When RONR is adopted by motion for a meeting

[paulmcclintock]

When RONR is adopted by motion for a meeting (no PA specified in the bylaws), can a bylaw provision in the nature of a rule of order be suspended?

My particular concern at present is the bylaw provision that the president chair the membership meeting, with bylaw provisions allowing the VP or Secretary to chair if necessary. Can they willingly step aside to allow someone else to preside?

There seems to be some amorphous common law or general parliamentary law that bylaws absolutely cannot be suspended, and it is only if RONR is a bylaw-adopted parliamentary authority (PA) that you can suspend a bylaw in the nature of a rule of order. 

Paul McClintock

[Shmuel Gerber]

It doesn't take a suspension of the rules for the regular presiding officer (and those next in line) to relinquish the chair, at least according to RONR 43:29, 47:11, and 47:13.

They certainly can willingly step aside; the only question is whether this is a violation of the bylaws and/or neglect of duty. 

[Weldon Merritt]

Another way to look at it is that if all three were absent, the bylaws could not reasonably be interpreted to mean that no one else can chair the meting as chair pro tem. And if all (or any of them) are present, but refuse to preside. the assembly likewise cannot reasonably be presented from electing a chair pro tem. The only question is (as Mr. Gerber suggests) is whether the officers  or should, be disciplined for neglect of duty. They may technically be liable, but if the assembly is OK with someone else presiding, then presumably no one will initiate any such action. 

[Josh Martin]

On 10/5/2023 at 2:59 PM, paulmcclintock said:

When RONR is adopted by motion for a meeting (no PA specified in the bylaws), can a bylaw provision in the nature of a rule of order be suspended?

Yes.

On 10/5/2023 at 2:59 PM, paulmcclintock said:

My particular concern at present is the bylaw provision that the president chair the membership meeting, with bylaw provisions allowing the VP or Secretary to chair if necessary. Can they willingly step aside to allow someone else to preside?

The answer to this is certainly "yes," and in fact, no suspension of the rules is necessary in order to do so. Suspending the rules would only be necessary if it was desired to elect a different chair and these persons were unwilling to step aside.

"In certain instances in an ordinary society—for example, if an adjourned meeting or a special meeting (9) must deal with a problem that has intensely divided the organization—it may be that such a meeting can accomplish more under the chairmanship of an invited nonmember who is skilled in presiding. (Sometimes this may be a professional presiding officer.) If the president and vice-president(s) do not object, the assembly, by majority vote, can adopt an incidental main motion to effect such an arrangement for all or part of a session. This motion is a question of privilege affecting the assembly (19). Alternatively, the rules may be suspended to authorize this type of temporary appointment, even over the objection of the president or a vice-president." RONR (12th ed.) 47:13

On 10/5/2023 at 2:59 PM, paulmcclintock said:

There seems to be some amorphous common law or general parliamentary law that bylaws absolutely cannot be suspended, and it is only if RONR is a bylaw-adopted parliamentary authority (PA) that you can suspend a bylaw in the nature of a rule of order. 

I am not aware of any principle in the common (or general) parliamentary law suggesting "that bylaws absolutely cannot be suspended."

To the extent "common law" refers to legal precedents established by the courts, that is a question for an attorney.

Edited October 5, 2023 at 10:29 PM by Josh Martin

[Rob Elsman]

Is a "meting" yesterday's meeting? 😂

[J. J.]

On 10/5/2023 at 6:27 PM, Josh Martin said:

Yes.

The answer to this is certainly "yes," and in fact, no suspension of the rules is necessary in order to do so. Suspending the rules would only be necessary if it was desired to elect a different chair and these persons were unwilling to step aside.

"In certain instances in an ordinary society—for example, if an adjourned meeting or a special meeting (9) must deal with a problem that has intensely divided the organization—it may be that such a meeting can accomplish more under the chairmanship of an invited nonmember who is skilled in presiding. (Sometimes this may be a professional presiding officer.) If the president and vice-president(s) do not object, the assembly, by majority vote, can adopt an incidental main motion to effect such an arrangement for all or part of a session. This motion is a question of privilege affecting the assembly (19). Alternatively, the rules may be suspended to authorize this type of temporary appointment, even over the objection of the president or a vice-president." RONR (12th ed.) 47:13

I am not aware of any principle in the common (or general) parliamentary law suggesting "that bylaws absolutely cannot be suspended."

To the extent "common law" refers to legal precedents established by the courts, that is a question for an attorney.

