Specific Bylaw in nature of a rule of order

[Caryn Ann Harlos]

On 9/8/2023 at 10:32 AM, Rob Elsman said:

But 2:21 is unqualified. What is said in RONR (12th ed.) 13:8 is limited in scope to instructions given to a committee.

These committees are created by the bylaws.  The bylaws contain these limitations in the same article.  They are, in effect, standing instructions to these committees until amended.

Edited September 8, 2023 at 04:39 PM by Caryn Ann Harlos

[Rob Elsman]

I find no dilemma, so I cannot help.

[Caryn Ann Harlos]

I understand, thank you for trying to assist.

 

[Josh Martin]

On 9/8/2023 at 9:42 AM, Caryn Ann Harlos said:

1.  Is this a bylaw in the nature of a rule of order?

Yes.

On 9/8/2023 at 9:42 AM, Caryn Ann Harlos said:

2.  If it is a bylaw in the nature of a rule of order can it suspended?

Yes.

On 9/8/2023 at 9:42 AM, Caryn Ann Harlos said:

3.  If the answer is yes to both of the prior questions, who can suspend it?

That is where I am a bit baffled.  The committees this applies to are committees created by the bylaws.  With the exception of one of these committees, the appointing bodies are diverse subordinate units of the national political party.  Can the committees themselves suspend these rules?  Would the convention delegates have to proactively suspend it for the incoming committees and wouldn't that be an issue to suspend it for the entire term of the committee?  Can all of the appointing bodies agree to suspend them?

 

On 9/8/2023 at 10:24 AM, Caryn Ann Harlos said:

Certainly, the part in particular that was the focus was the second part of the rule in question specifically saying the platform committee must approve each plank separately. Can that be suspended to take a vote on a cluster of planks or even a complete omnibus strike and replace of the whole platform recommendation.

Certainly, the rule may not be suspended by the committees. I concur with Mr. Mervosh that the rule is in the nature of instructions to the committee. The rule may not be proactively suspended by the convention or another appointing body, since the motion to Suspend the Rules in RONR may not apply beyond the current session.

It seems to me that this rule could be suspended only by the convention, and the manner in which it would be suspended would be as follows:

• A committee would need to separate its report into two parts. One part would contain the recommendations which are compliant with the rule.
• The second part would contain the recommendations of the committee which are not compliant with the rule and would include a recommendation from the committee that the rules be suspended to permit those recommendations to be made by the committee.
• The convention would determine whether to suspend the rules to permit the noncompliant recommendations to be made, as proposed by the committee.

If the organization desires some other manner of suspending this rule, such as by permitting a "proactive" suspension for a longer term, or providing that the committees may suspend the rule, this would need to be specified in the bylaws. In the alternative, if the organization finds the rule is not serving its best interests, the rule could be amended to be more suitable to the organization's needs.

Edited September 9, 2023 at 11:34 AM by Josh Martin

[Caryn Ann Harlos]

Thank you Josh that is conclusion I was coming to.  I think we are going to amend in some way as despite it not being a suspendable rule, I know the committees are not strictly following it (and I don't even think it has been on purpose, just from not understanding this rule) and the delegates haven't cared.  No point in having a dead rule.  Trying to track down the historical concern that caused this rule and perhaps make it clearer if the historical reasoning is still valid.

[Rob Elsman]

I disagree with my colleagues that the bylaw in question is to be equated to the kind of instruction to a committee discussed in RONR (12th ed.) §13, which would render the bylaw unsuspendable by the committee, even by unanimous consent.  There is nothing in the facts provided that even hints that §13 is applicable, and I think it is a red herring.

 

[Gary Novosielski]

On 9/9/2023 at 11:29 AM, Caryn Ann Harlos said:

Thank you Josh that is conclusion I was coming to.  I think we are going to amend in some way as despite it not being a suspendable rule, I know the committees are not strictly following it (and I don't even think it has been on purpose, just from not understanding this rule) and the delegates haven't cared.  No point in having a dead rule.  Trying to track down the historical concern that caused this rule and perhaps make it clearer if the historical reasoning is still valid.

