I count 30 places where RONR states "unless provided otherwise in the bylaws" ...

[Howard Roark]

... or some variant thereof.  Which leads to two questions:

1) Since that statement applies to everything in RONR, why does RONR not provide a single, overarching, general statement to that effect (similar to 2:18), prominently and perhaps on the same page as the "CITE THIS BOOK" page, and then eliminate these 30 individual statements?  Surely that would save a few pages, in total.

2) By qualifying only those 30 individual statements, it would appear that this qualification would not apply to anything else in RONR (thus conflicting with 2:18), per principle of interpretation 56:68(4):

"If the bylaws authorize certain things specifically, other things of the same class are thereby prohibited.  There is a presumption that nothing has been placed in the bylaws without some reason for it."

I'm looking for some wisdom from this august group!

Edited September 10, 2023 at 10:58 PM by Howard Roark

[Josh Martin]

On 9/10/2023 at 6:49 PM, Howard Roark said:

1) Since that statement applies to everything in RONR, why does RONR not provide a single, overarching, general statement to that effect (similar to 2:18), prominently and perhaps on the same page as the "CITE THIS BOOK" page, and then eliminate these 30 individual statements?  Surely that would save a few pages, in total.

Because what the general statement in 2:18 actually says is as follows:

"When a society or an assembly has adopted a particular parliamentary manual—such as this book—as its authority, the rules contained in that manual are binding upon it in all cases where they are not inconsistent with the bylaws (or constitution) of the body, any of its special rules of order, or any provisions of local, state, or national law applying to the particular type of organization." RONR (12th ed.) 2:18, emphasis added

"However, when the parliamentary authority is prescribed in the bylaws, and that authority states that a certain rule can be altered only by a provision in the bylaws, no special rule of order can supersede that rule." RONR (12th ed.) 2:16n5

That is, in the general case, the organization may supersede a rule in RONR by adopting a rule in the bylaws or by adopting a special rule of order. In certain circumstances, however, a rule is of such a fundamental nature that a special rule of order is insufficient, and a rule in the bylaws is required to supersede the rule. That is the reason why RONR states, in certain circumstances, "unless provided otherwise in the bylaws," or some variant thereof.

RONR is not suggesting that the bylaws cannot supersede other rules. As you correctly note, a rule in the bylaws may supersede any rule in the parliamentary authority, and there is a general statement to this effect in 2:12.

"Except for the corporate charter in an incorporated society, the bylaws (as the single, combination-type instrument is called in this book) comprise the highest body of rules in societies as normally established today. Such an instrument supersedes all other rules of the society, except the corporate charter, if there is one." RONR (12th ed.) 2:12

Edited September 10, 2023 at 11:10 PM by Josh Martin

[Howard Roark]

Thank you!  That clears it up for me.  So, any statement in RONR other than those 30 statements can be overridden by a Special Rule of Order, whereas those thirty require an actual bylaw to be overridden.  Makes sense!

Only remaining complexity that I can see is that, if any of those 30 statements are rules of order, overriding them would require placing rules of order into the bylaws. 

And bylaws that are clearly in the nature of rules of order can be suspended!

With the exceptions, of course, listed in §25.  I suppose the exceptions listed in §25 cover all of the applicable statements, making it airtight.  From what I have seen of RONR so far, I have confidence that they are.

Thanks again, Josh.

[Josh Martin]

On 9/10/2023 at 6:44 PM, Howard Roark said:

Only remaining complexity that I can see is that, if any of those 30 statements are rules of order, overriding them would require placing rules of order into the bylaws. 

And bylaws that are clearly in the nature of rules of order can be suspended!

With the exceptions, of course, listed in §25.  I suppose the exceptions listed in §25 cover all of the applicable statements, making it airtight.  From what I have seen of RONR so far, I have confidence that they are.

Yes, I think you have it right. While I have not made a comprehensive review of the statements in this regard, I am generally inclined to think that all (or at least most) of them cannot be suspended for one or more of the reasons listed in Section 25.

[puzzling]

I haven^t checked all instances where in RONR it says "unless provided otherwise in the bylaws" (do publish your list) but i presume that they are all so called "principles of parliamentary law" that cannot be overruled by (mere) special rules of order. 

Because an organisation in their bylaws can put whatever the organisation wants to put in them, the bylaws can (at their own risk) also overrule these principles 

[J. J.]

On 9/11/2023 at 2:45 PM, puzzling said:

I haven^t checked all instances where in RONR it says "unless provided otherwise in the bylaws" (do publish your list) but i presume that they are all so called "principles of parliamentary law" that cannot be overruled by (mere) special rules of order. 

