts resolutions ordering trial before the assembly

or a committee, the secretary should immediately send to the accused

by registered mail a letter notifying him of the date, hour and place of

the trial, containing an exact copy of the charges and specifications

with date of their adoption...

"The trial is a formal hearing on the validity of the charges..."

My sense is that the defendant's right to due process was violated when he was denied adequate time to prepare a defense to the added charge. However, if I understand the facts right, his counsel did not raise an objection or move to quash the additional charge at the trial, so I am not much inclined to think that the verdict or punishment is invalid on account of the error, serious though it was. I'll be anxious to read what the others have to say about this.

[Guest Guest]

My sense is that the defendant's right to due process was violated when he was denied adequate time to prepare a defense to the added charge. However, if I understand the facts right, his counsel did not raise an objection or move to quash the additional charge at the trial, so I am not much inclined to think that the verdict or punishment is invalid on account of the error, serious though it was. I'll be anxious to read what the others have to say about this.

The individual's counsel did object. So did someone else when the new 'evidence' was presented. I believe

the exchange was tape-recorded.

Moreover, I sent an email to the organization's Board of Governors several days prior to the trial advising the

Board that the chairman is openly hostile toward the accused and should step down from the chair; also that

there were problems with the charges. The chief manager is a member of the Board of Governors. I pointed out

- quoting Robert's Rules - that the chief manager is not to act to act as a 'prosecutor' per se, but to 'get to the

truth'.

As I said, I offered to provide evidence to refute one of the three charges and qualifying information regarding

another. The managers did respond to my email. I confirmed that my email was delivered to the Board of

Governors.

One followup question: If the individual's due process was violated, what recourse does he have short of

seeking an injunction in the courts. We're a public-interest association.

Thank you for your response.

[Rob Elsman]

The individual's counsel did object. So did someone else when the new 'evidence' was presented. I believe

the exchange was tape-recorded.

Moreover, I sent an email to the organization's Board of Governors several days prior to the trial advising the

Board that the chairman is openly hostile toward the accused and should step down from the chair; also that

there were problems with the charges. The chief manager is a member of the Board of Governors. I pointed out

- quoting Robert's Rules - that the chief manager is not to act to act as a 'prosecutor' per se, but to 'get to the

truth'.

As I said, I offered to provide evidence to refute one of the three charges and qualifying information regarding

another. The managers did respond to my email. I confirmed that my email was delivered to the Board of

Governors.

One followup question: If the individual's due process was violated, what recourse does he have short of

seeking an injunction in the courts. We're a public-interest association.

Thank you for your response.

Okay, the counsel did object. Now what? Did the chair overrule the objection? Was an appeal raised to put the matter before the assembly for its judgment?

[J. J.]

My organization held its first-ever general assembly trial of a member this week and expelled a member.

Apparently (I wasn't present), the 'managers' and chair (who is openly hostile to the accused; he made multiple

statements in front of witnesses prior to the meeting declaring that he's 'going to get that guy') added a charge

to the charge list just prior to the meeting on the day of the meeting which the accused and his counsel hadn't

been informed of in advance.

The managers also didn't respond to a written offer by me to provide evidence challenging one of the three other

charges that had been sent to the accused by registered mail.

Please offer advice: Is the expulsion invalid because the managers changed the charge list from those included

in the formal notification? And also wouldn't consider evidence to exonerate the accused of at least one charge?

What internal recourse does the expelled member have? Or, since ours is a quasi-professional organization,

should he turn elsewhere?

Is our organization, by not following the rules (and on disciplinary matters we follow Robert's Rules), exposed

legally?

Thank you.

"If the society adopts resolutions ordering trial before the assembly

or a committee, the secretary should immediately send to the accused

by registered mail a letter notifying him of the date, hour and place of

the trial, containing an exact copy of the charges and specifications

with date of their adoption...

"The trial is a formal hearing on the validity of the charges..."

Well, except possibly for an offense that occurs during a meeting or within the trial, he has a right to proper notice of the charge (p. 631, l. 20-23). A guilty verdict on that specific charge is probably null and void as it violated the basic right of an individual member (p. 244 e). That would not, however, apply to guilty verdicts on other charges, where notice was given. I take it that the member was found guilty on all charges and specifications.