Yeah, it might be worth striking it in its entirety.  RONR already has sufficient protection in the form of Division of the Question to allow members to pry individual questions out of an over-full basket of them, should the need arise.

Even if this is considered to be a "red herring" in the first place, as Mr. Elsman suggests, a herring of any hue is, in my view, less desirable than no herring at all.

Edited September 9, 2023 at 03:48 PM by Gary Novosielski

[Michael Seebeck]

I have to disagree here.  (Disclosure, I was part of the meeting and group that raised this question in the first place.  I am also a systems engineer by profession, so that's the methodology of how I think.)  I think Mr. Mervosh has it correct.

BLUF #1: A committee can suspend the rules provided such suspension is within the scope of its duties, does not violet member rights, and doesn't violate any superior rules or bylaws.

BLUF #2: A prohibition on an action of a committee must be explicitly stated by the parent body at the time the committee is created as part of its creation.

Back to basics: There are three parts to defining a committee/assembly/board/convention: scope, structure, and process. (Also true for any functional system, be it a committee or a black-box widget.) Robert's has a very bad habit of blurring those lines when it shouldn't, and that's the case here in RONR; it loses clarity in verbosity a lot.

• The scope of a committee is what work it does and why.
• The structure of a committee is who is doing the work.
• The process of a committee is when, where and how it is doing the work.

Each of these parts are linked yet separate and each need to be properly and explicitly defined.  Implication doesn't cut it, and hierarchy of bylaws rules requires explicit exception or else it falls to lower in the hierarchy where it already is (or may be) defined.  That's consistent with 56:68 #3 where the general statement yields to the specific statement, but the specific has to be stated for that to apply--implication is not enough.

A committee is constituted by a parent body to do specific work, and if that constitution includes specific instructions, then yes, those instructions are binding upon the committee.

But only those instructions.  And those instructions must not violate the rights of the members, either, including the rights of the members of the committee.  See 1:4.

Absent explicit instructions to the contrary in the motion or in a superior rule, the default is back down to the parliamentary authority, down the rules hierarchy, in this case Robert's.  (See 2:3 and 2:4) Robert's allows a suspension of the rules. (See 25:1 et seq.)

Robert's in 50:25 gives explicit instructions on the types of motions that are changed in a committee (rescind, amend something previously adopted, reconsider, call the question) but does not include suspension of the rules.  50:26 says a committee operates under the parliamentary authority of the parent body, which absent a specific rule, allows suspension of the rules.

When a motion to commit is made, that motion includes specific instructions on the scope of the committee's consideration.  It can (but generally does not) include instructions on the process to follow within that scope.  The same holds true to defining a committee in the bylaws.

So back to the original question #3, "who can suspend it?" The answer is the committee can, because they do not have an explicit prohibition against suspension or the rules (or that rule) set upon them by their establishment by the parent body or in the bylaws. See also Standard characteristic #2 of Suspend the Rules, 25:2, 25:7, and 2:21 ("Rules clearly identifiable as in the nature of rules of order that are placed within the bylaws can (with the exceptions specified in 25) also be suspended by a two-thirds vote;").  50:68 #6 states "A prohibition or limitation prohibits everything greater than what is prohibited, or that goes beyond the limitation; but it permits what is less than the limitation, and also permits things of the same class that are not mentioned in the prohibition or limitation and that are not evidently improper." (emphasis added) In this case, suspension of the rules by a committee is not stated as a limitation, so it's permitted because it falls to the parliamentary authority, which lists explicit restrictions on certain motions (see 50:25, "The informalities and modifications of the regular rules of parliamentary procedure listed in 49:21 for use in small boards are applicable during the meetings of all standing and special committees, unless the committee is otherwise instructed by the society (see next paragraph below);" and 50:26, "Committees of organized societies operate under the bylaws, the parliamentary authority, and any special rules of order or standing rules of the society which may be applicable to them. A committee may not adopt its own rules except as authorized in the rules of the society or in instructions given to the committee by its parent assembly in a particular case." (emphasis added)) 

 

In short: A committee has to be told explicitly in instructions that they cannot suspend the rules, because the parliamentary authority they operate under allows them to do so; implication is insufficient.  A committee can't go beyond it's scope, but within that scope, it can't go beyond the parliamentary authority.

