J. J.

I agree, but I was showing difficulty in preventing it.

Usually the answer is yes. Except in some cases where a rule would be constructed to prevent its suspension, at worst, the rules could be suspended to permit this. The rules could be suspended to permit me to make a motion or recommendation.

The "voting body" is the board; unless there is some other rule, they would not be released.

1. Yes, but those minutes, unless released, are only opened to members board. 2. No.

I do not agree with the bolded part. The rule being suspended is not, "a rule requiring a majority vote for adoption." The rule that is being suspended this situation is: "a rule requiring a majority vote taken by ballot for adoption." At the time the chair makes his announcement, it is the above rule. The circumstances have added another function to that rule. I do not believe, at that point, the ballot requirement can be separated from the rule requiring a majority vote. I can at least one other example were, because of a change in circumstances, something that would normally be void is is fine; it is not specific to this situation. "However, this seems to be based upon an assumption that every time the chair announces the result of a ballot vote there is an assumed request for unanimous consent to the suspension of any rule which may have been violated." No, but believe that this virtually happened. As to the "in general," I cannot find anything in text that would lead me to believe that this is the exception to that rule.

I would not see why. This not appear to be a rule in the nature of rule of order, as it could not be adopted as a rule of order. In earlier editions, it very clearly was a rule in the nature of rule of order, because it was specifically stated that a special rule could permit it. All that said, the position was listed as "chairman," which doesn't tell us if this is an officer position or not.

Elections take effect immediately, unless your bylaws say otherwise, and if the person being elected does not object, or has given previously to being elected (p. 444, ll. 16-20). If the member is not present and did not consent to being elected, then it would be effective when he's notified of the election, unless he immediately declined. Basically, if the person has consented to being elected, and unless the bylaws say otherwise, he takes office when elected. I have no idea what your bylaws say or if the people consented.

Adding to that, you would find the requirements for previous notice in both your own rules and in RONR.

This is perhaps where I have a problem. I feel if a rule can be suspended, the breach of that cannot be a breach of a continuing nature. Likewise, if cannot be suspended, its violation creates a continuing breach. That is certainly implicit in RONR, as the section that breaches of a continuing refers to the section on rules that cannot be suspended. It has also been that the authorship team, collectively, have stated, saying, in regard to the 10th edition: "Answering that question [of what constitutes a continuing breach] did not require writing on a clean slate, since in the existing work there was already considerable similarity between specific rules listed as providing exceptions to the timeliness requirement and those described as rules that cannot be suspended. Indeed, there is considerable force to the argument that, in general, those rules of such importance that they cannot be suspended are also those whose violation is so consequential that they should be subject to even an untimely point of order.” (“Significant Changes in RONR, Part II,” National Parliamentarian, 2st Quarter, 2001) I see no changes between the 10th and 11th editions on this point. You can also ask if that relationship between a breach and a suspension is an accurate reporting of the nebulous general parliamentary law. I think it is.

To me, the result seems to be identical. I would have the same problem if, after the fact, the assembly adopted a rule "suspend the rules and permit a plurality to elect," unless the vote was by ballot. I'm very trouble about looking at the reasons for why we think a breach of a continuing nature happened. The first case is deliberate act; the second is presumably by accident. That should not make a difference. Continuing breaches are many times accidental in nature. Many times they are deliberate. We are presuming that the election case is accidental, but the unanimous vote might have been taken by voice, without realizing that it would force some members to presumably reveal their ballot vote.

A "charter member" is defined as someone who is enrolled in the society at the time the time that the permanent society is form or before a certain date set by the society (p. 560, ll.5-6) or before a certain date set by the society (p. 560, fn.). RONR does not grant the charter member any additional rights; it is effectively an honorary title. Your bylaws could create additional rights for "charter members." Your bylaws could create an additional honorary title of "founding members," and establish criteria for it. It could be identical to charter members, or it could have separate criteria. Your bylaws could create additional rights for "founding members." How your society chooses to define "founding members," if it uses the title, are totally up to your society.

No. Very little of RONR applies outside of a meeting.

That is left to your bylaws.

"Great Importance" is the eye of the beholder. To me, if nobody objects, the motion is not one of "great importance" in the eyes of the assembly.

Yes.

I missed this. Yes. Whatever the chair rules, his decision can be appealed; he can also submit point of order to the assembly. What the assembly will do, one way or another, is determine if there is a custom of using the five minute procedure. They can say that there is no existing custom and that there is no limitation on debate. They can find that there is a custom, and that chair should stop the speech at five minutes. If I was chairing, I would initially stop debate at 5 minutes. That is the way the assembly has been doing it, and nobody, at that point, has given the chair the specific instruction not to do it that way or to do it some other way.

If the assembly decides that, at any level, it will do something different than the custom, that ends the custom. These will end the custom. A point of order is raised that the custom of limiting debate is no longer binding. The chair rules a the point of order well taken. That would end the custom. A point of order is raised that the custom of limiting debate is no longer binding. The chair rules against a point of order, and a successful appeal is made. The assembly adopts a rule that sets a limit on debate, that is different from the custom. The assembly adopts the motion that "the custom of limiting debate shall no longer be in force." Over time, the chair and the assembly ignore the rule repeatedly; the custom, eventually, is not in force. Over time, the chair and the assembly ignore the rule, but follows another practice in its place. Eventually that will replace the custom of limiting debate to five minutes with a new custom. You could also adopt a rule that "Only written rules adopted by the assembly shall be used to govern parliamentary procedure." That would have to be special rule or placed in the bylaws. This would end all custom based practices. Rescind would be out of order; that applies to main motions, not a customary practices.