The managers are under no obligation to hear allegedly exculpatory evidence, that the defense declines to introduce. The chair may well indeed have formed an opinion, but you have presented no claim that he acted inappropriately within the trial.

[J. J.]

The individual's counsel did object. So did someone else when the new 'evidence' was presented. I believe

the exchange was tape-recorded.

"New" evidence may be presented, but not a new charge or specification.

Assume that the charge was "Conduct unworthy of a member in this society."

The original specifications, or specific acts, were:

#1 Spread false reports.

#2 Provoked a disturbance at a restaurant. (see p. 634 for exact wording)

A third specification could not be added, without notice:

#3 That on December 16, 2010 the member vandalized the lobby of the clubhouse.

New evidence supporting #1 or #2 could, however, be found on 12/16/10 and introduced.

[Rob Elsman]

"New" evidence may be presented, but not a new charge or specification.

Assume that the charge was "Conduct unworthy of a member in this society."

The original specifications, or specific acts, were:

#1 Spread false reports.

#2 Provoked a disturbance at a restaurant. (see p. 634 for exact wording)

A third specification could not be added, without notice:

#3 That on December 16, 2010 the member vandalized the lobby of the clubhouse.

New evidence supporting #1 or #2 could, however, be found on 12/16/10 and introduced.

While I agree, I think I gather from the facts that the claim of a breach of the defendant's right to due process was raised, overruled by the chair, and not appealed. Don't you think that this is now a done deal?

[Guest Guest]

Okay, the counsel did object. Now what? Did the chair overrule the objection? Was an appeal raised to put the matter before the assembly for its judgment?

I wasn't there. But I believe the chair overruled the objection. I don't believe the matter was put before the assembly

for its judgment. Mr. Elsman, when justice is perverted it's not justice. The chair openly and publicly declared that he

'wanted the guy out'. I requested in writing that he recuse himself and let the vice president take over. Then, against

the counsel's objection, he allowed a new charge to be introduced. Anyway, thank you very much for your time.

[Rob Elsman]

I wasn't there. But I believe the chair overruled the objection. I don't believe the matter was put before the assembly

for its judgment. Mr. Elsman, when justice is perverted it's not justice. The chair openly and publicly declared that he

'wanted the guy out'. I requested in writing that he recuse himself and let the vice president take over. Then, against

the counsel's objection, he allowed a new charge to be introduced. Anyway, thank you very much for your time.

Yes, that's my understanding from the limited facts given. My sense is that the decision of the chair stands, since an appeal was not raised at the time the ruling was made. That's not to say I think everything was wine and roses. There's not much to be proud of in the way this went down.

[Guest harper]

Well, except possibly for an offense that occurs during a meeting or within the trial, he has a right to proper notice of the charge (p. 631, l. 20-23). A guilty verdict on that specific charge is probably null and void as it violated the basic right of an individual member (p. 244 e). That would not, however, apply to guilty verdicts on other charges, where notice was given. I take it that the member was found guilty on all charges and specifications.

The managers are under no obligation to hear allegedly exculpatory evidence, that the defense declines to introduce. The chair may well indeed have formed an opinion, but you have presented no claim that he acted inappropriately within the trial.

From Page 636: The 'managers'...'have the task of presenting the accused...Their duty, however, is not to act as prosecutors - in the sense of making every effort to secure conviction -but rather to strive that the trial will get at the truth and that, in light of all facts brought out, the outcome will be just.'

If their mandate is to 'get at the truth', then they are obliged to hear allegedly exculpatory evidence. I don't believe the defense 'declined' to introduce it. I can't say whether the chair behaved inappropriately within the trial, but he surely talked about it - 'we've got to get rid of this guy' - prior to the proceeding.

Thank you for your time.

[J. J.]

While I agree, I think I gather from the facts that the claim of a breach of the defendant's right to due process was raised, overruled by the chair, and not appealed. Don't you think that this is now a done deal?

No, because it does deal with notice and a basic right to due process, as I would see it; the defendant could waive that right. It would be a breach of a continuing nature.

There is a problem, however, for the defendant. While this charge/specification can be attacked on this ground, there are two others that cannot. The penalty on the others is still there and expulsion would still happen.