 

 

[Josh Martin]

On 9/10/2023 at 11:19 AM, Michael Seebeck said:

I think Mr. Mervosh has it correct.

I think you mean Mr. Elsman.

On 9/10/2023 at 11:19 AM, Michael Seebeck said:

BLUF #2: A prohibition on an action of a committee must be explicitly stated by the parent body at the time the committee is created as part of its creation.

I am not aware of the source of this claim. I find no basis for this statement in RONR.

I have no disagreement that it is preferable to explicitly state such matters - indeed, explicitly stating rules is a good practice generally. (With no disrespect meant, I think it is especially desirable to explicitly state rules in this particular organization.) But I think it goes too far too suggest that such a rule must be explicit to be effective.

On 9/10/2023 at 11:19 AM, Michael Seebeck said:

So back to the original question #3, "who can suspend it?" The answer is the committee can, because they do not have an explicit prohibition against suspension or the rules (or that rule) set upon them by their establishment by the parent body or in the bylaws. See also Standard characteristic #2 of Suspend the Rules, 25:2, 25:7, and 2:21 ("Rules clearly identifiable as in the nature of rules of order that are placed within the bylaws can (with the exceptions specified in 25) also be suspended by a two-thirds vote;").  50:68 #6 states "A prohibition or limitation prohibits everything greater than what is prohibited, or that goes beyond the limitation; but it permits what is less than the limitation, and also permits things of the same class that are not mentioned in the prohibition or limitation and that are not evidently improper." (emphasis added) In this case, suspension of the rules by a committee is not stated as a limitation, so it's permitted because it falls to the parliamentary authority, which lists explicit restrictions on certain motions (see 50:25, "The informalities and modifications of the regular rules of parliamentary procedure listed in 49:21 for use in small boards are applicable during the meetings of all standing and special committees, unless the committee is otherwise instructed by the society (see next paragraph below);" and 50:26, "Committees of organized societies operate under the bylaws, the parliamentary authority, and any special rules of order or standing rules of the society which may be applicable to them. A committee may not adopt its own rules except as authorized in the rules of the society or in instructions given to the committee by its parent assembly in a particular case." (emphasis added)) 

But if a superior assembly tells its subordinate committees it cannot do something, is it not reasonable to generally assume the superior assembly means what it says? Or should it be assumed that the superior assembly is always actually saying “You can’t do this unless you have a 2/3 vote” unless the parent assembly explicitly provides otherwise?

My own view is that the wording of the rule is intended as an instruction to the committee and that it is not be be suspended by the committee.

I will say that I am by no means suggesting that the interpretation stated by yourself and Mr. Elsman is unreasonable. In my view, the rule is ambiguous in this regard. It will ultimately be up to the organization to interpret its own rules in this matter.

I will admit, my personal views aside, that the Principles of Interpretation do suggest that when a rule is ambiguous, it should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the drafters, to the extent this can be determined. And the fact that historically “the committees are not strictly following it… and the delegates haven't cared” does lend weight to the interpretation that the committees may suspend the rule. (And also raises the question of whether there is a purpose in keeping the rule at all.)

Edited September 10, 2023 at 05:11 PM by Josh Martin

[Caryn Ann Harlos]

I can give some historical context.  This is a provision that is over forty years old.  About 15 years ago, the bylaws were revamped over a period of several conventions to take rules of order which can be suspended out of the bylaws and it was represented to me that prior drafters likely did not understand the whole issue of "bylaws in the nature of a rule of order" and put things in the bylaws specifically because they did not want them suspended.  Of course that is a much later interpretation, but considering that these were left in the bylaws by talented drafters (I have to go back through old bylaws reports to see if they ever attempted to move them but were unsuccessful), it seems to me that the understanding was they were not suspendable.  All of this is admittedly second and third hand which is why I was hoping @Alicia Percell, PRP would weigh in since it was her labor of love that was getting suspendable rules out of the bylaws where possible.  I would love to know if she considered this one of them.

