Dan Honemann

First of all, I should have noted that this statement I had bolded assumes that a rule mandating cumulative voting protects a minority of a particular size, which is not the case. The examples I supplied illustrate that the vote necessary to suspend the rule mandating cumulative voting will vary depending on the number of members voting in the election. We wouldn't, because the fraction of members protected (1/5) is fixed and constitutes a minority of a particular size. It won't change no matter how many members vote on the main motion. I'm not sure I understand this question. Cumulative voting creates a right (of sorts) in a minority group whose size will vary depending upon the circumstances.

It is not possible to determine what vote will be needed for adoption of the motion to suspend the rules without knowing how many votes will be cast in the election. Suppose we assume that, under your scenario, all 120 members vote on the motion to suspend the rules. For this to be adopted, at least 105 will have to vote in the affirmative, which is 87.5% of the votes cast. A minority of 16 members are protected by the rule. Let's also assume, under my scenario, that all 120 members vote on the motion to suspend the rules. For this to be adopted, at least 118 will have to vote in the affirmative, which is 98.3% of the votes cast. A minority of 3 members are protected by the rule. The disparity is greater if fewer members vote on the motion to suspend. Suppose we assume that, under your scenario, 100 members vote on the motion to suspend the rules. For this to be adopted, at least 85 will have to vote in the affirmative (16 members are protected), which is 85% of the votes cast. Under my scenario, if 100 members vote on the motion to suspend the rules at least 98 will have to vote in the affirmative (3 members are protected), which is 98% of the votes cast.

I don't think that any of this is accurate, but let's just focus now on the assertion that the fraction will not change based on a change in the number of people voting. Suppose, in your original scenario, only 20 of the 120 members present vote in the election for the 4 seats on the committee. This means that 11 votes will be needed for adoption, and that a minimum of 3 members will need to vote for a candidate in order to ensure his election. This is 3/20 (15%) of the members voting, which is not the same fraction arrived by Mr. Martin when he assumed that all 120 of the members present vote. If Mr. Martin thinks I have gotten any of this wrong (I wouldn't be shocked if I have), I hope that he will so advise us.

None of this makes any sense. I agree that the rule can be suspended. The dispute concerns whether the second sentence of 25:2(7) is applicable. But isn't it true that this fraction will vary depending upon what assumption is made concerning how many of the members present will vote?

I honestly don't see any good reason why a rule mandating cumulative voting cannot be suspended. In this instance the rule is a special rule of order adopted pursuant to bylaw authority, without which it could not have been adopted. It is certainly a rule of order, and if it was in the bylaws it would be a bylaw in the nature of a rule of order. The real question, it seems to me, is whether a rule mandating cumulative voting is a rule "protecting a minority of a particular size" within the meaning of 25:2(7). In my simplistic view of things it is not. If I understand him correctly, Mr. Martin says that it is, since in any particular instance the minority being protected can be determined by application of a mathematical formula to be applied based upon an assumption. Dr. Kapur appears to object to the assumption being made. At least for now, I'll stick to my admittedly simplistic belief that "a minority of a particular size" refers to a certain fraction, such as one-fifth.

But Guest James seems to despair of ever arriving at that point.

Yes.

Which one is that?

Well when you do, please do so accurately and in context.

If there are four positions on the committee to be filed, all members retain the right to vote for up to four candidates of their choice. Nothing I have said implies otherwise.

No.

Suspension of the rule doesn't take away any individual member's right to vote. It takes away the right of all members to cast their votes in a certain manner. All members are still entitled to cast their votes for candidates of their choice.

A policy isn't really a policy if you don't have any way of knowing exactly what it says.

In this instance, suspending the rule takes away a "right" which itself violates a fundamental principle of parliamentary law. Its suspension remedies that situation.

Well, this isn't the first time we have failed to agree. 😃

I do not think that the rule in 46:43 protects "a minority of a particular size" as contemplated by the rule in 25:2(7). Yes, the rule you refer to in your initial post is a rule that can be suspended by a two-thirds vote. The rules may not be suspended in order to authorize cumulative voting.

I suppose the method for suspending this rule is the making and adoption of a motion to do so. The first question to be answered is whether or not the rule in the second sentence of 25:2(7) is applicable, and I think the answer to this question is no. A rule requiring a certain fraction of the votes cast for adoption, such as four-fifths, is a rule protecting a minority of a particular size. A rule authorizing or mandating cumulative voting is not.

In the general situation. Is a unanimous vote required?

Mr. Elsman, I have always understood your aversion to the adoption of an agenda at the outset of a regular meeting of an assembly which holds its regular meetings at least as often as quarterly and has adopted RONR as its parliamentary authority, but I can't understand why you think that adoption of an agenda might not prove helpful at the outset of a special meeting called to consider a number of differing items of business.

So what would you say is the vote required to suspend a rule requiring a three-fourths vote for the adoption of a particular motion?

Dr. Kapur, am I right in concluding that, in your opinion, the second sentence of 25:2(7) is inapplicable and a two thirds vote is required and is sufficient to suspend the special rule referred to in J.J.'s statement the facts?

Based upon the additional facts provided*, we are dealing here with a rule, apparently developed by the board with membership approval several years ago, purporting to confer a continuing power upon the board to remove officers elected by the general membership and expel members of the organization. As stated in 49:5, such a power can only be conferred upon the board by a bylaw provision. There is nothing in the bylaws which grants the membership the authority to adopt such a rule by anything other than a bylaw provision. Instead, the bylaws adopt, as the society's parliamentary authority, the "generally accepted and adopted Robert's Rules of Order", which I think it is fair to be taken as meaning the current edition of RONR, including the provisions of 49:5. As a consequence, I stand by my previous responses. In my opinion, the last sentence of the quoted APG is null and void. ----------------------- * It's worth noting that the additional facts provided show that our guest Hillary Kasarjian did a remarkably good job in initially summarizing the factual situation. It would be nice if this were more often the case in these forums.

Well, this is an interesting thought, but there is nothing at all in the facts provided that would even come close to indicating that this is what occurred.

The footnote to which you refer relates to the adoption of special rules of order, and has nothing whatsoever to do with adoption of rules conferring power or authority upon a subordinate board. We are here dealing with a rule purporting to confer powers upon a board, and this sort of rule is not a rule of order. The relevant rule is found in 49:5, which reads as follows (emphasis supplied): "A society has no executive board, nor can its officers act as a board, except as the bylaws may provide; and when so established, the board has only such power as is delegated to it by the bylaws or by vote of the society's assembly referring individual matters to it." We are not here dealing with a vote of this society's assembly referring an individual matter to its board. We are dealing here with a rule adopted, we are told, several years ago (presumably by the general membership), purporting to confer a continuing power upon the board to remove officers (presumably elected by the general membership) and expel members of the organization. As stated in 49:5, such a power can only be conferred upon the board by a bylaw provision.

This is what Mr. Martin posted several days ago in response to J.J.: "We are told the rule provides "that the Board can vote to remove the Officer and/or a General Member" and that "no bylaw exists regarding discipline." So far as RONR is concerned, authority to remove a general member rests with the society, not the board. If the membership elects the officers, then authority to remove officers rests with the general membership as well. I do not think a special rule of order would suffice to delegate this authority to the board - only a rule in the bylaws would be sufficient." This is absolutely correct. If your organization wishes to grant any such power to your board that your bylaws do not now grant it, this can only be done by amending your bylaws. It's really as simple as that.