In a large part the assembly should give direction on how the procedure is followed. The assembly not so given any additional directions; it has not even said "We are no longer limiting debate to one five minute speech, per member, on each debatable motion." The assembly has not changed its instructions. 1. I think general parliamentary law is, well, general. There may not be any general parliamentary law setting the limits of debate. General parliamentary law is nebulous, and even if we find a something, it may not part of that general parliamentary law. 2. Ranks all the sources of rules relating to parliamentary procedure are stated in RONR. At the top of the list is the corporate charter, then a constitution, bylaws, special rules of order, the parliamentary authority, and finally custom. General parliamentary law is not on that list. That is because the rank of general parliamentary law is lower than anything on that list. If something from higher source conflicts with something in general parliamentary law, that higher source is controlling. 3. Sources that do give general parliamentary law a place in the hierarchy of the rules, place it below custom. I find that persuasive. 4. Parliamentary procedure, which we are really talking about, is general parliamentary law, "as it is followed in any given assembly," along with any rules the assembly has adopted (p. xxx) While custom is not adopted, it is created by the assembly. It is certainly, by its nature, is something that is followed by the assembly, as are higher level rules. The assembly has chosen to use custom to govern some procedure, at some level. And in the case of the thermostat, the officers and employees will not act without an order; they obey the rules. The thermostat will remain at 68 degrees.

I do not agree. The ballot was interpreted improperly, but that interpretation was still not the ballot. I have to keep coming back to p. 413. Basically the chair is declaring a plurality a majority when it was not. That is my answer to Josh as well. Maybe you could answer this; this is where I'm having the problem. If instead of needing a majority to be adopted, what if it needed a unanimous vote of those voting and the chair declared this vote unanimous, would that be a breach of a continuing nature? I do understand that there is a problem of "belling the cat." Somebody has a raise of order, or object, at some point.

Then you tell me what elected that person chairman? Normally, I would say a vote, but that is not the case here.

It depends on that the error is. If the error causes the choice to be made by a method other than a ballot, yes, assuming that the vote is to be by ballot.. The chair could improperly ask for a for/against on each choice and take that vote by ballot; that is not a problem. That is the first one that comes to mind. A point of order or a vote on appeal is not a vote on one of these choices. A motion to postpone the pending motion (or election), is not a vote on these choices. Would you disagree that if the chair would have called for a voice vote on this motion, then this could be challenged at a later date?

Because the assembly has changed how the rule can be modified, but they have not changed how the rule functions. I'm going to use the Five Minute rule as an example. The assembly says, when repealing rule, "this rule will not be binding." It does not say, "and we are going to handle debate this way" or "we are no longer going to use the Five Minute rule." The assembly has not said anything about what the assembly will do, in that instance, nor has it prohibited use of the Five Minute rule. It is clear that the Five Minute rule does not conflict with any adopted rule. Following the Five Minute rule also what the assembly has customarily done. The assembly has not changed anything about the length of debate itself; it has changed the method for extending or limiting debate, but it has not changed the actual length of debate. Perhaps this example of standing rule will work. A society has adopts a standing rule that "the thermostat be set at 68 degrees." The rule violates no other rule of the asembly. The thermostat is set at 68 degrees, in accordance with the rule. After three sessions the rule "the thermostat be set at 68 degrees," is properly rescinded. No other rule dealing with the thermostat has been adopted. What is the temperature set at? My answer is 68 degrees.

I think you missed something. Jodi made no claim that this person had not attended two meetings. The exact quote is: Additionally, this person has not attended any member meetings since becoming a Candidate member. (Emphasis added)

First, if any of those sources conflict with the bylaws, the bylaws prevail. The bylaws give criteria for membership for this class of membership, and under #4 pp. 589-90, no from a lower source (at least internal to the society), can create criteria for membership. The person is eligible under that bylaw, if he meets the qualifications for being a member. In order to meet the criteria for being a member of this class, the quotes lists criteria, one of those is that the potential member has "attended at least two member meetings." You have indicated that he has not attended any meetings since becoming a candidate member. If the potential member has not attended two meetings in his life, he clearly is not eligible to be a member; there is no ambiguity in that. There is ambiguity on if this criteria means that the potential member must have attended the 2 meetings while his status was that of a candidate member or if he had to attend 2 meetings at some point in his life. That is ambiguous, and needs to be interpreted (p. 588, #1). You might be able to clear up that ambiguity by looking at the rest of the bylaws. It is up to the assembly to determine which interpretation should prevail. Either, based on the information provided, would be a reasonable interpretation.

Those are analogies. I do not believe that the assembly is capable, in a procedural sense, of making the decision in this case without making that decision by ballot, p. 413, ll. 1-4. If the assembly did not take some action, then nobody was elected. I would not agree with the premise that no one was elected.