A caveat to the "delegates haven't cared," - I don't think they even realize it.  That is a form of not caring I suppose, but it is passive rather than active.  We tend to have a lot of new people who don't understand bylaws or parliamentary procedure and just assume if committee passed it, it was done that way.  On the bylaws committee, I honestly did not notice the "majority present" requirement until we were amending something.  Fortunately, all of our prior proposals already passed by that amount, but that was happy coincidence.  But in now the fifth committee under these rules, no one ever brought it up that I recall.  I think the rule needs to be amended or deleted.  We need to really stop and think: what precisely is trying to be accomplished here and how can we say it with clarity.

PS: Josh, I can see the MI dispute had a lasting impact by one of your comments.  We are going through a contentious time organizationally, sorry you got dragged into that.  If you have not kept up the issue is the subject of several court battles atm.  The national organization is suing the splinter board for trademark infringement and the state organization's bank is suing asking the court to instruct them as to who owns the bank account.

 

 

Edited September 10, 2023 at 05:25 PM by Caryn Ann Harlos

[Josh Martin]

On 9/10/2023 at 1:20 PM, Caryn Ann Harlos said:

Josh, I can see the MI dispute had a lasting impact by one of your comments.  We are going through a contentious time organizationally, sorry you got dragged into that.  If you have not kept up the issue is the subject of several court battles atm.  The national organization is suing the splinter board for trademark infringement and the state organization's bank is suing asking the court to instruct them as to who owns the bank account.

No apologies are necessary. I have not had to do any work on that issue in some time and have not lost any sleep over it. This was simply an observation that, as you have said, this organization is “going through a contentious time.” In such cases, it is especially desirable that rules be worded as clearly, concisely, and explicitly as possible.

[Caryn Ann Harlos]

On 9/10/2023 at 11:25 AM, Josh Martin said:

No apologies are necessary. I have not had to do any work on that issue in some time and have not lost any sleep over it. This was simply an observation that, as you have said, this organization is “going through a contentious time.” In such cases, it is especially desirable that rules be worded as clearly, concisely, and explicitly as possible.

Absolutely agreed, and appreciate your professionalism.

[Michael Seebeck]

On 9/10/2023 at 12:10 PM, Josh Martin said:

I am not aware of the source of this claim. I find no basis for this statement in RONR.

MWS: It's not a statement of Robert's but rather a basic construction of bylaws and rules and other contracts and legal documents: if it's not written down, it's not a rule.

I have no disagreement that it is preferable to explicitly state such matters - indeed, explicitly stating rules is a good practice generally. (With no disrespect meant, I think it is especially desirable to explicitly state rules in this particular organization.) But I think it goes too far too suggest that such a rule must be explicit to be effective.

MWS: No disrespect taken. 🙂

But if a superior assembly tells its subordinate committees it cannot do something, is it not reasonable to generally assume the superior assembly means what it says? Or should it be assumed that the superior assembly is always actually saying “You can’t do this unless you have a 2/3 vote” unless the parent assembly explicitly provides otherwise?

MWS: Normally that's true, but in this converse case, the superior assembly did NOT say the subordinate committee cannot do something. It is implied without clarity.

My own view is that the wording of the rule is intended as an instruction to the committee and that it is not be be suspended by the committee.

MWS: Intention in this case is lacking context, because as Ms. Harlos stated, the clause in question was done 15 years ago when the understanding of this nuance was missing.  Lacking that intention, the only thing left is actual wording.  The instruction also does not say that the committee cannot suspend the rules.  It could be argued that the committee cannot suspend *that* instruction, but that instruction is also poorly worded to say two different things at once, that the majority vote for the "do pass" is both "present and voting" and just "present." Hence the problem with it.

I will say that I am by no means suggesting that the interpretation stated by yourself and Mr. Elsman is unreasonable. In my view, the rule is ambiguous in this regard. It will ultimately be up to the organization to interpret its own rules in this matter.

MWS: Agreed.  But I was not referring to Mr. Elsman.  I was referring to Mr. Mervosh's mention of 2:21.