[Guest harper]

There's not much to be proud of in the way this went down.

I agree. Since a reputation is involved, it would be interesting to see if the chair's conduct meets the

qualifications laid out on Page 16 concerning 'local, state or national law' applying to this particular organization...

Thank you, again.

[J. J.]

From Page 636: The 'managers'...'have the task of presenting the accused...Their duty, however, is not to act as prosecutors - in the sense of making every effort to secure conviction -but rather to strive that the trial will get at the truth and that, in light of all facts brought out, the outcome will be just.'

If their mandate is to 'get at the truth', then they are obliged to hear allegedly exculpatory evidence. I don't believe the defense 'declined' to introduce it. I can't say whether the chair behaved inappropriately within the trial, but he surely talked about it - 'we've got to get rid of this guy' - prior to the proceeding.

Thank you for your time.

Brought out in the trial. The defense chose not to use your testimony. Nothing in RONR gives you the right to produce evidence or give testimony when neither the managers or the defend want it.

And the comment, outside of the meeting has no bearing on how the chair conducted himself within the meeting. You made absolutely no claim of anything improper regarding the chair's conduct within the meeting.

[Guest harper]

No, because it does deal with notice and a basic right to due process, as I would see it; the defendant could waive that right. It would be a breach of a continuing nature.

There is a problem, however, for the defendant. While this charge/specification can be attacked on this ground, there are two others that cannot. The penalty on the others is still there and expulsion would still happen.

But how do you separate? Legally, the final charge blindsided the defense's counsel (who is a real lawyer)

and upset several usually cool members. He wasn't given a chance to cross-examine the person who made

the accusation and to prepare any sort of informed rebuttal. We're talking maybe five votes between acquittal

and conviction...

So, I gather there's no internal recourse. Effectively, the chair's word stands.

Truly thank you for your comments.

[J. J.]

But how do you separate? Legally, the final charge blindsided the defense's counsel (who is a real lawyer)

and upset several usually cool members. He wasn't given a chance to cross-examine the person who made

the accusation and to prepare any sort of informed rebuttal. We're talking maybe five votes between acquittal

and conviction...

So, I gather there's no internal recourse. Effectively, the chair's word stands.

Truly thank you for your comments.

Well, because if the defendant did have the chance to rebut the charges with the notice.

I disagree with Mr. Elsman on the charge without notice; I think that decision is the sole one that can be subject to a point of order. The defendant had a complete opportunity to argue, rebut, or deal with the other two, because the defendant was informed of them. If the defendant declined to, or declined to introduce evident that you think is exculpatory, that is the defendant's problem.

On that one "non-noticed" charge, I would say that a point of order could still be raised, but not on the two that received proper notice.

[Guest harper]

Well, because if the defendant did have the chance to rebut the charges with the notice.

Perhaps. But I also believe that you understate the Page 16 caveat giving national, state and local

laws precedence over Robert's Rules. If the chair makes prejudicial comments about the accused

prior to the proceeding and those comments influence the outcome I suspect he might expose

himself and perhaps organization to damages.

I would urge Robert's Rules editorial board to give more space than just a single paragraph to legal

ramifications of involving oneself in a proceeding if you have a conflict or intense personal feelings

for or against another party. A section similar to 'decorum at meetings' would work.

Another matter: Robert's Rules, to the best of knowledge, has no mechanism to insure that members

tell the truth. The presumption is that they will. The reality is that they don't always do so. This, in my

opinion, is why secret meetings are unwise.

Thank you for your advice. But understanding, having spoken to the counsel, is that he didn't have

sufficient time or a sufficiently neutral chair to rebut all of the charges - though he did try. The

chair was openly hostile to the accused and should have allowed his number two to preside.

[hmtcastle]

Another matter: Robert's Rules, to the best of knowledge, has no mechanism to insure that members tell the truth.

I believe the 11th Edition (due any day now) will include a recipe for sodium pentathol.

[Rob Elsman]

I believe the 11th Edition (due any day now) will include a recipe for sodium pentathol.

I sense from J. J.'s replies that he and I have widely diverging understandings of the facts of the matter. I doubt we have remarkably different understandings of the applicable rules.