I agree that it could be unnecessary to suspend the rules to permit someone else to preside. 

When the bylaws create RONR as the parliamentary authority, they do include something in the bylaws that provides the suspension of certain rules, i.e. rules in the nature of a rule of order.  That is a form of self suspension.

If the bylaws had no parliamentary authority, could the assembly adopt a special rule that would permit a rule or type of rule in the bylaws to be suspended?  My answer would be no.  

[Gary Novosielski]

On 10/5/2023 at 6:28 PM, Rob Elsman said:

Is a "meting" yesterday's meeting? 😂

Since that spelling goes back to Middle English, it would be considerably earlier than yesterday.

[Dan Honemann]

On 10/5/2023 at 3:59 PM, paulmcclintock said:

When RONR is adopted by motion for a meeting (no PA specified in the bylaws), can a bylaw provision in the nature of a rule of order be suspended?

I agree with Mr. Martin that the answer to this question is yes.

[J. J.]

On 10/6/2023 at 8:04 AM, Dan Honemann said:

I agree with Mr. Martin that the answer to this question is yes.

 

Then, absent a parliamentary authority, could a special rule be adopted that said, "Any rule in the bylaws in the nature of a rule of order may be suspended?" 

[Dan Honemann]

On 10/6/2023 at 9:16 AM, J. J. said:

Then, absent a parliamentary authority, could a special rule be adopted that said, "Any rule in the bylaws in the nature of a rule of order may be suspended?" 

Yes.

[J. J.]

On 10/6/2023 at 9:46 AM, Dan Honemann said:

Yes.

And your rationale? 

 

[Dan Honemann]

On 10/6/2023 at 10:18 AM, J. J. said:

And your rationale? 

 

Do you have any doubt but that, if an organization has adopted no parliamentary authority, it can adopt RONR (which contains this rule regarding suspension of rules contained in the bylaws which are in the nature of rules of order) by the adoption of a special rule of order?  

 

 

[J. J.]

On 10/6/2023 at 11:28 AM, Dan Honemann said:

Do you have any doubt but that, if an organization has adopted no parliamentary authority, it can adopt RONR (which contains this rule regarding suspension of rules contained in the bylaws which are in the nature of rules of order) by the adoption of a special rule of order?  

 

 

To the extent that it does not violate the existing bylaws, yes. 

The problem is that the special rule conflicts with an existing bylaw (see 2:12). 

[Dan Honemann]

On 10/6/2023 at 12:36 PM, J. J. said:

To the extent that it does not violate the existing bylaws, yes. 

The problem is that the special rule conflicts with an existing bylaw (see 2:12). 

I think you are assuming that there is some underlying, basic rule that says that no rule contained in the bylaws can be suspended, no matter what its nature, unless the bylaws specifically say so.  Where do you find this rule? 

I think the underlying, basic rule says just the opposite.  That is to say, I think that what is said in RONR concerning this matter is a correct codification of our common parliamentary law concerning this matter, both now and when General Robert stated in ROR (1915 ed., pp. 85, 267) that rules contained in bylaws which are merely rules in the nature of rules of order may be suspended by a two-thirds vote. It is to be understood that such rules are not intended to be incapable of suspension unless the bylaws specifically so provide.

 

[J. J.]

On 10/6/2023 at 1:49 PM, Dan Honemann said:

I think you are assuming that there is some underlying, basic rule that says that no rule contained in the bylaws can be suspended, no matter what its nature, unless the bylaws specifically say so.  Where do you find this rule? 

I think the underlying, basic rule says just the opposite.  That is to say, I think that what is said in RONR concerning this matter is a correct codification of our common parliamentary law concerning this matter, both now and when General Robert stated in ROR (1915 ed., pp. 85, 267) that rules contained in bylaws which are merely rules in the nature of rules of order may be suspended by a two-thirds vote. It is to be understood that such rules are not intended to be incapable of suspension unless the bylaws specifically so provide.

 

No, I do not feel that way.  I feel special rule may not supersede a bylaw (2:12).

Since the General did not envision a parliamentary authority being adopted by a special rule (PL, 366)  Neither citation deals with a parliamentary authority established by a special rule.

[Dan Honemann]

On 10/6/2023 at 4:38 PM, J. J. said:

No, I do not feel that way.  I feel special rule may not supersede a bylaw (2:12).

2:12 says nothing whatsoever about the proper interpretation of various bylaw provisions or about the suspendibility of bylaw provisions.

