Kim Goldsworthy

>> " . . . how do you determine 'approximately one third'?" Customized wording, which is not lifted from Robert's Rules of Order, implies that you are "on your own" to interpret, "What you meant at the time of adoption," as well as the future question, "How do we administer this new rule, today, for real?" So, I think I am answering your implied question, "I don't know."

Red herring. When a parent assembly refers an item of business to a committee, it uses the subsidiary motion "Refer or Commit". The parent assembly has not adopted a unique rule. The parent assembly has just referred X to a committee. That's all. *** Please read carefully the subsection "Rules which cannot be suspended" (p. 263-265). Nothing in pages 263-265 suggest that the committee gets any crippled motions out of the parliamentary authority. Nothing in pages 263-265 suggest that a committee cannot suspend any rule, like (a.) adjusting its agenda items, up/down, or (b.) to allow a non-member of the committee to speak. If a committee can "suspend the rules", for examples #a and #b, then committees can suspend rules of order, in general. If a given committee did suspend a rule of order, then the committee is still in compliance with pages 263-265. *** When and if the parent assembly adopts a special rule of order, then that special rule of order will be suspendable, except as pages 263-265 describe.

Note that "interference" and "benefit" is not: (a.) a fundamental principle; (b.) a right of membership; (c.) previous notice. If a parliamentary rule is not #a, not #b, and not #c, then the rule is suspendable. *** Similarly: Within RONR, there are many rules which are out-of-order for the sake of "benefit". See "amendments". -- Namely, third degree (tertiary) amendments are out-of-order. Why are third degree amendments out of order? -- The reason isn't #a, #b, or #c above. -- The reason is one of arbitrary "convenience" or "simplicity". Q. Can you suspend the rules and entertain a 3rd degree amendment? A. Yes. This, despite the text of SDC #6 on page 133. ("A secondary amendment cannot be amended.") Just because page 133 says "X cannot be amended", that does not imply that the rule is therefore "not suspendable." It is just a parliamentary rule. -- It isn't a fundamental principle, nor a right-of-membership; nor a previous notice. Just like "Limit Debate".

Good question. Here is what I see in RONR, regarding how "firm" this rule is. *** See the subsection "Committee Procedure" on page 500. (I have split the paragraph into 3 separate sentences.) *** S1.) Committees of organized societies operate under the bylaws, the parliamentary authority, and any special rules of order or standing rules of the society which may be applicable to them. S2.) A committee may not adopt its own rules except as authorized in the rules of the society or in instructions given to the committee by its parent assembly in a particular case. S3.) If a standing or special committee is so large that it can function best in the manner of a full‑scale assembly, it should be instructed that the informalities and modifications of the regular rules of parliamentary procedure listed for small boards on pages 487‑88 are not to apply to its proceedings. *** • Please note S3. If "informality" is not suitable to the committee, then "formality" is suitable. No fundamental principle is involved. No violation of rights-of-membership is involved. Just toggle, from one to the other. • Please note S2. A committee may not adopt its own rules. But S2 never says that a committee cannot suspend the rules. No surprise here. -- If S3 allows for the rules to toggle between (a.) informal vs. (b.) formal; then there should no surprise that a committee can toggle a single instance where the default rule interferes with a higher priority, e.g., (a.) a time deadline (as page 500 footnote gives); or (b.) a member who abuses the right to debate to the dilatory detriment of the committee (as page 500 gives). Since page 500 footnotes gives us two instances where there is no problem with toggling the rule in other other direction, then there must be some kind of flexibility built-in to the rule. -- Q. Why else would page 500's footnote offer two exceptions to the "rule"? *** If the rule (viz., to limit debate inside a committee) were NOT suspendable, then there must be a REASON for its un-suspend-ability. But is the reason because ______________: (a.) a fundamental principle is involved? -- No. That is clear, from the toggling ability. (b.) a right-of-membership is involved? -- No. That is clear from the toggling ability. Q. If the reason is "protection", then what the protection "from"? For X to be a non-suspendable rule, then X must be something very high up in the ranks of parliamentary rules. Q. What is that attribute of the high rank? -- A class? A right? A previous notice? Q. When can a parliamentary rule, already subject to the normal two-thirds vote, not be suspendable?

OK. I will try to explain. See the quote: ". . . having the benefit of . . .". A "benefit" is not a "protection". -- Do not equate a nicety with a right-of-membership. You can suspend a benefit, an advantage, a nicety. The rule (to cut off debate) is not absolute. It is a rule in the nature of a rule of order, which even Robert's Rules says the chair may abridge for the singular individual of page 500's footnote. So it cannot be an absolute rule. It is just out of order. But out-of-order motions can be made in-order via a suspension of the rules. Like any out-of-order motion. See the quote: ". . . if there is no opportunity for this to occur . . .". Even RONR allows for those committees which are tight on time to do something which normally would have been out-of-order. Nothing surprising about that. -- If there is no reasonable time to finish X, then a workaround is allowed, by RONR. *** Again, it is just a default rule. Not an absolute rule. There is no "protecting" going on. It is merely an attribute of committee behavior, but not all committees, in those instances where time is a bigger factor more so than would have been in an average, unconstrained committee.

