Specific Bylaw in nature of a rule of order

[Michael Seebeck]

On 9/23/2023 at 8:41 PM, Josh Martin said:

By this logic, every rule limits a member's rights, since the rule limits a member's right to make a motion which is contrary to the rule.

Once again, that incorrectly equates a "rule" about purpose vs. process.

See, this is where Robert's falters: it fails that differentiation repeatedly by trying to apply procedural rules to structural composition when the two are related yet different.  Speaking as a systems engineer, that differentiation between structure, its purpose, and its processes is how systems, including societies, are constructed and operate.  It's a differentiation that is essential for success in any system--including the human system that is a society.

[Michael Seebeck]

On 9/23/2023 at 8:53 PM, Atul Kapur said:

A member does not have the right to make a frivolous motion.

No one has stated otherwise.

On 9/23/2023 at 8:53 PM, Atul Kapur said:

The committee does not have the authority to suspend this rule, so a member's motion to do so is frivolous. 

That is incorrect.  The error is equating a "rule" on committee scope with a rule on committee process. As stated elsewhere, they are different.  A committee does not have authority to go beyond its scope, true, but the scope of a committee cannot unilaterally by implication without explication limit process.  That has to be done by explicit special rules or order or by designation through the parliamentary authority.

[Caryn Ann Harlos]

That is not correct.  You might believe that RONR should not limit process on a committee, but that is your belief.  The fact is that is nowhere stated (the opposite is stated) and we are dealing with what is not what we think should be. 

 

A motion or bylaw to establish a committee can and not uncommonly does limit process.

Edited September 24, 2023 at 02:08 AM by Caryn Ann Harlos

[J. J.]

On 9/8/2023 at 9:42 AM, Caryn Ann Harlos said:

I am the chair of a bylaws committee in a political party.  We have a bylaw that says:

"A majority vote of those Committee members present is necessary for a "do pass" recommendation, and in the case of the Platform Committee, a majority must approve each specific plank separately."

This has been a source of much consternation but the interesting questions posed to me were these:

 

1.  Is this a bylaw in the nature of a rule of order?

I believe yes it is.

2.  If it is a bylaw in the nature of a rule of order can it suspended?

Well in general all bylaws in the nature of a rule of order can be suspended.

3.  If the answer is yes to both of the prior questions, who can suspend it?

That is where I am a bit baffled.  The committees this applies to are committees created by the bylaws.  With the exception of one of these committees, the appointing bodies are diverse subordinate units of the national political party.  Can the committees themselves suspend these rules?  Would the convention delegates have to proactively suspend it for the incoming committees and wouldn't that be an issue to suspend it for the entire term of the committee?  Can all of the appointing bodies agree to suspend them?

I may have further questions, but I hope I made it understandable how I see this as a really confusing question.  Once this is sussed out I likely have a related question that I will start a new thread on.

 

1.  I am in agreeing that, in the general case, a committee may properly adopt a motion to suspend the rules. 

2.  I agree that this is effectively a rule in the nature of a rule of order as it deals with the transaction of business within a meeting.  (Note that not all rules in the nature of a rule of order are suspendable.)

3.  While this is a rule in the nature of a rule of order it is also an instruction to the committee, and it is beyond the committee's power to suspend or modify those instructions (I think this was Mr. Mervosh's point).  That is the reason why the committee cannot suspend this (13:8 d).  That notes that instructions may be binding, even if the "suspend, modify, or conflict with rules of order."  Note, as well, that even if a committee would, in the general case, act beyond its instructions, the assembly would have to ratify that action (10:54).

4.  The assembly, a convention, can suspend the rules for the duration of a session, internally to the assembly.  It cannot directly suspend the rules to permit something to be done outside of that session, so it could not suspend a rule in a committee. 

In the general case, the rules could be suspended, by the assembly, to instruct a committee to follow a different process than outlined in the bylaws (assuming that the process was otherwise suspendable).  However, in the case of the platform committee of a convention, it meets and conducts business prior to the convention.  There is no ability of the assembly to meet and issue the instruction. 

[Atul Kapur]

On 9/23/2023 at 10:03 PM, Michael Seebeck said:

The error is equating a "rule" on committee scope with a rule on committee process. As stated elsewhere, they are different.

As stated somewhere elsewhere than RONR, they may very well be different. This is a forum on RONR.

What you call RONR's "very bad habit of blurring those lines when it shouldn't" could just as easily be considered a different mindset and approach.

[J. J.]

On 9/23/2023 at 9:55 PM, Michael Seebeck said:

Once again, that incorrectly equates a "rule" about purpose vs. process.

See, this is where Robert's falters: it fails that differentiation repeatedly by trying to apply procedural rules to structural composition when the two are related yet different.  Speaking as a systems engineer, that differentiation between structure, its purpose, and its processes is how systems, including societies, are constructed and operate.  It's a differentiation that is essential for success in any system--including the human system that is a society.