 

On 10/6/2023 at 4:38 PM, J. J. said:

Since the General did not envision a parliamentary authority being adopted by a special rule (PL, 366)  Neither citation deals with a parliamentary authority established by a special rule.

He said that bylaw provisions that are in the nature of rules of order can be suspended.  This is the answer to the question asked in this thread.

You asked "Then, absent a parliamentary authority, could a special rule be adopted that said, "Any rule in the bylaws in the nature of a rule of order may be suspended?"  The answer is yes because there is no conflict between this special rule of order and any provision in the bylaws.  As has already been explained, absent any parliamentary authority, rules in the bylaws which are merely rules in the nature of rules of order may be suspended.  This is the basis for General Robert's statement to this effect in ROR.  He didn't simply make it up himself. 

[J. J.]

On 10/6/2023 at 5:16 PM, Dan Honemann said:

2:12 says nothing whatsoever about the proper interpretation of various bylaw provisions or about the suspendibility of bylaw provisions.

 

He said that bylaw provisions that are in the nature of rules of order can be suspended.  This is the answer to the question asked in this thread.

You asked "Then, absent a parliamentary authority, could a special rule be adopted that said, "Any rule in the bylaws in the nature of a rule of order may be suspended?"  The answer is yes because there is no conflict between this special rule of order and any provision in the bylaws.  As has already been explained, absent any parliamentary authority, rules in the bylaws which are merely rules in the nature of rules of order may be suspended.  This is the basis for General Robert's statement to this effect in ROR.  He didn't simply make it up himself. 

2:12 does apply and for the reason you inadvertently (?) stated.  There is a conflict between the rule in the bylaws and the temporary suspension of that rule, by definition.  

Since we are talking about the general parliamentary law, can you cite anything, apart from the works of Robert and its successors that would permit suspension of a rule in the nature of a rule of order included in the bylaws? 

[Dan Honemann]

On 10/6/2023 at 7:50 PM, J. J. said:

2:12 does apply and for the reason you inadvertently (?) stated.  There is a conflict between the rule in the bylaws and the temporary suspension of that rule, by definition.  

No, there is no conflict unless the bylaws specifically say that rules in the bylaws which are merely rules in the nature of rules of order cannot be suspended.

 

On 10/6/2023 at 7:50 PM, J. J. said:

Since we are talking about the general parliamentary law, can you cite anything, apart from the works of Robert and its successors that would permit suspension of a rule in the nature of a rule of order included in the bylaws? 

I don't need to. In this forum we are concerned only with a proper understanding of the rules in RONR.  What others say is of no consequence.

[J. J.]

On 10/6/2023 at 8:53 PM, Dan Honemann said:

No, there is no conflict unless the bylaws specifically say that rules in the bylaws which are merely rules in the nature of rules of order cannot be suspended.

 

I don't need to. In this forum we are concerned only with a proper understanding of the rules in RONR.  What others say is of no consequence.

If you are claiming that this is the general parliamentary law, existing beyond RONR, you will need to.  I do not claim that it is.

It is not the suspension that creates the conflict described in 2:12; it is the action taken under that suspension. 

[Dan Honemann]

On 10/7/2023 at 8:18 AM, J. J. said:

If you are claiming that this is the general parliamentary law, existing beyond RONR, you will need to.  I do not claim that it is.

It is not the suspension that creates the conflict described in 2:12; it is the action taken under that suspension. 

Well, if I am to try to assist you in understanding the common parliamentary law in this country on the suspendibility of rules of order, I need to ask if you have a copy of (or access to) Cushing's Manual and if you will agree with me that it constitutes the best evidence we have as to the common parliamentary law on this subject in 1847 and thereafter until publication of Robert's Rules of Order in 1876.  Do you?

 

[J. J.]

On 10/8/2023 at 7:23 AM, Dan Honemann said:

Well, if I am to try to assist you in understanding the common parliamentary law in this country on the suspendibility of rules of order, I need to ask if you have a copy of (or access to) Cushing's Manual and if you will agree with me that it constitutes the best evidence we have as to the common parliamentary law on this subject in 1847 and thereafter until publication of Robert's Rules of Order in 1876.  Do you?

I do have access to the 1886 version.

IIRC, Cushing, in Lex Parliamentaria Americana, noted that suspension of the rules had previously required a unanimous vote, but that this had changed. 

I would hope that you would agree that the general parliamentary law does change over time. 