I will admit, my personal views aside, that the Principles of Interpretation do suggest that when a rule is ambiguous, it should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the drafters, to the extent this can be determined. And the fact that historically “the committees are not strictly following it… and the delegates haven't cared” does lend weight to the interpretation that the committees may suspend the rule. (And also raises the question of whether there is a purpose in keeping the rule at all.)

MWS: The rule is question is likely to be recommended to stricken.  The broader question, though remains: can a superior assembly instruct a subordinate committee that they cannot follow the parliamentary rules, this violating member rights, when the bylaws indicate the parliamentary authority is to be followed, by implication, or does it have to be explicit? I contend that it has to be explicit, otherwise it is not applicable as a rule or instruction.  The concept of an unwritten rule should be abhorrent to Robert's since its whole purpose is to prevent that from happening, including all of its variations of "making it up as they go."

 

[Michael Seebeck]

Apologies on the nested comments; I'm not sure how to split those out in this format.

[Josh Martin]

On 9/10/2023 at 4:49 PM, Michael Seebeck said:

The broader question, though remains: can a superior assembly instruct a subordinate committee that they cannot follow the parliamentary rules, this violating member rights, when the bylaws indicate the parliamentary authority is to be followed, by implication, or does it have to be explicit?

Yes, rules may be implied rather than explicit. I am also not in agreement that instructions to a committee generally, or these particular instructions, "violate member rights."

Once again, I am in full agreement that it is preferable for a rule to be explicit. But many organizations can (and do) adopt rules which are not explicit.

On 9/10/2023 at 4:49 PM, Michael Seebeck said:

The concept of an unwritten rule should be abhorrent to Robert's since its whole purpose is to prevent that from happening, including all of its variations of "making it up as they go."

I don't think it is quite fair to call this rule "unwritten."

"A majority vote of those Committee members present is necessary for a "do pass" recommendation, and in the case of the Platform Committee, a majority must approve each specific plank separately."

The rule quite clearly states what the committee can do in its consideration of these matters, and therefore also what the committee cannot do in its consideration of these matters. Indeed, in many ways, the rule is explicit. The rule provides that "in the case of the Platform Committee, a majority must approve each specific plank separately."

The question then arises as to whether this rule is intended simply to describe the ordinary operations of the committee and the rule exists for the benefit of the committee, in which event the committee is free to suspend it in a particular case under the same conditions as any other rule of order, or if the rule is intended to be an instruction to the committee, and exists for the benefit of the parent assembly, in which event the rule may not be suspended by the committee.

It may sound strange to suggest this rule may exist for the benefit of the parent assembly, since the rule is applicable only within committee meetings and applies only to members of the committee. But a similar situation exists in the case of RONR's own rule pertaining to limits on debate not applying to committees (unless otherwise instructed by the parent assembly). Even although this rule is applicable only within committee meetings and applies only to members of the committee, the purpose of this rule is actually to protect the parent assembly, and therefore may not be suspended by the committee.

"In order that there may be no interference with the assembly's having the benefit of its committees' matured judgment, motions to close or limit debate (15, 16) are not allowed in committees." RONR (12th ed.) 50:27

In a similar manner, I think it is conceivable that the purpose of this rule is to protect the society, by ensuring that the committee has considered each proposed plank of the platform separately. If so, in my view, this rule may not be suspended by the committee.

In the alternative, if the rule is intended solely for the committee's benefit, then the committee may suspend the rule.

The members of the society will be in a better position than I am to make this determination and I ultimately leave this question to the society's judgment, since my own analysis is based upon the brief wording of the rule and a few paragraphs of information concerning the rule's history. The members of the society will have more information on this matter.

Edited September 10, 2023 at 11:02 PM by Josh Martin

[Caryn Ann Harlos]

On 9/10/2023 at 4:59 PM, Josh Martin said:

In a similar manner, I think it is conceivable that the purpose of this rule is to protect the society, by ensuring that the committee has considered each proposed plank of the platform separately. If so, in my view, this rule may not be suspended by the committee.

In the alternative, if the rule is intended solely for the committee's benefit, then the committee may suspend the rule.

