Rules' Self-Suspendability?

[TheGrandRascal]

RONR-12th 2:23: "Rules that have any application outside a meeting context... cannot be suspended."

PART ONE:

Hmmm. Why so absolute? Must we infer that any appended "suspension clause" is therefore null and void? Consider the following hypothetical rule:

"Resolved, That members shall park their cars in the parking lot and not on the street fronting the meeting hall. Any cars so parked will be towed. This rule may be suspended, in a particular instance and for the benefit of a particular member, by a two-thirds vote."

The parking of cars is most definitely outside a meeting context! But at the same time, the Assembly might wish to make an exception in the case of a member with good reason to "mis-park." Are we then to conclude that the clause embodied in this rule's last sentence is invalid?

PART TWO:

I also ponder the opposite case: can an otherwise suspendable rule, declare itself to be unsuspendable? Consider the following hypothetical bylaw provision:

"The President shall appoint the chairmen and members of all standing committees. This rule may not be suspended."

As unwise as such a rule is (I myself would most VIGOROUSLY oppose ANY inclusion of that last sentence! Yeesh!), would such a clause actually be binding?

Edited February 5, 2021 at 12:00 PM by TheGrandRascal

[Richard Brown]

16 minutes ago, TheGrandRascal said:

RONR-12th 2:23: "Rules that have any application outside a meeting context... cannot be suspended."

PART ONE:

Hmmm. Why so absolute? Must we infer that any appended "suspension clause" is therefore null and void? Consider the following hypothetical rule:

"Resolved, That members shall park their cars in the parking lot and not on the street fronting the meeting hall. Any cars so parked will be towed. This rule may be suspended, in a particular instance and for the benefit of a particular member, by a two-thirds vote."

The parking of cars is most definitely outside a meeting context! But at the same time, the Assembly might wish to make an exception in the case of a member with good reason to "mis-park." Are we then to conclude that the clause embodied in this rule's last sentence is invalid?

PART TWO:

I also ponder the opposite case: can an otherwise suspendable rule, declare itself to be unsuspendable? Consider the following hypothetical bylaw provision:

"The President shall appoint the chairmen and members of all standing committees. This rule may not be suspended."

As unwise as such a rule is (I myself would most VIGOROUSLY oppose ANY inclusion of that last sentence! Yeesh!), would such a clause actually be binding?

In my opinion, the first rule, about parking, may be suspended because the rule itself provides for its suspension. That will trump any contrary provision in RONR.

As to the second rule, which is a bylaw provision, I do not believe that is a rule of order because it has to do with the power and authority of an officer. It is not in the nature of a rule of order and therefore would not be suspendable even without the provision saying it cannot be suspended.

[TheGrandRascal]

15 minutes ago, Richard Brown said:

"...As to the second rule, which is a bylaw provision, I do not believe that is a rule of order because it has to do with the power and authority of an officer. It is not in the nature of a rule of order and therefore would not be suspendable even without the provision saying it cannot be suspended."

 O.K., so supposing a rule within the bylaws is in the nature of a rule of order, and concludes with, "This rule may not be suspended."

What then?

[Richard Brown]

1 minute ago, TheGrandRascal said:

 O.K., so supposing a rule within the bylaws is in the nature of a rule of order, and concludes with, "This rule may not be suspended."

What then?

If such a rule says that it may not be suspended then it may not be suspended.

[Josh Martin]

12 hours ago, TheGrandRascal said:

RONR-12th 2:23: "Rules that have any application outside a meeting context... cannot be suspended."

PART ONE:

Hmmm. Why so absolute? Must we infer that any appended "suspension clause" is therefore null and void? Consider the following hypothetical rule:

"Resolved, That members shall park their cars in the parking lot and not on the street fronting the meeting hall. Any cars so parked will be towed. This rule may be suspended, in a particular instance and for the benefit of a particular member, by a two-thirds vote."