[J. J.]

I sense from J. J.'s replies that he and I have widely diverging understandings of the facts of the matter. I doubt we have remarkably different understandings of the applicable rules.

I'm not too sure that we do.

It looks to me like the accused was properly informed of two charges/specifications. A third one was added without proper notice to the accused.

The only problem, as I would see it, is the accused right to due process, i.e. to be informed of the third charge/specification and adequate time to prepare a defense on that charge, was violated. That would create a continuing breach, even if the chair/assembly erred at the trial.

In actuality, it would make no difference, if the accused is found guilty on the other two charges.

[J. J.]

Perhaps. But I also believe that you understate the Page 16 caveat giving national, state and local

laws precedence over Robert's Rules. If the chair makes prejudicial comments about the accused

prior to the proceeding and those comments influence the outcome I suspect he might expose

himself and perhaps organization to damages.

Why? The rule on p. 16 applies to procedural rules of law and I am totally unaware of any that would apply.

[Gary Novosielski]

Perhaps. But I also believe that you understate the Page 16 caveat giving national, state and local

laws precedence over Robert's Rules. If the chair makes prejudicial comments about the accused

prior to the proceeding and those comments influence the outcome I suspect he might expose

himself and perhaps organization to damages.

I would urge Robert's Rules editorial board to give more space than just a single paragraph to legal

ramifications of involving oneself in a proceeding if you have a conflict or intense personal feelings

for or against another party. A section similar to 'decorum at meetings' would work.

RONR does warn against the possibility of slander charges if specifications are made public when there is no overriding need to do so.

But don't misunderstand the note on page 16. This refers to statutes that are in the nature of rules of order, or which mandate (or prohibit) certain rules being used by particular organizations, which would supersede the rules in RONR.

It does not mean that RONR prohibits societies from breaking the law. They still are prohibited, of course, but by the law itself, not by RONR.

I predict you will have little luck in convincing the authorship team to expand the scope of this rule. It was, in fact, narrowed in the latest (10th) edition. Prior editions were more expansive, prohibiting the adoption (or rescission) of any motion if the effect of that action would cause a violation of law, or even a breach of an agreement in the nature of a civil contract. This restriction was removed in the 10th edition, because the feeling was that RONR ought to be concerned with the rules by which decisions are reached, "and not with the wisdom, or even the legality, of the decision itself."

With the earlier rules, it would have been impossible for a human rights organization to deliberate on the merits of staging an action of civil disobedience in pursuit of its organizational goals. This would put RONR dangerously close to the line of taking a political position based on the content of a motion.

[Guest harper]

RONR does warn against the possibility of slander charges if specifications are made public when there is no overriding need to do so.

But don't misunderstand the note on page 16. This refers to statutes that are in the nature of rules of order, or which mandate (or prohibit) certain rules being used by particular organizations, which would supersede the rules in RONR.

It does not mean that RONR prohibits societies from breaking the law. They still are prohibited, of course, but by the law itself, not by RONR.

I predict you will have little luck in convincing the authorship team to expand the scope of this rule. It was, in fact, narrowed in the latest (10th) edition. Prior editions were more expansive, prohibiting the adoption (or rescission) of any motion if the effect of that action would cause a violation of law, or even a breach of an agreement in the nature of a civil contract. This restriction was removed in the 10th edition, because the feeling was that RONR ought to be concerned with the rules by which decisions are reached, "and not with the wisdom, or even the legality, of the decision itself."

With the earlier rules, it would have been impossible for a human rights organization to deliberate on the merits of staging an action of civil disobedience in pursuit of its organizational goals. This would put RONR dangerously close to the line of taking a political position based on the content of a motion.

RONR does warn against the possibility of slander charges if specifications are made public when there is no overriding need to do so.

But don't misunderstand the note on page 16. This refers to statutes that are in the nature of rules of order, or which mandate (or prohibit) certain rules being used by particular organizations, which would supersede the rules in RONR.

It does not mean that RONR prohibits societies from breaking the law. They still are prohibited, of course, but by the law itself, not by RONR.