The rule is a parliamentary rule, not a fundamental principle. So, the rule (to close debate) is suspendable. Remember, not all committees are the same. -- Some committees do have deadlines, and some committees must leave the building at a fixed hour. So, the committee must have a tool to plan how to cover all of its material in a tight window of time. -- Fixing the debate time is one tool. Previous Question is another tool. Since the vote requirement is two-thirds, I see no problem, here. While most committees are not large, and not constrained by time, a few are. -- It is for these committees that the Robertian rule is not absolute. -- But is suspendable. *** The assembly is not the party being "protected." There is no assembly (i.e., no quorum, no meeting) at the moment the committee itself is meeting. They (the parent assembly) are home, in bed. -- There is no one to protect -- at the moment the committee suspends the "debate" rule. The assembly is not debating. Therefore, there is no one left to protect by a two-thirds vote on "limiting debate" in a body separate from the parent assembly. *** Analogy: Imagine: A board meets. The board suspend a rule on "limiting debate". Q. Has the general membership lost its "protection", when its own board votes via a 2/3 vote on the Previous Question? A. No. -- When the board is debating, its own limiting-of-debate among its members protects no outside party at the time of the suspension. The general membership has not "lost protection" by the action of the board. So it is with a committee. -- The suspension inside a committee meeting has nothing to do with protecting a quorumless parent assembly, at that moment. Bottom line: • If you seek a party to "protect", it won't be an absentee member, for any parliamentary rule regarding "debate".

You know what? That sounds like an insult. It doesn't come across as an objective measure of qualifications for office, nor does it come across a a rule citation. "Anyone in the state"? Really?

A1.) See the motion "Discharge a committee" in Robert's Rules of Order. A2.) Choices are: (a.) take the task/project away from the committee (so that the committee has nothing to do). (b.) instruct the committee (again, or more thoroughly). (This is called "to charge a committee".) (c.) swap personnel of the committee. Remove some members of the committee, and appoint new blood. (d.) Eliminate the committee completely. See the motion "Discharge a committee" in Robert's Rules of Order. A3.) The party who created a special committee is the party to discharge (or re-charge) the special committee. • If your Bar Council created the committee, then the Bar Council is free to do #a, #b, #c, #d, above. A4.) The only committee which isn't automatically dissolved is a standing committee. And you have said, ". . . a committee made by the Bar Council". Unless the Bar Council created a standing committee (which I doubt), then the Bar Council is free to un-appoint any of the personnel of the committee.

Review the context: • This was an annual meeting. • The motion, to adjourn the annual meeting, was adopted. What does this imply? It probably implies that the original poster was speaking on a topic which the majority of the members present thought was of less value than "going home." It probably implies that the portion of the meeting was in the "good of the order / general welfaire" kind of business. -- All talk. No motions. *** If you interrupt a speaker when there is no motion on the floor, that interruption is probably a minor violation, and not a major violation. Robert's Rules of Order does allow a speaker to be interrupted, for a subset of motions. -- See tinted page 40, for a list of ten such motions. So the "interruption" isn't an act to be accorded the level of egregious violation, when there are ten legitimate opportunities to do exactly that. It's no "fundamental principle." If it is not a fundamental principle, then it must be something else. I think it is indeed "something else." I await details from the original poster to suggest that the violation was something more.

A1.) No. The board must give authorization. Or, a rule must be in place (see your bylaws) already saying so. A2.) Presidents cannot grant such power, unless a rule to the contrary is in place. In contrast, the board can authorize a certain party to speak or to act on behalf of the board, but not necessarily on behalf of the whole the organization, unless the board, by rule, holds such authority to act on behalf of the whole organization. Some boards are defined with limited powers. I have not read your bylaws. So your board might be an exception. A3.) Yeow! "Confronting"? What is going on which requires confrontation? -- Fisticuffs? Chastisement?