The parking of cars is most definitely outside a meeting context! But at the same time, the Assembly might wish to make an exception in the case of a member with good reason to "mis-park." Are we then to conclude that the clause embodied in this rule's last sentence is invalid?

PART TWO:

I also ponder the opposite case: can an otherwise suspendable rule, declare itself to be unsuspendable? Consider the following hypothetical bylaw provision:

"The President shall appoint the chairmen and members of all standing committees. This rule may not be suspended."

As unwise as such a rule is (I myself would most VIGOROUSLY oppose ANY inclusion of that last sentence! Yeesh!), would such a clause actually be binding?

If a rule says that it can be suspended, even though the rule otherwise could not be suspended, then it cannot be suspended.

Conversely, if a rule says that it cannot be suspended, even though the rule otherwise could be suspended, then it cannot be suspended. The rule could, however, be amended through the appropriate procedures to do so.

A rule that the President shall appoint the chairmen and members of all standing committees already cannot be suspended (unless the rule provides for its suspension).

"When the bylaws provide that the president shall appoint all committees, this power does not transfer to the chair if someone else presides. A clause in the bylaws assigning to the president the duty of appointing all committees should therefore contain appropriate provision for its own suspension if necessary (for example, if there is occasion to appoint a special committee during a meeting from which the president is absent)." RONR (12th ed.) 50:13

Edited February 6, 2021 at 12:54 AM by Josh Martin

[J. J.]

Disagreeing with my colleague, Mr. Brown, I think that the second rule is a rule in the nature of a rule of order.  Standing committees can be created by a rule of order (50.8).  It follows that a rule regarding the details of how a committee can be formed is a rule in the nature of a rule of order.  The application would be that, during a meeting, a motion "to suspend the rules and appoint ____ as chairman of Standing Committee A," would be in order normally in order.  The clause, This rule may not be suspended,"  makes this rule unable to be suspended. 

[Josh Martin]

7 minutes ago, J. J. said:

Disagreeing with my colleague, Mr. Brown, I think that the second rule is a rule in the nature of a rule of order.  Standing committees can be created by a rule of order (50.8).  It follows that a rule regarding the details of how a committee can be formed is a rule in the nature of a rule of order.  The application would be that, during a meeting, a motion "to suspend the rules and appoint ____ as chairman of Standing Committee A," would be in order normally in order.

I don't find this persuasive, given the following language.

"When the bylaws provide that the president shall appoint all committees, this power does not transfer to the chair if someone else presides. A clause in the bylaws assigning to the president the duty of appointing all committees should therefore contain appropriate provision for its own suspension if necessary (for example, if there is occasion to appoint a special committee during a meeting from which the president is absent)." RONR (12th ed.) 50:13

"First, the motion to Suspend the Rules applies only when “an assembly wishes to do something during a meeting that it cannot do without violating one or more of its regular rules.” RONR (10th ed.), p. 252, l. 7-9 (emphasis added); see also p. xxii. Rules of order “relate to the orderly transaction of business in meetings and to the duties of officers in that connection.” RONR (10th ed.), p. 15, l. 5-7 (emphasis added). Consequently, Suspend the Rules cannot be used to remove from the president (even temporarily) any of her administrative duties — those related to the role of an executive officer that are distinct from the function of presiding over the assembly at its meetings." Official Interpretation 2006-2

The rules may not be suspended to deprive the President of the authority to appoint committees (unless the rule provides for its suspension), since this authority does not derive from the President's function of presiding over the assembly at its meetings.

Edited February 5, 2021 at 08:07 PM by Josh Martin

[J. J.]

1 hour ago, Josh Martin said:

I don't find this persuasive, given the following language.