I predict you will have little luck in convincing the authorship team to expand the scope of this rule. It was, in fact, narrowed in the latest (10th) edition. Prior editions were more expansive, prohibiting the adoption (or rescission) of any motion if the effect of that action would cause a violation of law, or even a breach of an agreement in the nature of a civil contract. This restriction was removed in the 10th edition, because the feeling was that RONR ought to be concerned with the rules by which decisions are reached, "and not with the wisdom, or even the legality, of the decision itself."

With the earlier rules, it would have been impossible for a human rights organization to deliberate on the merits of staging an action of civil disobedience in pursuit of its organizational goals. This would put RONR dangerously close to the line of taking a political position based on the content of a motion.

Mr. Novosielski, all:

Again, thank you for your input. I still believe that if the chair and the accused have a known history of personal enmity the chair is obliged to recuse himself in a disciplinary proceeding as I've described. The concept of 'malice' is a legal concept. If there's even an appearance of 'malice' it undermines the ultimate judgment. Whether this falls under the Page 16 stipulation is a separate matter. However, I was highly impressed with the 'due process' safeguards written into RONR with the exception of the secrecy provisions which, it would appear to me, are designed more to protect the accuser than the accused. Anyway, that's just an opinion. But the 'Disciplinary Procedure' section is finely crafted and I believe, in spirit, offers due process protections to the accused. No need to parse it. The chair should have recused himself.

On the issue of whether two charges or three still legitimize an expulsion judgment, it all depends on the charges. The counsel was prepared to defend the accused of three charges against him. I don't wish to go into great detail, but the organization has a 'cowboy' type history; it ain't a church choir or PTA. The accused has a penchant to use four-letter words. So do others in the organization. I would have offered a bar of soap had I been in attendance. I do not think the case was strong enough to expel - although that too is just an opinion. But we'll never know because the fourth charge (which was not shown to the accused or his counsel until the proceeding was underway) was something more serious. The counsel formally protested, but the chair allowed the charge to be circulated with no chance for the counsel to cross-examine the person who made it because the person wasn't present.

This charge was not in the original writ sent out by registered mail.

I believe the chair perverted Robert's Rules 'trial procedure' section.

Thank you again.

[Dan Honemann]

Mr. Novosielski, all:

Again, thank you for your input. I still believe that if the chair and the accused have a known history of personal enmity the chair is obliged to recuse himself in a disciplinary proceeding as I've described. The concept of 'malice' is a legal concept. If there's even an appearance of 'malice' it undermines the ultimate judgment. Whether this falls under the Page 16 stipulation is a separate matter. However, I was highly impressed with the 'due process' safeguards written into RONR with the exception of the secrecy provisions which, it would appear to me, are designed more to protect the accuser than the accused. Anyway, that's just an opinion. But the 'Disciplinary Procedure' section is finely crafted and I believe, in spirit, offers due process protections to the accused. No need to parse it. The chair should have recused himself.

On the issue of whether two charges or three still legitimize an expulsion judgment, it all depends on the charges. The counsel was prepared to defend the accused of three charges against him. I don't wish to go into great detail, but the organization has a 'cowboy' type history; it ain't a church choir or PTA. The accused has a penchant to use four-letter words. So do others in the organization. I would have offered a bar of soap had I been in attendance. I do not think the case was strong enough to expel - although that too is just an opinion. But we'll never know because the fourth charge (which was not shown to the accused or his counsel until the proceeding was underway) was something more serious. The counsel formally protested, but the chair allowed the charge to be circulated with no chance for the counsel to cross-examine the person who made it because the person wasn't present.

This charge was not in the original writ sent out by registered mail.

I believe the chair perverted Robert's Rules 'trial procedure' section.

Thank you again.

Well, making complaints here in this forum will accomplish nothing.

[J. J.]

Mr. Novosielski, all:

Again, thank you for your input. I still believe that if the chair and the accused have a known history of personal enmity the chair is obliged to recuse himself in a disciplinary proceeding as I've described. The concept of 'malice' is a legal concept. If there's even an appearance of 'malice' it undermines the ultimate judgment. Whether this falls under the Page 16 stipulation is a separate matter. However, I was highly impressed with the 'due process' safeguards written into RONR with the exception of the secrecy provisions which, it would appear to me, are designed more to protect the accuser than the accused. Anyway, that's just an opinion. But the 'Disciplinary Procedure' section is finely crafted and I believe, in spirit, offers due process protections to the accused. No need to parse it. The chair should have recused himself.

