Voting rights - disenfranchisement

[Guest Sumner]

Imagine a hypothetical deliberative body the constitution of which reads in part:

All full time xyz's are members. In addition all pqr's are ex officio members.

Over the years, there has been a proliferation of assistant pqr's, under-pqr's, and other people whose job title includes the word "pqr."

The constitutional language has for several years been interpreted "loosely" to include these modified pqr's on the voting roll, according to the logic "an assistant pqr is a KIND of pqr." With the huge proliferation of these pqr-oids, there is a move afoot to amend the constitution to remove their status as ex officio members.

A motion was made and passed that prior to voting on the constitutional amendment, a "strict" interpretation of the constitution be adopted, saying that only people with actual job title of pqr (not assistant-pqr or under-pqr) are the ex officio members referred to in the constitution, and that the voting roll be purged of all others.

So here is my question:

Is there anything improper about disenfranchising a fair number of people by the simple majority required to pass a motion to interpret the constitution? Does it matter that the whole purpose of the new interpretation is to make it more likely that the pending amendment will pass?

On the one hand, Roberts' makes it clear that a body can interpret ambiguities within its governing documents. On the other hand, it just doesn't feel right. Thank you for your time and help.

[Kim Goldsworthy]

Imagine a hypothetical deliberative body the constitution of which reads in part:

All full time xyz's are members.

In addition all pqr's are ex officio members.

Over the years, there has been a proliferation of assistant pqr's, under-pqr's, and other people whose job title includes the word "pqr."

The constitutional language has for several years been interpreted "loosely" to include these modified pqr's on the voting roll, according to the logic "an assistant pqr is a KIND of pqr."

With the huge proliferation of these pqr-oids, there is a move afoot to amend the constitution to remove their status as ex officio members.

A motion was made and passed that prior to voting on the constitutional amendment, a "strict" interpretation of the constitution be adopted, saying that only people with actual job title of pqr (not assistant-pqr or under-pqr) are the ex officio members referred to in the constitution, and that the voting roll be purged of all others.

Is there anything improper about disenfranchising a fair number of people by the simple majority required to pass a motion to interpret the constitution?

Since you may be in violation of your constitution, then you must disenfranchise people if the alternative is to violate your constitution.

Put the other way, you must obey your constitution, even if that results in disenfranchising people.

Did you think that it was okay to violate your constitution, to keep from disenfranchising people?

Does it matter that the whole purpose of the new interpretation is to make it more likely that the pending amendment will pass?

No.

The motivation, or rationale, or psychological reason, is immaterial.

Obedience to the constitution comes ahead of WHY you planned to amend the constitution.

[hmtcastle]

Imagine a hypothetical deliberative body the constitution of which reads in part:

All full time xyz's are members. In addition all pqr's are ex officio members.

By the way, all full-time xyzs are ex-officio members as well in that their status as member is predicated on their being a full-time xyz.

[Josh Martin]

Is there anything improper about disenfranchising a fair number of people by the simple majority required to pass a motion to interpret the constitution? Does it matter that the whole purpose of the new interpretation is to make it more likely that the pending amendment will pass?

On the one hand, Roberts' makes it clear that a body can interpret ambiguities within its governing documents. On the other hand, it just doesn't feel right.

The organization is the judge of its governing documents, and it should attempt to interpret them in good faith. That is, members should attempt to determine what they feel the language in the Constitution actually means, and not worry about who this will or will not disenfranchise, or the effects of the interpretation on the likelihood of adopting a subsequent amendment.

[Dan Honemann]

So here is my question:

Is there anything improper about disenfranchising a fair number of people by the simple majority required to pass a motion to interpret the constitution? Does it matter that the whole purpose of the new interpretation is to make it more likely that the pending amendment will pass?

On the one hand, Roberts' makes it clear that a body can interpret ambiguities within its governing documents. On the other hand, it just doesn't feel right. Thank you for your time and help.

The organization is the judge of its governing documents, and it should attempt to interpret them in good faith. That is, members should attempt to determine what they feel the language in the Constitution actually means, and not worry about who this will or will not disenfranchise, or the effects of the interpretation on the likelihood of adopting a subsequent amendment.

Josh, shouldn't any determination by an assembly as to the correct interpretation of a purportedly ambiguous bylaw provision come about as a result of an appeal from a ruling by the chair (or on submission by the chair of a point of order to the assembly for its decision)? Is a main motion to interpret a bylaw provision in a certain way in order?

[Robert B Fish]

Josh, shouldn't any determination by an assembly as to the correct interpretation of a purportedly ambiguous bylaw provision come about as a result of an appeal from a ruling by the chair...

Would a ruling to a point of order by the chairman without an appeal also establish a precedent for the organization? I had thought that was the reason the secretary was required to record not only the point of order but also the chairman's reasons for his/her ruling.

-Bob

[Dan Honemann]

Would a ruling to a point of order by the chairman without an appeal also establish a precedent for the organization? I had thought that was the reason the secretary was required to record not only the point of order but also the chairman's reasons for his/her ruling.

-Bob

Yes, I think it would.

[Josh Martin]

Josh, shouldn't any determination by an assembly as to the correct interpretation of a purportedly ambiguous bylaw provision come about as a result of an appeal from a ruling by the chair (or on submission by the chair of a point of order to the assembly for its decision)?

Of course.

Is a main motion to interpret a bylaw provision in a certain way in order?

Well, in my opinion, a main motion to interpret an ambiguous Bylaw provision a certain way is in order, but such a motion is simply a "sense of the assembly" resolution and does not create a precedent. Such a resolution is comparable to the chair's response to a Parliamentary Inquiry. If a member disagrees with the sense of the assembly as expressed in the resolution, he should act contrary to it, and an actual decision will be made on the subject by a ruling of the chair and any subsequent appeal (or a Point of Order submitted to the assembly for a decision).

Thank you for raising this point. I got so focused on answering the question of how the assembly should interpret the issue that I missed the bit about the main motion.

Would a ruling to a point of order by the chairman without an appeal also establish a precedent for the organization?

Yes, but given the controversy surrounding this decision, I expect that an Appeal is likely regardless of how the chair rules on the matter.