The members of the society will be in a better position than I am to make this determination and I ultimately leave this question to the society's judgment, since my own analysis is based upon the brief wording of the rule and a few paragraphs of information concerning the rule's history. The members of the society will have more information on this matter.

I can say without a shadow of a doubt that the intended purpose is to protect the Society.  

[Michael Seebeck]

All of that misses the point of the original question: Can a committee suspend the parliamentary rules or not in its proceedings?  There still is not an answer here.

If the parliamentary authority is designated to apply to all cases not inconsistent with the Bylaws or other special rules of order ala 56:49, and the parent body does NOT explicitly state that the committee cannot suspend the rules in its proceedings, then can they?

And if they can't, why not? and how does that not violate the rights of the members of the committee?

And if they can in part, and can't in part, then what's the dividing line?

[Atul Kapur]

On 9/10/2023 at 11:19 AM, Michael Seebeck said:

instructions must not violate the rights of the members, either, including the rights of the members of the committee.  See 1:4.

I agree with @George Mervosh and @Josh Martin. Speaking of thr collective rights of members of a committee (specifically, the right to suspend the rules) is a red herring. 1:4 applies to members of an assembly. A committee is not an assembly (1:9, 50:1, and 1:24 which states that committees are "subordinate instruments of 
an assembly,")

[Josh Martin]

On 9/21/2023 at 9:52 PM, Michael Seebeck said:

All of that misses the point of the original question: Can a committee suspend the parliamentary rules or not in its proceedings?  There still is not an answer here.

As a general matter, yes.

In particular circumstances, however, a parliamentary rule may be in the nature of an instruction to the committee and intended for the benefit of the parent assembly. In those circumstances, the rule may not be suspended.

On 9/21/2023 at 9:52 PM, Michael Seebeck said:

If the parliamentary authority is designated to apply to all cases not inconsistent with the Bylaws or other special rules of order ala 56:49, and the parent body does NOT explicitly state that the committee cannot suspend the rules in its proceedings, then can they?

Once again, as a general matter, a committee may suspend rules in the parliamentary authority, however, there are particular circumstances where this is not the case. There are a handful of circumstances, for example, where the parliamentary authority provides that a committee cannot do something. In my view, these rules mean what they say, and the committee cannot get around the prohibition by suspending the rule, even although the rules in question do not explicitly state that they cannot be suspended.

Similarly, there may be special rules of order or instructions an assembly will adopt which are of this nature, even although the rule does not explicitly state that the committee cannot suspend the rules.

Certainly, it may be preferable for the organization to specifically state that the rules in question may not be suspended, for the sake of clarity.

On 9/21/2023 at 9:52 PM, Michael Seebeck said:

And if they can't, why not? and how does that not violate the rights of the members of the committee?

And if they can in part, and can't in part, then what's the dividing line?

As I have indicated above, the dividing line is whether the rule is one which is applicable generally or whether the rule is of a nature intended to protect the assembly, or other persons who are not members of the committee.

Two examples of such rules which come to mind are as follows:

• A rule providing that all members of the committee (perhaps with certain exceptions, perhaps not) are open to all members of the society to attend.
• A rule providing that roll call votes shall be taken on motions pertaining to certain subject matters.

In either of these cases, the rule clearly has nothing to do with what the members of the committee want. The purpose of the rule is to create and protect rights of persons who are not members of the committee. As a result, it seems clear to me that these rules clearly may not be suspended by the committee, even in the absence of a rule specifically providing as much. If the committee wishes to act contrary to these instructions, its only recourse is to seek leave to do so from the parent assembly.

I concede that the rule in this particular circumstance is more of a gray area, and there may be reasonable differences of opinion over whether the rule is intended for the ordinary operations of the committee or whether the rule is intended to protect the parent assembly.

As to the question regarding the rights of committee members, a committee and its members have only such rights as its parent assembly sees fit to give the committee. Committees are not a society, and they are not even a full assembly in the same manner as a board. Except to the extent the bylaws provide otherwise, committees can be instructed as their parent assembly sees fit.