"When the bylaws provide that the president shall appoint all committees, this power does not transfer to the chair if someone else presides. A clause in the bylaws assigning to the president the duty of appointing all committees should therefore contain appropriate provision for its own suspension if necessary (for example, if there is occasion to appoint a special committee during a meeting from which the president is absent)." RONR (12th ed.) 50:13

"First, the motion to Suspend the Rules applies only when “an assembly wishes to do something during a meeting that it cannot do without violating one or more of its regular rules.” RONR (10th ed.), p. 252, l. 7-9 (emphasis added); see also p. xxii. Rules of order “relate to the orderly transaction of business in meetings and to the duties of officers in that connection.” RONR (10th ed.), p. 15, l. 5-7 (emphasis added). Consequently, Suspend the Rules cannot be used to remove from the president (even temporarily) any of her administrative duties — those related to the role of an executive officer that are distinct from the function of presiding over the assembly at its meetings." Official Interpretation 2006-2

The rules may not be suspended to deprive the President of the authority to appoint committees (unless the rule provides for its suspension), since this authority does not derive from the President's function of presiding over the assembly at its meetings.

While the ability to appoint committees is not transferable to a temporary chair, but that says nothing about the ability of the assembly to suspend the rules.

To an extent, this does refer to a function within the meeting, e.g. the names must be announced at a meeting (50.13).  That requirement makes that business transacted within the meeting.  By a 2/3 vote, the assembly could require someone to be on a committee or prohibit someone, by preventing the naming.  Nothing would prevent the chair, in the second case at least, from appointing and naming the same individual that was rejected.

[Josh Martin]

12 minutes ago, J. J. said:

While the ability to appoint committees is not transferable to a temporary chair, but that says nothing about the ability of the assembly to suspend the rules.

Okay, but what about the sentence which provides "A clause in the bylaws assigning to the president the duty of appointing all committees should therefore contain appropriate provision for its own suspension if necessary (for example, if there is occasion to appoint a special committee during a meeting from which the president is absent)." RONR (12th ed.) 50:13

If it was already in order to suspend such a rule, this sentence doesn't make a whole lot of sense.

12 minutes ago, J. J. said:

To an extent, this does refer to a function within the meeting, e.g. the names must be announced at a meeting (50.13).

Where does it say that?

RONR provides that "When the chair appoints a committee, no vote is taken on the appointees, except any who are not members of the assembly in cases where there is no prior authorization for the chair to appoint non–assembly members to the committee—either in the bylaws or in a motion directing the appointment of the particular committee (see also 13:15, 56:46). But the chair must announce the names of the committee members to the assembly, naming the chairman of the committee first, as in (c) above; and until such announcement is made the committee cannot act." RONR (12th ed.) 50:13, emphasis added

It is not clear to me that this rule also applies to cases where the bylaws authorize the President to appoint committees.

12 minutes ago, J. J. said:

That requirement makes that business transacted within the meeting.  By a 2/3 vote, the assembly could require someone to be on a committee or prohibit someone, by preventing the naming.  Nothing would prevent the chair, in the second case at least, from appointing and naming the same individual that was rejected.

As I understand the rules on this matter, a rule which authorizes the President (as opposed to the chair) to appoint committees permits the President to appoint such persons at any time, even outside of a meeting, because the person continues to hold the office of President outside of meetings and may continue to exercise the powers of that office. This is in contrast to the chair, which refers to the person who is presiding over a meeting, and therefore no one is "in the chair" outside of a meeting.

As a result, it seems to me that a rule which authorizes the President to appoint members of all committees is not a rule relating to the conduct of business in meetings or the duties of officers in that connection, even although the President may well choose to announce the appointments during a meeting.

So I continue to maintain that if the organization wishes for this rule to be suspendable, the rule must provide as much.

Edited February 5, 2021 at 09:50 PM by Josh Martin

[J. J.]

3 minutes ago, Josh Martin said:

Okay, but what about the sentence which provides "A clause in the bylaws assigning to the president the duty of appointing all committees should therefore contain appropriate provision for its own suspension if necessary (for example, if there is occasion to appoint a special committee during a meeting from which the president is absent)." RONR (12th ed.) 50:13

If it was already in order to suspend such a rule, this sentence doesn't make a whole lot of sense.

