J. J.

No, because the assembly is authorized to set annual dues.

Respectfully, the issue is on how this rule conflicts with the bylaws, with the presumption that the bylaws are otherwise silent on the issue. Can you elaborate on how this rule does conflict with this bylaw? That is the problem that I, and I think a number of others, are having with the premise. I would certainly agree that the 3% per year increase could be ended by following the process in the bylaws.

It may be inflammatory, but it is accurate. I have seen instances where some person insisted that a particular phrase authorizing some action was in the bylaws. No such phrase existed after both a detailed study of the bylaws and a document search. That was not the only case. Just to be clear, I am not referring to this particular instance.

I am seeing nothing in this quote that indicates that the dues amount much be reauthorized each year. Because a motion generally remains in force until rescinded (see p. 111, especially the footnote), a hypothetical motion "that the dues be set at $50.00 per year" adopted in 2012 would remain in effect today, unless that motion was rescinded or amended as something previously adopted. I would find nothing out of order about a hypothetical motion being adopted in 2012 "that the dues be set at $50.00 in 2013 and increased to $75.00 beginning in 2015." This effectively, specifies the time when the effect of setting $50.00 dues per year, and replaces it with another amount. We see this effect in relation to provisos, where one effect begins sometime after the proviso is adopted (p. 597). I think that there is general agreement that a proviso could apply to a main motion. I would see nothing out of order with a motion setting a 3% annual increase anymore than I would with a motion that said, "that the dues be set at $50.00 for 2012, $51.50 in 2013, $53.05 in 2014, $54.16 in 2015, $56.28 in 2017, ..." ending at a distant time in the future. If this is all that the bylaws say, then the members at a meeting may adopt a change in the dues as provided in this compact. Assuming that board submitted a recommendation, that proper notice was given to the adoption of this recommendation and, finally, that the vote was by a secret method (e.g. ballot). I see no violation of the bylaws, at least in regard to the quoted passage, by adopting a 3% annual dues increase.

The first one is very clearly a rule in the nature of a rule of order as it deals with the transaction of business within a meeting (p. 15, ll. 9-11). An order of business is specifically mentioned as something that is a rule in the nature of a rule of order (p. 16, ll. 7-9). Likewise, the setting of a vote threshold deals with the transaction of business within a meeting. That is a rule in the nature of a rule of order as well.

Setting the legality, the motion might be in order, if such a motion was clear to all members (and the secretary) and/or was written, especially the latter. Reading a long motion, perhaps pages, could be skipped, without objection (p. 33, ll. 31-33). That would not remove the secretary's duty of including the motion in the minutes, as appropriate, verbatim. Nor would this prohibit any member of this board from demanding that the motion be read prior to it being put to a vote (p. 299, ll. 4-8).

Did the voting take place at a meeting?

The voter, in order to identify how he votes, could be required to sign his ballot in the presence of the secretary, or somehow publicly verify how he voted. That would prevent me from signing the name "Shmuel Gerber," or saying that I voted no when I voted yes. It might be advisable for Mr. Greenberg to see the article "On the Record," National Parliamentarian, Fourth Quarter 2000. I do not have a digital copy, but one could be gotten from the National Association of Parliamentarians. I think it covers the very legitimate situation issue you are raising.

The only thing that I think could possibly create a problem is if there was a special rule requiring the ballots to be "official" to be credited.

The questioner said " since it was presented to the department ahead of time," so that may not apply. Yes, if notice was required by the bylaws, it would be null and void. There is a possibility of using a majority of the entire membership in some cases. Say hello to the condors for me.

Unless the vote was by ballot, or required to be by ballot, it sounds like it is too late to raise a point of order.

I think it should be treated like an election, at least if the motion is adopted with a blank; that would include the possibility of reopening suggestions. However, the 11th edition does not say that.

Who elected the vice president? Does the vice president have to be a board member?

If you are asking the general question, "Can a person be eligible to run for election and become a director on our Co-op board if they do not meet the eligibility requirements for office as expressed in our bylaws or superior rules," the answer is no (p. 445, ll. 19-22). The question will be if someone runs or is elected a director is, in fact, ineligible. That second question is one that your organization will have to answer.

Or, you could just contact the author, who would happy to send you the text.

Usually. I'm not hanging out with J. J. that much anymore.

As I've indicated, this could be a bylaw interpretation question. It would be better to amend the bylaws to state if this a matter of "continuing eligibility" or a requirement at election. I hate giving the bylaw interpretation answer, but it often is.

And I.

Agreeing with you, I would note that some, if not most, of those types of hearing are governed by RONR.

I found it. Precedent and RONR, National Parliamentarian, Third Quarter 2012. I'm sorry, but my memory is going. Edit: I am attaching a copy because it sounds so much like this thread. NP 31.doc

If it were found that the motion electing the officer was still in effect them a point of order could be raised based on p. 445, ll. 19-22. I would refer you to a paper, but I forget which that it is.

Could the board go into executive session and exclude everyone who is not a voting member? (Obviously, this assumes that there is no bylaw or higher provision to the contrary.)

That will largely depend on what the bylaws say, and very possibly will be a question of bylaw interpretation. I can see a situation where the assembly may properly determine that someone is ineligible to hold office, by a point of order, and that there is no incumbent in that office. It could then either complete the election or fill the vacancy, as appropriate. Most bylaws do not include a clause that an incumbent who is dead is no longer in office, but there is no question that, absent a bylaw to the contrary, that the office is vacant. The second footnote on page 654, does indicate that a member who is also an officer,being removed from membership (via disciplinary action) is "necessarily" removed from office if an officer is required to be a member as a condition of eligibility to hold that office. It can be looked at, possibly, as a motion, "That X be elected chief," is now a motion that violates the bylaws. If that motion is not in force, filling the vacancy, would not be the adoption of a main motion conflicting with one still in force (p. 445, ll. 19-25)." There may be a lot of questions on if something violates the bylaws or not, or even if that would effect eligibility at this point in time. Perhaps another question that should be asked is what happens when a previously adopted main motion becomes one in violation of the bylaws? It was clearly in order when adopted, but it now violates the bylaws.

The bylaws would create that other method. Certainly they could, though whether or not do in this case is questionable.

Would not the bylaws superseded this? If the bylaws say, in effect, an officer shall cease to be an officer when this commission is met, why would rescission or disciplinary action be needed?