"Instructions to the committee can also be included in the motion to Commit, whether the committee is to be a standing or a special one, or a committee of the whole. These instructions, which are binding on the committee, may involve such matters as when the committee is to meet, how it is to consider the question, whether it is to employ an expert consultant, and when it is to report. The committee can be given “full power” to act for the society in a specific case and can be authorized to spend money or even to add to its own membership. The motion to Commit requires a majority vote for its adoption even when it contains instructions that suspend, modify, or conflict with rules of order that would otherwise apply to meetings of the committee. (See 9:35 regarding the adoption of instructions authorizing a committee to hold electronic meetings.)" RONR (12th ed.) 13:8

Further, I would note that the rule at issue here exists in the organization's bylaws, and the organization's bylaws can certainly limit the rights of members, even the rights of members of the society. There is certainly no doubt that such a rule may bind the committee and may prohibit the committee from suspending the rule. The only question is whether this particular rule does so.

I would also note that it does not seem to me that this rule actually relates to the individual, parliamentary rights of members, so I am not clear on what "rights" are being referred to here. The rule does not limit any committee member's right to make motions, to speak in debate, to vote, or of any basic rights concomitant to these rights.

"A member of an assembly, in the parliamentary sense, as mentioned above, is a person entitled to full participation in its proceedings, that is, as explained in 3 and 4, the right to attend meetings, to make motions, to speak in debate, and to vote. No member can be individually deprived of these basic rights of membership—or of any basic rights concomitant to them, such as the right to make nominations or to give previous notice of a motion—except through disciplinary proceedings." RONR (12th ed.) 1:4

Edited September 22, 2023 at 11:06 AM by Josh Martin

[Dan Honemann]

On 9/10/2023 at 6:59 PM, Josh Martin said:

The question then arises as to whether this rule is intended simply to describe the ordinary operations of the committee and the rule exists for the benefit of the committee, in which event the committee is free to suspend it in a particular case under the same conditions as any other rule of order, or if the rule is intended to be an instruction to the committee, and exists for the benefit of the parent assembly, in which event the rule may not be suspended by the committee.

It seems to me that the question asked here had previously been resolved in this thread, and has been properly answered by you and others here, but I'm a bit troubled by your mention of this "question" you say arises and must be answered in determining whether a rule specifically imposed upon a committee by its parent assembly can be suspended by the committee.  It doesn't seem, on its face, to be unreasonable, but it's new to me and I'd be interested in knowing where you found it. 

In any event, in the instant case, we are told that the bylaws provide as follows:

"A majority vote of those Committee members present is necessary for a "do pass" recommendation, and in the case of the Platform Committee, a majority must approve each specific plank separately."

The wording of the first half of this provision may leave a bit to be desired*, but the second half is crystal clear. There should be no doubt whatsoever but that this rule is binding on the Platform Committee and cannot be suspended by it.

--------------------------------------------

* I think this simply states the general rule, but I gather that some say that that it requires the vote of a majority of the members present.

[Josh Martin]

On 9/22/2023 at 4:21 PM, Dan Honemann said:

It seems to me that the question asked here had previously been resolved in this thread, and has been properly answered by you and others here, but I'm a bit troubled by your mention of this "question" you say arises and must be answered in determining whether a rule specifically imposed upon a committee by its parent assembly can be suspended by the committee.  It doesn't seem, on its face, to be unreasonable, but it's new to me and I'd be interested in knowing where you found it. 

Regrettably, I do not recall where I found this "question." It may be that it came from a discussion some time ago on this forum or its predecessor, or it may be that I invented it out of whole cloth.

[Michael Seebeck]

On 9/22/2023 at 1:55 AM, Atul Kapur said:

I agree with @George Mervosh and @Josh Martin. Speaking of thr collective rights of members of a committee (specifically, the right to suspend the rules) is a red herring. 1:4 applies to members of an assembly. A committee is not an assembly (1:9, 50:1, and 1:24 which states that committees are "subordinate instruments of 
an assembly,")

That makes no sense, because there is not a "collective right" at question here, but *individual* rights of the members.  This reasoning implies that members forfeit rights in a committee because they are not part of the assembly?  That's absurd on its face; they do not check their member rights at the door by being on a committee.  Member rights are because they are part of the *society,* not the assembly, which is a subgroup of the society.