The rule in question is:  "A majority vote of those Committee members present is necessary for a 'do pass' recommendation, and in the case of the Platform Committee, a majority must approve each specific plank separately."

Nothing in this rule strikes my as being about "purpose."  This rule governs process, solely. 

[Dan Honemann]

On 9/10/2023 at 6:59 PM, Josh Martin said:

The question then arises as to whether this rule is intended simply to describe the ordinary operations of the committee and the rule exists for the benefit of the committee, in which event the committee is free to suspend it in a particular case under the same conditions as any other rule of order, or if the rule is intended to be an instruction to the committee, and exists for the benefit of the parent assembly, in which event the rule may not be suspended by the committee.

 

On 9/22/2023 at 5:21 PM, Dan Honemann said:

It seems to me that the question asked here had previously been resolved in this thread, and has been properly answered by you and others here, but I'm a bit troubled by your mention of this "question" you say arises and must be answered in determining whether a rule specifically imposed upon a committee by its parent assembly can be suspended by the committee.  It doesn't seem, on its face, to be unreasonable, but it's new to me and I'd be interested in knowing where you found it. 

 

On 9/23/2023 at 8:01 PM, Josh Martin said:

Regrettably, I do not recall where I found this "question." It may be that it came from a discussion some time ago on this forum or its predecessor, or it may be that I invented it out of whole cloth.

I'm having difficulty imagining that there can be a rule which a parent assembly deems advisable to impose upon its subordinate committee which will not also be of benefit to the parent assembly. 

[Dan Honemann]

On 9/23/2023 at 9:55 PM, Michael Seebeck said:

See, this is where Robert's falters: it fails that differentiation repeatedly by trying to apply procedural rules to structural composition when the two are related yet different.  Speaking as a systems engineer, that differentiation between structure, its purpose, and its processes is how systems, including societies, are constructed and operate.  It's a differentiation that is essential for success in any system--including the human system that is a society.

Mr. Seebeck, your reference to being a systems engineer seems to be designed to indicate that this tends to enhance the ability to properly understand parliamentary law, but I'm afraid that your contributions to this discussion fail to support this notion.

[J. J.]

On 9/24/2023 at 8:50 AM, Dan Honemann said:

 

 

I'm having difficulty imagining that there can be a rule which a parent assembly deems advisable to impose upon its subordinate committee which will not also be of benefit to the parent assembly. 

A rule (or instruction) that motions in a committee require seconds? 

[Dan Honemann]

On 9/24/2023 at 12:31 PM, J. J. said:

A rule (or instruction) that motions in a committee require seconds? 

The assembly may not want its committee to be wasting time debating motions that only one member wants to have considered.  I can understand why an assembly would regard more efficient use by the committee of the committee's time to be beneficial to the assembly.

[Gary Novosielski]

On 9/24/2023 at 9:06 AM, Dan Honemann said:

Mr. Seebeck, your reference to being a systems engineer seems to be designed to indicate that this tends to enhance the ability to properly understand parliamentary law, but I'm afraid that your contributions to this discussion fail to support this notion.

🫳🎤

[J. J.]

On 9/24/2023 at 1:00 PM, Dan Honemann said:

The assembly may not want its committee to be wasting time debating motions that only one member wants to have considered.  I can understand why an assembly would regard more efficient use by the committee of the committee's time to be beneficial to the assembly.

That would not benefit the assembly.  It may benefit the committee. 

 

A waste of the committee's time is not a waste of the assembly's time. 

[Dan Honemann]

On 9/24/2023 at 1:21 PM, J. J. said:

That would not benefit the assembly.  It may benefit the committee. 

 

A waste of the committee's time is not a waste of the assembly's time. 

Do you seriously believe that it doesn't benefit a parent organization to have its committee operate more efficiently?

[J. J.]

On 9/24/2023 at 1:35 PM, Dan Honemann said:

Do you seriously believe that it doesn't benefit a parent organization to have its committee operate more efficiently?

I believe that it would not benefit the assembly.  The assembly may to care about efficiency in another body. 

[J. J.]

I would also ask that, if the goal is "efficiency" in the committee, why are not seconds mandated in committees in RONR.

[Gary Novosielski]

On 9/24/2023 at 1:41 PM, J. J. said:

The assembly may to care about efficiency in another body. 

They may to, and often do to.

[Dan Honemann]

On 9/24/2023 at 1:47 PM, J. J. said:

I would also ask that, if the goal is "efficiency" in the committee, why are not seconds mandated in committees in RONR.

This, frankly, has nothing at all to do with the question under consideration.  It might be assumed that, ordinarily, eliminating the need for seconds in committees will be beneficial, but situations may well arise where it causes substantial amounts of time to be wasted.