Where does it say that?

 

Making a rule self suspendable (a) can set conditions where the rule can be automatically suspended. e.g. when the president is absent; (b) lower the threshold to suspend the rule overall.

The naming is in 50:13, the last paragraph of subsection d. (p. 470).  I think covers your last two points.  It is a cameral function of the president. 

2:23 defines a standing rule as being "related to the details of administration of the society rather than to parliamentary procedure."  If appoint members to committees was an administrative function,  it could be authorized as a standing rule.  Based on that, I have to conclude that the appointment of members to committees is a parliamentary rule, as opposed to an administrative duty. 

 

[Gary Novosielski]

10 hours ago, Josh Martin said:

If a rule says that it can be suspended, even though the rule otherwise could not be suspended, then it cannot be suspended.

Is that what you meant to say?

[Josh Martin]

31 minutes ago, Gary Novosielski said:

Is that what you meant to say?

Nope. "Cannot" should be "can."

[TheGrandRascal]

On 2/5/2021 at 9:06 AM, Josh Martin said:

"...A rule that the President shall appoint the chairmen and members of all standing committees already cannot be suspended (unless the rule provides for its suspension)..."

Hmmm. So, a provision in the bylaws that "the President shall preside at all meetings" is a Special Rule of Order (according to footnote 5, to the second sentence in 62:12, RONR 12th, p.617), but a provision that "the President shall appoint the chair of all special committees" is not a Special Rule of Order?

Now how did we arrive at that strange distinction, I should like to know...???

[Rob Elsman]

On 8/28/2022 at 2:11 PM, TheGrandRascal said:

So, a provision in the bylaws that "the President shall preside at all meetings"

I think I know someone who is going to pick his own switch and go to the woodshed with You Know Who.  Been there; done that.  😁

[Gary Novosielski]

On 8/28/2022 at 3:11 PM, TheGrandRascal said:

Hmmm. So, a provision in the bylaws that "the President shall preside at all meetings" is a Special Rule of Order (according to footnote 5, to the second sentence in 62:12, RONR 12th, p.617), but a provision that "the President shall appoint the chair of all special committees" is not a Special Rule of Order?

Now how did we arPrive at that strange distinction, I should like to know...???

Please stop tail ending on year old threads, and post your new question by starting a new topic.

[Josh Martin]

On 8/28/2022 at 2:11 PM, TheGrandRascal said:

Hmmm. So, a provision in the bylaws that "the President shall preside at all meetings" is a Special Rule of Order (according to footnote 5, to the second sentence in 62:12, RONR 12th, p.617), but a provision that "the President shall appoint the chair of all special committees" is not a Special Rule of Order?

It should first be noted that no rule in the bylaws is a "special rule of order". That is a specific category of rules which is separate and distinct from the bylaws. What I believe you mean to say, as the text states in 62:12n5, is that a rule that the President shall preside at all meetings is "clearly in the nature of a rule of order." 

With this clarification, yes, this is correct.

On 8/28/2022 at 2:11 PM, TheGrandRascal said:

Now how did we arrive at that strange distinction, I should like to know...???

I don't think there is anything strange about it. Rules of order are defined as rules which "relate to the orderly transaction of business in meetings and to the duties of officers in that connection. The object of rules of order is to facilitate the smooth functioning of the assembly and to provide a firm basis for resolving questions of procedure that may arise." RONR (12th ed.) 2:14

Based upon this definition, a rule which provides for which person shall serve as presiding officer for a meeting appears to quite clearly be in the nature of a rule of order. It is difficult to imagine a rule which would be more clearly in the nature of a rule of order. A rule pertaining to who is presiding clearly matches every part of the definition - it relates to the orderly transaction of business in meetings, the duties of officers in that connection, the smooth functioning of the assembly, and to provide a firm basis for resolving questions of procedure.

There is then the question of whether the President appointing the members of a special committee is a special rule of order. I am inclined to think it is not. For starters, there is the fact that RONR explicitly says so in multiple locations - and directly addresses whether such a rule can be suspended.

