J. J.

After Rob's comment, I am not sure that any on the other comments answer the OP's question.

I am not certain what you mean. The bylaw or special rule create the situation where something is referred to a standing committee. For example, if a bylaw or special rule said that a standing committee would "decide cases involving alleged violations of the bylaws," that committee would have the full authority to decide any claim that the bylaws were being violated. The parameter is established in the bylaw or special rule.

That was one of my problems with the answer.

How would that be different from the chair making a motion? Further, how would be it be properly minuted?

I agree with your initial interpretation and the need for clarification.

Does your CAO take the minutes?

To follow up on Mr. Katz's comment, it could violate the bylaws, in theory. If the bylaws of the society forbade the members from expressing an opinion, the censure may express that opinion, and be out of order.

It, depending on the circumstances, may be an original main motion or an incidental main motion (10:3-10:5).

2:12, sorry. No. By adopting a bylaw, no matter what its "nature," the assembly has agreed to be bound by that bylaw. That bylaw may provide for its own suspension, but a lesser rule cannot. Adopting a rule in the bylaws that permits the suspension of a certain class of rules is permissible. Adopt a rule that is below the bylaws cannot change a rule, even for a fleeting period, in the bylaws. You have claimed, "the suspensibility of rules in the nature of rules of order applies to both SROs and bylaws." So far, there has been nothing to support that claim, except the canon of Robert, and even then, there is support it did not, initially, apply to rules in the nature of a rule of order in a constitution.

Since this is a question of bylaws, why then is Cushing relevant? You cited it. Keep in mind that this is not a question of if an adopted special rule, below the level of a bylaw, can be suspended. It is not a question of if a bylaw may provide for its own suspension. It is a question of if an adopted special rule can supersede a bylaw. 2:13 would indicate that it cannot. That is the problem.

Which has no bearing on the issue. Gen. Robert gave an example of a rule of the nature of a rule of order in the constitution, and then said it could not be suspended.

That does not deal with bylaws, but the suspension of a special rule, as stated. Even the claim that ROR indicates that a constitution should not contain rules in the nature of a rule of order is in error. ROR clearly notes that a constitution should provide for its own amendment; that is a rule in the nature of a rule of order. Yet Section 67 notes, "Nothing should be placed in the constitution that may be suspended, except in the case of requiring elections of officers to be by ballot, in which case the requirement may be qualified so as to allow the ballot to be dispensed with by a unanimous vote when there is but one candidate for the office."

Would you care to cite where that is. I have not found any that says that prior RO (1876) nor any in works that have been published in the last 60 years. (There is one that was published after 1915, but it was not published within the last 70 years.)

"A codification," not "the codification." There are variations and this may be one of them. I prefer the term "general parliamentary law," as "common parliamentary law" is too easily confused with "common law." RONR provides that the bylaws supersede all lower ranking rules (2:12); that is probably an embodiment of the general parliamentary law. An adopted rule, outside of those bylaws, cannot supersede, even for a few seconds, those bylaws. A rule stating that a bylaw can be suspended cannot be a rule superseded by the bylaws; it would have to be one incorporated in the bylaws. An adopted rule, outside of the bylaws, could possibly be suspended; that is consistent with Cushing. That, however, is not the issue.

I do not agree that RONR is the "common parliamentary law" is US, as pp. xxix-xxx indicates. RONR, correctly, does not make that claim. RONR may correspond to the "common parliamentary law" on some points and certainly contributes to it. That said, it is a function of a bylaw that some of its provisions may provide for the own suspension by the assembly. By incorporating RONR into the bylaws provides for that self suspension of rules considered to be "in the nature of rules of order." The incorporation makes RONR part of the bylaws. When a society does not incorporate RONR into the bylaws, there is no self suspension in the bylaws, except for any that the society has placed in the bylaws.

Let's, however, be clear about this. 2:12 says that the bylaws "...supersede all other rules of the society, except the corporate charter (2:12)." That applies to RONR as well. If a rule of order, adopted as such, conflicts with the bylaws, the rule of order is superseded. The assembly could not adopt a valid rule of order that would violate the bylaws, even if its effect would be ended before the end of the session. It is not a question of if the assembly can adopt a rule of order or a parliamentary authority by motion. It is a question of if that motion can violate the bylaws.

Page 267 of ROR only deals rules within the bylaws. 265 clearly refers to a constitution and does not permit suspension, except for a rule in the constitution permitting its own suspension. Cushing does not even deal with bylaws, by your own admission. A manual may be widely used, but, based on Gen. Robert's belief, that would not establish it as the amorphous general parliamentary law (RONR, 12th ed, xli). Do not, however, think that I regard RONR's divergence from the general parliamentary law as a bad thing; I take an opposite view. The answer to my question is that there is no additional source, currently, that would indicate that rule within the bylaws may be suspended, except if the bylaw provides for its own suspension. So, could a special rule supersede something in the bylaws? No.