In any event, since we are dealing with what I shall dub the "Martin Rule", it would help to hear from Mr. Martin as to whether or not a rule requiring that motions be seconded that is imposed upon a committee by its parent organization is a rule that may be suspended by the committee.

[J. J.]

On 9/24/2023 at 5:50 PM, Dan Honemann said:

This, frankly, has nothing at all to do with the question under consideration.  It might be assumed that, ordinarily, eliminating the need for seconds in committees will be beneficial, but situations may well arise where it causes substantial amounts of time to be wasted.

In any event, since we are dealing with what I shall dub the "Martin Rule", it would help to hear from Mr. Martin as to whether or not a rule requiring that motions be seconded that is imposed upon a committee by its parent organization is a rule that may be suspended by the committee.

You did raise the question of if "there can be a rule which a parent assembly deems advisable to impose upon its subordinate committee which will not also be of benefit to the parent assembly."  The answer is yes.

You are now raising a second question of if the rule could be suspended.  Based on 13.8 d., the committee could not suspend such a rule, unless the assembly gave the committee instructions that the rule could be suspended.

[Dan Honemann]

On 9/24/2023 at 6:57 PM, J. J. said:

You did raise the question of if "there can be a rule which a parent assembly deems advisable to impose upon its subordinate committee which will not also be of benefit to the parent assembly."  The answer is yes.

And I say it's no.

 

On 9/24/2023 at 6:57 PM, J. J. said:

You are now raising a second question of if the rule could be suspended.  Based on 13.8 d., the committee could not suspend such a rule, unless the assembly gave the committee instructions that the rule could be suspended.

I agree that the rule cannot be suspended by the committee, and it's probably best to leave it there. We are in agreement.

But if I understand the Martin Rule, and if you are right that the rule you mentioned concerning seconds should not be regarded as having been imposed by the association for its own benefit but only for the benefit of the committee, then under the Martin Rule it can be suspended by the committee.  That's assuming that I understand the Martin Rule correctly.  

Frankly, I've pretty much come to the conclusion that the Martin Rule is very troublesome.

[J. J.]

On 9/24/2023 at 7:37 PM, Dan Honemann said:

And I say it's no.

 

I agree that the rule cannot be suspended by the committee, and it's probably best to leave it there. We are in agreement.

But if I understand the Martin Rule, and if you are right that the rule you mentioned concerning seconds should not be regarded as having been imposed by the association for its own benefit but only for the benefit of the committee, then under the Martin Rule it can be suspended by the committee.  That's assuming that I understand the Martin Rule correctly.  

Frankly, I've pretty much come to the conclusion that the Martin Rule is very troublesome.

First, that decision will not be up to you, or to me.  That is entirely too arbitrary and could differ from assembly to assembly, and obviously from parliamentarian to parliamentarian. 

The assembly may adopt the rule, or instruction, for a committee.  It makes no difference if the rule is "beneficial" to the committee, to the assembly, to both, or to neither.  It is a question of the assembly's ability to issue such instructions, and 13:8 d unambiguously says that the assembly has that ability.

I do not see the "Martin Rule" as indicating that the rule is suspendable based on if it is beneficial to the committee or not.   I will note that the "Rule" is spread across several fairly long posts and a summary would be welcome. 

[Josh Martin]

On 9/24/2023 at 6:37 PM, Dan Honemann said:

And I say it's no.

I agree that the rule cannot be suspended by the committee, and it's probably best to leave it there. We are in agreement.

But if I understand the Martin Rule, and if you are right that the rule you mentioned concerning seconds should not be regarded as having been imposed by the association for its own benefit but only for the benefit of the committee, then under the Martin Rule it can be suspended by the committee.  That's assuming that I understand the Martin Rule correctly.  

Frankly, I've pretty much come to the conclusion that the Martin Rule is very troublesome.

I agree that this is a correct understanding of what I said, but I am inclined to agree upon reflection that this rule "is very troublesome." I was attempting to find a principle which distinguishes between why committees can suspend some rules and not others. I think the principle you have expressed is more workable in this regard - whether the rule is one which is generally applicable or is "specifically applicable" to committees, or to a particular committee. This is a much easier question to answer.

While I'm not sure this is still relevant, I think a rule concerning a requirement for seconds is likely adopted for the benefit of the association. Indeed, as you have suggested, it seems unlikely an association would adopt a rule solely for the benefit of the committee.

This also seems like a particularly odd example, because I generally am not certain what the purpose would be of suspending such a rule, since it would be easier for a member to simply second whatever motion the member wishes for the committee to consider.

[J. J.]