"When the bylaws provide that the president shall appoint all committees, this power does not transfer to the chair if someone else presides. A clause in the bylaws assigning to the president the duty of appointing all committees should therefore contain appropriate provision for its own suspension if necessary (for example, if there is occasion to appoint a special committee during a meeting from which the president is absent). In addition, a clause conferring on the president such power of appointment should exclude the nominating committee, and it may be advisable for such a clause also to exclude all disciplinary committees." RONR (12th ed.) 50:13

"All of the duties of the presiding officer described above relate to the function of presiding over the assembly at its meetings. In addition, in many organized societies, the president has duties as an administrative or executive officer; but these are outside the scope of parliamentary law, and the president has such authority only insofar as the bylaws provide it. In some organizations, the president is responsible for appointing, and is ex officio a member of, all committees (with the exception of the nominating committee, which should be expressly excluded from such a provision, and with the further possible exception of all disciplinary committees; see 56:47). But only when he is so authorized by the bylaws—or, in the case of a particular committee, by vote of the assembly—does he have this authority and status." RONR (12th ed.) 47:20

But further, it seems to me that the reason this rule is not in the nature of a rule of order is because this duty does not relate to the duties of officers in connection with the orderly transaction of business in meetings. After all, the President only serves as presiding officer during a meeting (since there is nothing to preside over at other times). On the other hand, the President could appoint the members of a special committee after a meeting is over (and often this is the expectation). Since the power can be exercised outside of meetings, it does not seem to be a power which is in connection with the orderly transaction of business in meetings.

But let us suppose one was to disagree with this analysis and was also to ignore the explicit statements in RONR on this subject. Even if this rule was in the nature of a rule of order, it still could not be suspended.

"Rules that have their application outside of the session which is in progress cannot be suspended. For example, a policy prohibiting total contributions to any one charitable organization in excess of $500.00 in any one calendar year is a rule which has its application outside of a meeting context, and thus cannot be suspended so as to permit the adoption of a motion to make a contribution in excess of the specified amount. (Such a rule can, however, be rescinded or amended; see 35.) Likewise, the rules cannot be suspended in order to permit postponement of a motion to a future session that will be held after the next regular business session or that will be held after more than a quarterly time interval has elapsed." RONR (12th ed.) 25:13

"Any one motion to Suspend the Rules that might limit the authority or duties of the presiding officer during a meeting can remain in effect, at most, for one session. (See 8:12, 8:16.)" RONR (12th ed.) 62:13

Suspending the rules to change who appoints the members of a special committee has its application outside of the current session, because the committee will continue to exist beyond the present session. As a result, such a motion attempts to suspend the President's authority as it relates to appointing special committees beyond the bounds of the present session, which is not permitted.

But in any event, as I have already noted, RONR is quite explicit on both of these points. So whether you think this distinction is strange or not, the rule is what it is. If an organization with RONR as its parliamentary authority wishes for the President to have the authority to appoint special committees, but for the assembly to be able to suspend this authority in particular cases, then the bylaws should state as much (as RONR says).

By the same token, if an assembly wishes (for some bizarre reason) to make the President "above the law" and provide in its bylaws that the rules may not be suspended to remove the President from the chair, then the organization may do so.

On 8/28/2022 at 3:42 PM, Gary Novosielski said:

Please stop tail ending on year old threads, and post your new question by starting a new topic.

I think this is a somewhat different case than usual, since the new poster is also the OP.

Edited August 28, 2022 at 11:51 PM by Josh Martin

[Richard Brown]

@Josh MartinVery good analysis. Thank you.

Edited August 29, 2022 at 01:30 PM by Richard Brown
Deleted text that inexplicably duplicated itself

[Gary Novosielski]

On 8/29/2022 at 9:29 AM, Richard Brown said:

Deleted text that inexplicably duplicated itself

I think I have run across this new "feature" myself.