Joshua Katz

Well, at least we've clarified exactly where we disagree.

I think adjourning a particular meeting is probably enough to make this work for me. Thanks.

This seems to me to say the opposite of what you're claiming. It says that authorization is needed, which puts us right back at - who is permitted to give such authorization? This makes more sense to me. However, a hypothetical or two: could a board, which the bylaws do not grant any power to delegate, authorize someone (anyone, it doesn't matter) to decide when its meetings are adjourned? Certainly the power to adjourn a meeting is an intrinsic power by this definition. How about authorizing the chair to decide when a motion should be referred to committee?

Well, at least we agree on that last point. It follows from your argument, then, that if a person votes for more candidates than there are positions, the ballot is counted towards a majority, but none of the preferences are counted. Is that right? Which is why, as I see it, p. 441 provides that what person can cast is one ballot. It's clarifying how "one person, one vote" applies in the case of electing multiple positions. It seems your position would entail that an assembly would not be permitted to adopt the form of approval voting I described unless it did so in its bylaws, since you seem to think it would violate the "one person, one vote" principle. Is that right?

I will add that the answer given, although it seems right to me, feels wrong to me. I would like to see a fleshed-out argument for why it's wrong, perhaps incorporating Mr. Martin's references to intrinsic powers.

I tentatively agree.

Possibly because its members think the authors of RONRIB got that wrong, and only that wrong?

Okay, if you do that, I'm sure what I'd do.

I think applying the language on p. 416 in this case is question-begging. It says "a ballot that contains votes for too many candidates for a given office is counted as one illegal vote cast for that office, because it is not possible for the tellers to determine which candidate(s) the voter prefers." The reason here implies that such a ballot is illegal where all the votes cast cannot count, and that that is what it means by "too many." But here, the question just is how many is too many, in that sense. For one position, the answer is clear. But where there are multiple offices, I don't think it's clear, and I would apply the more specific rule on p. 441 to conclude that all 4 votes are counted - i.e., when multiple identical positions are elected, the default is approval voting except that a majority is required.

You raise a good point as to whether the positions are actually identical, i.e. term length. Assuming the terms are the same, though, I disagree with this. "[E]very ballot with a vote for one or more candidates is counted as one vote cast, and a candidate must receive a majority of the total of such votes to be elected." A ballot with a vote for four candidates is a ballot with a vote for one or more candidates, and is counted as one vote cast.

Do your bylaws specify this procedure? It is not the procedure in RONR. Unless your bylaws say otherwise, or you adopt another permissible method by motion, neither is correct. The RONR procedure for electing multiple identical positions is to allow voters to vote for as many as they choose, even more than the seats to be filled. The winners will be those with the most votes whose votes are a majority of the ballots cast. If there are not enough winners meeting that description, you declare those elected who do fit the description, and vote again on all the remaining candidates. See p. 441, ll. 11-21. If RONR is your parliamentary authority, then by reference they say you need a majority to elect a candidate. A run-off is improper, see page 437, ll. 18-30, especially ll. 23-25. There are permissible ways, although, as the book says, the practice is "unfortunate and should be discouraged." Once people see the results, it is quite possible that they will unite around someone who had less support at the beginning as a compromise candidate.

If the bylaws said that, I can't say I'm sure how I'd rule on a conflict.

Not under RONR. You may have applicable laws, particularly if a public body.

What do your bylaws say about amending them?

I don't have the book in front of me, but doesn't the 11th edition state (as do previous editions, if I remember correctly) that it supersedes previous editions, and adoption of those previous editions is adoption of the latest? Yes, it says that. I like having my actions reinterpreted by a book about as much as I like my computer instructing me that it's busy updating Windows and I'm not allowed to turn it off.

How about if I want to adopt the 10th, or In Brief?

I thought I understood the story, until I came to this part, which seems not to make sense to me. To borrow from Mr. Mervosh above, X appears to be blocking the installation under zoning laws. (I'm not dealing with any legal issues, which may exist.) Rescinding X, then, seems to be good for the shelter. But now we're told that the council only rescinded X because people who support X knew about an apparent delaying tactic. I don't see how that's possible, so I must be misreading something. Other than that, I agree with Mr. Mervosh. Whatever happened with the mayor's motions (in theory, the chair shouldn't be making motions unless small board rules are used, but it is still his right if he is a member), it doesn't appear to have impacted anything, since the motion to rescind still was adopted. The mayor's motions probably should have been in the form of a motion to commit, and it's possible that their adoption should have prevented the council from taking further action, but it is too late to object to that anyway.

The sort of context provided in the last post is, I think, a good chunk of why it's not fruitful for us to try to interpret bylaw provisions - we don't know the rest of the structure, we don't know the organization, etc.

Not that page particularly, just statements along the lines of "efforts to adopt some other book mean adopting this book."

Are all intrinsic powers delegatable?

Well, I just have to live with it I guess, but this is one of those things in the book that really annoys me.

I think the best argument for this position, on these facts, is the principle that giving permission implies forbidding other things of like kind. But if we apply that logic, not only can't the President appoint, but neither can the Board or the EC. They'd all need to go to the general membership to fill their committees. That seems like a strange interpretation. So I tend to agree with GWCTD:

I'm just guessing, but this sounds like a board. If so, doesn't the answer here depend on whether or not the bylaws allow the board to delegate its powers?

I don't know. The tax code gets away with "ordinary and necessary." (Which, of course, means helpful. Meanwhile, "convenience of the employer" means business necessity.)

Why is it vacant? What do your bylaws say about filling vacancies? Most likely, it should not be vacant, since the vice-chair should have assumed the position (but there would then be a vice-chair vacancy). In any case, it will depend on what your bylaws say about it, and we might be able to help to some extent if you give the exact language for filling vacancies. The item would necessarily need to be included in the call to the meeting, since special meetings are limited to those topics in the call.