On 9/25/2023 at 6:45 AM, Josh Martin said:

I agree that this is a correct understanding of what I said, but I am inclined to agree upon reflection that this rule "is very troublesome." I was attempting to find a principle which distinguishes between why committees can suspend some rules and not others. I think the principle you have expressed is more workable in this regard - whether the rule is one which is generally applicable or is "specifically applicable" to committees, or to a particular committee. This is a much easier question to answer.

While I'm not sure this is still relevant, I think a rule concerning a requirement for seconds is likely adopted for the benefit of the association. Indeed, as you have suggested, it seems unlikely an association would adopt a rule solely for the benefit of the committee.

This also seems like a particularly odd example, because I generally am not certain what the purpose would be of suspending such a rule, since it would be easier for a member to simply second whatever motion the member wishes for the committee to consider.

Well, if the assembly could establish a rule (or instruction) requiring one second, it could establish a rule (or instruction) requiring multiple seconds.  Such an instruction (or rule) could, effectively, require more than a majority of the committee to be in favor of even considering some action.  Whether or not such an instruction or rule is beneficial to the assembly is both questionable and irrelevant.  Such an instruction or rule could be validly adopted.

When an assembly instructs a committee, it may supersede a rule of order (13:8 d), including, effectively, the rule that the rule can be suspended by the committee.  A special rule to this effect would act the same way. 

Perhaps an illustrative questions would be, in a society that has adopted RONR, 12th edition, these:

1.  If there is no rule or instruction to the contrary, may a committee suspend the rules and require two seconds for any motion?

2.  If the assembly has adopted a special rule, "Seconds of motions shall not be required in committees," may a committee suspend the rules and require two seconds for any motion?

 

 

[Josh Martin]

On 9/25/2023 at 10:52 AM, J. J. said:

Well, if the assembly could establish a rule (or instruction) requiring one second, it could establish a rule (or instruction) requiring multiple seconds.  Such an instruction (or rule) could, effectively, require more than a majority of the committee to be in favor of even considering some action.  Whether or not such an instruction or rule is beneficial to the assembly is both questionable and irrelevant.  Such an instruction or rule could be validly adopted.

If an assembly adopts such a rule, I believe it is clear that the assembly, at least, believes the rule is beneficial to the assembly.

Indeed, such a rule seems to even more clearly to be intended to limit the committee, notwithstanding the committee's wishes in this regard.

On 9/25/2023 at 10:52 AM, J. J. said:

Perhaps an illustrative questions would be, in a society that has adopted RONR, 12th edition, these:

1.  If there is no rule or instruction to the contrary, may a committee suspend the rules and require two seconds for any motion?

2.  If the assembly has adopted a special rule, "Seconds of motions shall not be required in committees," may a committee suspend the rules and require two seconds for any motion?

The answer to the second question is certainly "no," as it would certainly contradict a rule made specifically applicable to committees.

The answer to the first question is more difficult. RONR does provide that committees are to use the rules for committees and small boards, unless otherwise instructed by the assembly. On the other hand, RONR is not as explicit in regard to the "no seconds" rule as it is in regard to the rule that a committee may not limit debate. But it may be reasonably argued that this is, in effect, a limitation on debate.

Edited September 25, 2023 at 04:08 PM by Josh Martin

[Dan Honemann]

On 9/25/2023 at 11:52 AM, J. J. said:

Well, if the assembly could establish a rule (or instruction) requiring one second, it could establish a rule (or instruction) requiring multiple seconds.  Such an instruction (or rule) could, effectively, require more than a majority of the committee to be in favor of even considering some action.  Whether or not such an instruction or rule is beneficial to the assembly is both questionable and irrelevant.  Such an instruction or rule could be validly adopted.

When an assembly instructs a committee, it may supersede a rule of order (13:8 d), including, effectively, the rule that the rule can be suspended by the committee.  A special rule to this effect would act the same way. 

Perhaps an illustrative questions would be, in a society that has adopted RONR, 12th edition, these:

1.  If there is no rule or instruction to the contrary, may a committee suspend the rules and require two seconds for any motion?

2.  If the assembly has adopted a special rule, "Seconds of motions shall not be required in committees," may a committee suspend the rules and require two seconds for any motion?

The answer to both of these questions is no. 

The rule in in 49:21 that motions need not be seconded is made specifically applicable to committees by the first sentence of 50:25. 

One wonders why an assembly would adopt a special rule of order simply repeating a rule which is already in force, but if it does, it cannot be suspended by a committee to which it applies.

[J. J.]

On 9/25/2023 at 12:54 PM, Dan Honemann said:

The answer to both of these questions is no. 

The rule in in 49:21 that motions need not be seconded is made specifically applicable to committees by the first sentence of 50:25. 

One wonders why an assembly would adopt a special rule of order simply repeating a rule which is already in force, but if it does, it cannot be suspended by a committee to which it applies.

Then can any rule in RONR be suspended in a committee? If so, where is the line drawn?