Edited October 15, 2023 at 01:58 PM by Shmuel Gerber
Deleted blank lines

[Dan Honemann]

On 10/8/2023 at 9:59 AM, J. J. said:

I do have access to the 1886 version.

IIRC, Cushing, in Lex Parliamentaria Americana, noted that suspension of the rules had previously required a unanimous vote, but that this had changed. 

I would hope that you would agree that the general parliamentary law does change over time. 

Yes, I certainly agree that our common parliamentary law continues to evolve over time.  But in order for it to be properly understood today, it is necessary to start at the earliest point in time where we find any authoritative statement of it as it relates to the sorts of organizations with which we are concerned.  This is Cushing's Manual.

After noting that rules of order may be suspended by the adoption of a motion to do so, Cushing initially said that:

"It is usual, in the code of rules adopted by deliberative assemblies, and especially legislative bodies, to provide that a certain number exceeding a majority, as two thirds or three fourths, shall be competent to the suspension of a rule in a particular case; where this is not provided, there seems to be no other mode of suspending or dispensing with a rule than by general consent."

The important thing to note is that Cushing, in setting forth the common parliamentary law relating to the suspendibility of rules of order, gave no indication whatsoever that suspendibility was in any way dependent upon the manner in which the rules were adopted.  This was undoubtedly because of the view which he took of such rules, which he set forth, in bold letters, at the conclusion of his manual:

The great purpose of all rules and forms, is to subserve the will of the assembly rather than to restrain it; to facilitate, and not to obstruct, the expression of their deliberate sense.

If we are in agreement so far, I am willing to continue.  If not, I have better things to do.  🙂

 

 

 

[J. J.]

On 10/8/2023 at 12:18 PM, Dan Honemann said:

Yes, I certainly agree that our common parliamentary law continues to evolve over time.  But in order for it to be properly understood today, it is necessary to start at the earliest point in time where we find any authoritative statement of it as it relates to the sorts of organizations with which we are concerned.  This is Cushing's Manual.

After noting that rules of order may be suspended by the adoption of a motion to do so, Cushing initially said that:

"It is usual, in the code of rules adopted by deliberative assemblies, and especially legislative bodies, to provide that a certain number exceeding a majority, as two thirds or three fourths, shall be competent to the suspension of a rule in a particular case; where this is not provided, there seems to be no other mode of suspending or dispensing with a rule than by general consent."

The important thing to note is that Cushing, in setting forth the common parliamentary law relating to the suspendibility of rules of order, gave no indication whatsoever that suspendibility was in any way dependent upon the manner in which the rules were adopted.  This was undoubtedly because of the view which he took of such rules, which he set forth, in bold letters, at the conclusion of his manual:

The great purpose of all rules and forms, is to subserve the will of the assembly rather than to restrain it; to facilitate, and not to obstruct, the expression of their deliberate sense.

If we are in agreement so far, I am willing to continue.  If not, I have better things to do.  🙂

 

 

 

Not when it concerns bylaws.  Bylaws, generally serve as a limitation on a society (and its assembly); they act to prohibit certain actions.  That was certainly the context that Cushing was dealing with in terms of state legislatures, i.e. the concept of the "sovereign state."  While the principle exists today, it was much stronger prior to 1865.

In the abstract, I see bylaws as a contract and one that may only be modified by the assembly going through the process of amendment.  The body may temporarily suspend elements in the contract, but only by those terms within the contract. 

[Rob Elsman]

On 10/9/2023 at 7:40 AM, J. J. said:

Bylaws, generally serve as a limitation on a society (and its assembly); they act to prohibit certain actions.

On the contrary, bylaws more often authorize actions than prohibit them. A good reading of the RONR (12th ed.) Chapter XVIII makes this pretty clear, I think. That's why positive, declarative sentences are more commonly used than negative ones. For example, do a count on the sample bylaws, and what I'm saying will be clear.

[J. J.]

On 10/9/2023 at 8:53 AM, Rob Elsman said:

On the contrary, bylaws more often authorize actions than prohibit them. A good reading of the RONR (12th ed.) Chapter XVIII makes this pretty clear, I think. That's why positive, declarative sentences are more commonly used than negative ones. For example, do a count on the sample bylaws, and what I'm saying will be clear.

10:26 disagrees.  There you see a bylaw prohibiting a motion from being introduced.   2:13 indicates that the bylaws place "limitations" on the powers of the assembly.