However, ROR (1915) does not permit rules in the constitution to be suspended. You have pretty much made Mr. McClintock's case. Again, I ask you, apart from RONR, is there any source that currently indicates that rules in the nature of rules of order in the bylaws may be suspended?

Cushing makes it clear that the assembly can adopt its own special rules, which will supersede any "common parliamentary law" rule. The "general code" is very clearly not a constitution or bylaws; the latter did exist in the 1840's in legislative bodied and, as today, was considered a limitation on the body. That is a fact, that is seen, even today, and even in RONR 12th ed, that you keep ignoring. Even ROR (1915) notes that nothing in the constitution of the society should be suspendable, unless the rule provides for its own suspension (Sec 67 p. 265); so, Mr. Honemann, there not a general principle that any rule in the nature of a rule of order could be suspended. If we need to answer the question of if this is part of the general parliamentary law, that should answer it. In the case where RONR is established in the bylaws, there is permission granted to suspend rules in the nature of order included in the bylaws. As we have seen in a few organizations, the framers may include a clause in the bylaws removing that ability to suspend. 2:12 provides that bylaws (excepting a corporate charter or constitution) is the highest body of rules. 2:13 provides that these bylaws place limits on the assembly. Unless RONR is adopted (without removing that ability), the assembly is limited to follow those rules in the bylaws that are in the nature of a rule of order. If we all were to assume that there is a general parliamentary law principle that rules in the nature of a rule of order could be suspended, that still would not answer the question. You would have to show, in addition, that the general parliamentary law, or rule of order adopted apart from the bylaws, can supersede those bylaws. So far, you have not done so.

I do not see any support for that, even in Cushing. Cushing wrote a legislative manual, in the context of an assembly subject to the limitations of a (state) constitution. He does not use the words "by-law" or "bylaw." I see nothing that would indicate that "understand." I would not that, under the jurisprudence, a state constitution was considered a limitation on the rights of the assembly, i.e. anything not prohibited by that constitution was permitted (we will leave the role of the US Constitionion out of it for the moment). While I question the relevance of Cushing in 2023, I will note he wrote in his Author's Statement: "Members of legislative bodies, who may have occasion to make use of this work, will do well to bear in mind, that it contains only what may be called the common parliamentary law; which, in every legislative assembly, is more or less modified or controlled by special rules." That would indicate very strongly that the assembly could adopt even a special rule removing its own ability to suspend the rules, even if that suspension was agreed to by a fully unanimous vote (though such a rule could be amended). Let me be clear on one point, again. I do not necessarily agree with Mr. McClintock that there is a principle within the general parliamentary law that says, directly at least, that no rules in the nature of order in the bylaws may be suspended. I do not necessarily disagreeing with Mr. Martin that there may not by a prohibition in general parliamentary law on suspending rules in the nature of order in the bylaws. I am saying that in either case, the answer is relevant to if the society may adopt a special rule (or set of rules) that violates the bylaws, and that a society could not rely on the nebulous general parliamentary law to permit that.

There is a rather specific point that two posters made: I am not suggesting that there is a general (or common) parliamentary law principle "that bylaws absolutely cannot be suspended," or that there is not one. I am suggesting that an adopted rule outside of the bylaws (or constitution) cannot conflict, or permit a conflict, with the bylaws. Within RONR, that would be expressed within 2:13 and the very first line of 2:16. I think that this is part of the general parliamentary law.

Mr. Honemann, you cited Cushing's statement: "The great purpose of all rules and forms, is to subserve the will of the assembly rather than to restrain it; to facilitate, and not to obstruct, the expression of their deliberate sense." I do not agree that this statement would apply to bylaws. 2:13 indicates that bylaws limit the assembly.

Bylaws are, by their nature, are limitations on the powers of an assembly. RONR 12th ed. says so, in so many words.

10:26 disagrees. There you see a bylaw prohibiting a motion from being introduced. 2:13 indicates that the bylaws place "limitations" on the powers of the assembly.

Not when it concerns bylaws. Bylaws, generally serve as a limitation on a society (and its assembly); they act to prohibit certain actions. That was certainly the context that Cushing was dealing with in terms of state legislatures, i.e. the concept of the "sovereign state." While the principle exists today, it was much stronger prior to 1865. In the abstract, I see bylaws as a contract and one that may only be modified by the assembly going through the process of amendment. The body may temporarily suspend elements in the contract, but only by those terms within the contract.