['/quote]

The rules deal with the chair's conduct of the meeting and you have not even come close to showing that the chair acted partially while presiding. The standing is not what goes on in the chair's mind, but what goes on in the meeting.

The chair, on a ballot vote, would get to express his opinion by voting to determine guilt and, if determined, penalty. The only question is if the chair showed partiality while presiding, and even that would not be grounds for declaring the result void. Had the majority agreed with your claim, a point of order would have had to been raised at the time.

On the issue of whether two charges or three still legitimize an expulsion judgment, it all depends on the charges. The counsel was prepared to defend the accused of three charges against him. I don't wish to go into great detail, but the organization has a 'cowboy' type history; it ain't a church choir or PTA. The accused has a penchant to use four-letter words. So do others in the organization. I would have offered a bar of soap had I been in attendance. I do not think the case was strong enough to expel - although that too is just an opinion. But we'll never know because the fourth charge (which was not shown to the accused or his counsel until the proceeding was underway) was something more serious. The counsel formally protested, but the chair allowed the charge to be circulated with no chance for the counsel to cross-examine the person who made it because the person wasn't present.

This charge was not in the original writ sent out by registered mail.

Cross examination, in itself, is not always possible (p. 631); a right to cross examine is not granted by RONR. The assembly is free to weight that lack of cross examination in making its decision.

The accused was found guilty, I take it, on the charges for which he received notification; those cannot be legitimately attacked on the lack of notice to the accused. There is no "perversion" on those grounds.

The only thing, in all that you have posted that rises to the level of a breach of a continuing nature is the failure to give proper on one charge (p. 244, e); I take it that the member was found guilty on the other charges.

[Josh Martin]

I would urge Robert's Rules editorial board to give more space than just a single paragraph to legal ramifications of involving oneself in a proceeding if you have a conflict or intense personal feelings for or against another party. A section similar to 'decorum at meetings' would work.

The current rules in RONR on this topic are all that need to be said on the matter.

Another matter: Robert's Rules, to the best of knowledge, has no mechanism to insure that members tell the truth.

No, nor will it, since it is indecorous to accuse another member of lying, and there is no practical mechanism to ensure that members will tell the truth. The only recourse for dishonest members is disciplinary procedures.

This, in my opinion, is why secret meetings are unwise.

It is always true that executive session involves a certain degree of trust. If that trust is broken, that's what disciplinary procedures are for.

But understanding, having spoken to the counsel, is that he didn't have sufficient time or a sufficiently neutral chair to rebut all of the charges - though he did try. The chair was openly hostile to the accused and should have allowed his number two to preside.

This is unfortunate, but it would not constitute a continuing breach.

I still believe that if the chair and the accused have a known history of personal enmity the chair is obliged to recuse himself in a disciplinary proceeding as I've described.

If the chair believes he will be unable to preside impartially on a matter he should relinquish the chair, but that has nothing to do with what is said on pg. 16. Furthermore, the chair's failure to recuse himself would not cause a continuing breach.

The concept of 'malice' is a legal concept.

Then talk to a lawyer about it.

Whether this falls under the Page 16 stipulation is a separate matter.

It doesn't.

However, I was highly impressed with the 'due process' safeguards written into RONR with the exception of the secrecy provisions which, it would appear to me, are designed more to protect the accuser than the accused.

The secrecy provisions are intended to protect the accuser from liability and to protect the accused from defamation. Which party is protected to a greater extent depends on the facts of the particular case.

On the issue of whether two charges or three still legitimize an expulsion judgment, it all depends on the charges.

I am in agreement with J. J. that the inclusion of the additional charge was improper, but it does not undermine the validity of the expulsion from the standpoint of parliamentary law. From the facts provided, I see no legitimate basis to challenge the validity of the expulsion itself. The society may choose to readmit the member if it wishes, through whatever process the society uses for admitting new members. The society may also choose to take disciplinary action against some of the parties involved in the trial (such as the chair). Any further options are beyond the scope of parliamentary law and this forum.