56:68.2 does absurd include meaningless

[puzzling]

RONR 56:68.2 (Some principles of interpretation)

States:

"When a provision of the bylaws is suspecting to meanings, one of which which conflicts or renders absurd another provision, and the other meaning does not, the latter must be taken as the true meaning."

Now we have an provision that can have two meanings one of which renders another provision meaningless (not absurd) in one Interpretation. 

Can we then catagoricly state that the other (also reasonable) interpretation is the right one?

Or does this needs to be decided on a case by case basis?

 

 

 

[Josh Martin]

On 7/24/2023 at 4:56 AM, puzzling said:

RONR 56:68.2 (Some principles of interpretation)

States:

"When a provision of the bylaws is suspecting to meanings, one of which which conflicts or renders absurd another provision, and the other meaning does not, the latter must be taken as the true meaning."

Now we have an provision that can have two meanings one of which renders another provision meaningless (not absurd) in one Interpretation. 

Can we then catagoricly state that the other (also reasonable) interpretation is the right one?

Or does this needs to be decided on a case by case basis

I would generally suggest that including a meaningless provision in the bylaws is absurd, so yes, I would suggest that this principle is also applicable in cases where one interpretation renders the provision meaningless, and the other does not.

But the Principles of Interpretation are not hard and fast rules. Rather, they are guidelines for a society in interpreting the meaning of its own rules, which will require a careful review of the society's rules in their entirety, and it may well be that multiple Principles of Interpretation are applicable, some of which may point in different directions. So it is always the case in interpreting the bylaws that such matters need to be decided on a case by case basis.

[J. J.]

On 7/24/2023 at 5:56 AM, puzzling said:

RONR 56:68.2 (Some principles of interpretation)

States:

"When a provision of the bylaws is suspecting to meanings, one of which which conflicts or renders absurd another provision, and the other meaning does not, the latter must be taken as the true meaning."

Now we have an provision that can have two meanings one of which renders another provision meaningless (not absurd) in one Interpretation. 

Can we then catagoricly state that the other (also reasonable) interpretation is the right one?

Or does this needs to be decided on a case by case basis?

 

 

 

I think the rules on interpretation are, collectively, hard and fast rules.

In some cases, I would look at when the conflicting bylaw was adopted, if that can be determined.  23:6 b could also apply, effectively eliminating one of those provisions.