[Michael Seebeck]

On 9/22/2023 at 6:02 AM, Josh Martin said:

The rule does not limit any committee member's right to make motions, to speak in debate, to vote, or of any basic rights concomitant to these rights.

That would include a motion to suspend the rules by definition.

So does the a rule limit member's rights, or not?

It's not a difficult question, yet everybody seems to be dancing around it with word salads and splicing hairs about types of groups.

As I see it, applying differentiation between the bounds of a committee's purpose and the actions the committee can do, the answer is no, the rule cannot limit member's rights, it can limit the bounds of the committee. Purpose vs. Process.

Instructions to a committee, however they are made, are of the nature of a scope of notice of what is applicable to the committee and what is not, but within that scope, the member's rights are intact and not limited.  What is implied in this discussion is that the instructions are limitations of member rights, but it misses the point that instructions to a committee are scope of duties, not limitations on *process*.

[Josh Martin]

On 9/23/2023 at 8:31 PM, Michael Seebeck said:

That makes no sense, because there is not a "collective right" at question here, but *individual* rights of the members.  This reasoning implies that members forfeit rights in a committee because they are not part of the assembly?  That's absurd on its face; they do not check their member rights at the door by being on a committee.  Member rights are because they are part of the *society,* not the assembly, which is a subgroup of the society.

What rights as a member of the society are restricted by the rule in question?

While it is certainly correct that members do not lost any of their rights as a member of the society by joining a committee, I don't understand what this has to do with the question that was asked.

On 9/23/2023 at 8:41 PM, Michael Seebeck said:

That would include a motion to suspend the rules by definition.

So does the a rule limit member's rights, or not?

It's not a difficult question, yet everybody seems to be dancing around it with word salads and splicing hairs about types of groups.

As I see it, applying differentiation between the bounds of a committee's purpose and the actions the committee can do, the answer is no, the rule cannot limit member's rights, it can limit the bounds of the committee. Purpose vs. Process.

Instructions to a committee, however they are made, are of the nature of a scope of notice of what is applicable to the committee and what is not, but within that scope, the member's rights are intact and not limited.  What is implied in this discussion is that the instructions are limitations of member rights, but it misses the point that instructions to a committee are scope of duties, not limitations on *process*.

By this logic, every rule limits a member's rights, since the rule limits a member's right to make a motion which is contrary to the rule.

But that is not, in fact, how RONR defines this subject.

"A member of an assembly, in the parliamentary sense, as mentioned above, is a person entitled to full participation in its proceedings, that is, as explained in 3 and 4, the right to attend meetings, to make motions, to speak in debate, and to vote. No member can be individually deprived of these basic rights of membership—or of any basic rights concomitant to them, such as the right to make nominations or to give previous notice of a motion—except through disciplinary proceedings. Some organized societies define additional classes of “membership” that do not entail all of these rights. Whenever the term member is used in this book, it refers to full participating membership in the assembly unless otherwise specified. Such members are also described as “voting members” when it is necessary to make a distinction." RONR (12th ed.) 1:4

"Rules protecting a basic right of the individual member cannot be suspended. Thus, while generally applicable limits on debate and the making of motions may be imposed by motions such as the Previous Question, the rules may not be suspended so as to deny any particular member the right to attend meetings, make motions or nominations, speak in debate, give previous notice, or vote. These basic rights may be curtailed only through disciplinary proceedings." RONR (12th ed.) 25:11, emphasis added

This seems quite clearly to be a generally applicable limit on making this motion, not a suspension of any individual member's rights.

I would also point out, again, that the rule is found in the organization's bylaws. Rules in the bylaws can limit the individual rights of members.

Edited September 24, 2023 at 01:54 AM by Josh Martin

[Atul Kapur]

On 9/23/2023 at 9:31 PM, Michael Seebeck said:

That makes no sense, because there is not a "collective right" at question here, but *individual* rights of the members.

A member does not have the right to make a frivolous motion. The committee does not have the authority to suspend this rule, so a member's motion to do so is frivolous.