Because an organisation in their bylaws can put whatever the organisation wants to put in them, the bylaws can (at their own risk) also overrule these principles 

I would not make that presumption.  The classic example the "fundamental principle of parliamentary law" that only one subject can be considered at one time.  That would not have to  be in the bylaws. 

[puzzling]

On 9/11/2023 at 11:54 PM, J. J. said:

I would not make that presumption.  The classic example the "fundamental principle of parliamentary law" that only one subject can be considered at one time.  That would not have to  be in the bylaws. 

Good point, think this is one place where it is missing.

I think the principle that only one subject can be concidered at one time is guaranteed by the right of individual members to demand division of a motion (RONR 27:10-11) this section doesn't mention that this right can only be removed by the bylaws, but does that make this rule/right removable by a special rule of order?

[J. J.]

On 9/12/2023 at 4:43 AM, puzzling said:

Good point, think this is one place where it is missing.

I think the principle that only one subject can be concidered at one time is guaranteed by the right of individual members to demand division of a motion (RONR 27:10-11) this section doesn't mention that this right can only be removed by the bylaws, but does that make this rule/right removable by a special rule of order?

I was thinking of a consent calendar; by its nature, the assembly is considering two or more main motions at the same time. It effectively, supersedes the fundamental principle. Conceivably, a special rule could make something more difficult to add to, or remove from, the consent calendar.

For Howard Roark's and your reference, you might want to read "Parliamentary Authorities’ Rule Shift Function," Parliamentary Journal, January 2005.  I do not recall who wrote it, but it may have been John Galt.  

[Howard Roark]

On 9/12/2023 at 9:04 AM, J. J. said:

For Howard Roark's and your reference, you might want to read "Parliamentary Authorities’ Rule Shift Function," Parliamentary Journal, January 2005.  I do not recall who wrote it, but it may have been John Galt.  

Who is John Galt?

[Dan Honemann]

On 9/12/2023 at 12:04 PM, J. J. said:

I was thinking of a consent calendar; by its nature, the assembly is considering two or more main motions at the same time. It effectively, supersedes the fundamental principle. Conceivably, a special rule could make something more difficult to add to, or remove from, the consent calendar.

Yes, it is certainly true that a special rule of order may provide for consideration in gross of all motions on a consent calendar, but this, in effect, results in these motions being considered in gross under a single enacting motion much the same as is described in RONR (12th ed.) 10:25, thus resulting in no violation of the rule that only one question can be considered at a time.

"The special rule of order establishing a consent calendar may provide that, when the matters on the calendar are called up, they may be considered in gross or without debate or amendment. Otherwise, they are considered under the rules just as any other business, in which case the 'consent' relates only to permitting the matter to be on the calendar for consideration without conforming to the usual, more onerous, rules for reaching measures in the body."   RONR (12th ed.) 41:32

 

[J. J.]

On 9/13/2023 at 6:51 AM, Dan Honemann said:

Yes, it is certainly true that a special rule of order may provide for consideration in gross of all motions on a consent calendar, but this, in effect, results in these motions being considered in gross under a single enacting motion much the same as is described in RONR (12th ed.) 10:25, thus resulting in no violation of the rule that only one question can be considered at a time.

"The special rule of order establishing a consent calendar may provide that, when the matters on the calendar are called up, they may be considered in gross or without debate or amendment. Otherwise, they are considered under the rules just as any other business, in which case the 'consent' relates only to permitting the matter to be on the calendar for consideration without conforming to the usual, more onerous, rules for reaching measures in the body."   RONR (12th ed.) 41:32

 

I think that 10:25 would violate the fundamental principle, hence the singular objection to prevent it.

Is there anything in RONR that would prevent the society from adopting a special that required more than one objection? 

[Dan Honemann]

On 9/13/2023 at 8:42 PM, J. J. said:

I think that 10:25 would violate the fundamental principle, hence the singular objection to prevent it.

There is nothing in 10:25 that conflicts with any fundamental principle of parliamentary law.  It refers to the making and consideration of a "single main motion", and yes, the rules relating to division of a question found in 27:1-15 may come into play, just the same as they do for any main motion.

On 9/13/2023 at 8:42 PM, J. J. said:

Is there anything in RONR that would prevent the society from adopting a special that required more than one objection? 

If you are referring here to the adoption of a special rule of order which conflicts in some way with the rules found in 27:10-11, I can't at the moment think of anything that would prevent the adoption of such a rule.