Reply to S1. "No." To fill a vacancy implies that you are completing an existing term of office, and not beginning a new term of office. *** Reply to S2. "Correct." You, as the party who was elected to complete an ongoing term of office, do not "reset the clock." The term of office is fixed in length, or, depending on the wording of your bylaws, may be fixed in the "start of the clock", even if the end of the term of office is not necessarily with a fixed end-point. (See term of office defined in some bylaws as lasting ". . . until a successor is elected or qualified . . .", thus the end-point may be flexible. Some bylaws just say, ". . . for one year . . .", and simply put a period on the sentence -- no qualifier added.) *** I am surprised that you did not pick this up from the wording in your bylaws. -- One's term of office for a given office, in most bylaws, are usually defined with a clear "start", and with one of two kinds of "end points". -- I am curious about the wording of your bylaws' definition. Q. Do you know what the term of office is for this office of treasurer?

In reply. A violation which is not a continuing breach, is a violation which is "minor" in the sense that, its violation does not lead to any kind of nullification of the transacted business. It may be "major" in a psychological sense, or in a political sense, or in an ethical sense. But in the parliamentary sense, the error remains as mere parliamentary error, due to no point of order and no appeal being offered by a second member. *** In the opinion of the majority of the members present, the violation was not worth the labor or effort of a timely point of order/appeal. So, from the original post, the membership itself did not consider the violation major. --That context is quite telling, in my opinion. -- The chair's evaluation of the situation must have matched 99% of the members present. Why else the dead silence?

While it is out of order for the interruption to occur, if the interruption does occur, and if the motion is made To Adjourn, and if the motion To Adjourn is adopted, then, unless a Point of Order is immediately raised, the vote stands, and the meeting stands adjourned. So, yes, "a meeting can be adjourned while member is speaking". The violation (viz., to entertain an interruption which, by rule, cannot interrupt a speaker) is a minor violation, and won't invalidate the motion, or invalidate the meeting.

No, and no. The fact that the conducting of the election was last (or first), is of no import. It isn't the positioning of an item of business in one's agenda which could invalidate the business. The fact that the chair at the time was not the regular chair, is of no import. It isn't the person wielding the gavel which can turn an election into an improper election.

Your distinction is garbled. Q. Are you equating (a.) abstaining; with (b.) not-debating? *** Q. Are you equating (a.) debating; with (b.) not-abstaining? That is a logically fallacious choice. The two acts are not even related. • You can debate, debate, debate, and then choose to abstain. • You could abstain, despite debating vigorously, for every minute of your two (or more?) opportunities. The two acts (viz., to debate; and to abstain) are not mutually exclusive.

Are you asking, "Can an ordinary motion, upon adoption, override a bylaw?" The answer is, "No." I assume that the bylaws grant you the rights of membership to your board, and that you are not in a separate membership class (with crippled rights).

This Is why I was wondering if our hearing should actually be considered the trial. Yes. I agree. If you are issuing a punishment, then, in effect, you have a trial, even if you give it an inappropriate, misleading name. A hearing cannot issue a punishment, under the normal meaning of "hearing".

A1. I have not read the text of your Constitution & Bylaws. But a generic answer would be "No." -- A hearing is not a trial. A hearing's purpose is to determine if the charges are significant enough to justify a trial. The hearing might turn out to show that the charges are flimsy or unproveable or trivial. If such were to be the case, you've saved yourself the labor and grief of a full-blown trial. A2. The hearing must be held in executive session, because a hearing's verbiage typically will taint the reputation of the targeted party, possibly with false innuendo. So, it is vital the the good name of the targeted member be preserved at risk of false charges. -- You don't a slander/libel lawsuit on your hands, because one jealous member didn't have enough self control to zip his lip. A3. (a.) This is a good idea. The 3 to 5 people on the hearing committee needs to impartial and uninvolved prior to listening to all parties. But you won't find that "good idea" in Robert's Rules of Order. (b.) This is a good idea, too. While the 3-5 members of the hearing committee must remain un-tainted by too-early data coming in to their ears, that leaves 10-100 interested parties to act as mediators, to intervene and get the charging party to change his mind.

Yes.

"J"? Then, obviously, "K"!

Q. Was the dismissal due to reasons beyond control of the board? (e.g., the meeting hall burned down; the checking account is at zero dollars; an emergency bill became overdue; the quorum threshold is impossible to satisfy; etc.) Since you don't know where you stand, then start at Square One: Make a motion. ("I move that the annual meeting be held on D Day, H Hour, at L Location.") Then, listen carefully. Whatever the objections are, solve those problems. -- And then make the motion again.

There are parliamentary tools available to quash motions you don't want to spend time on. You don't need to "set a clock" (or "set a calendar"). When the issue comes up, just move to postpone indefinitely.

Q. Where did this magical number come from? Q. Why not "one" or "three"?

>> [...] the individual would have been acclaimed, per our bylaws. What do your bylaws say? -- Your paraphrase of your rule is unclear. The acclamation might be for (a.) a sole nominee; or be for (b.) any number less than four nominees. So the text of the rule will make a big difference in interpretation.

First, let me ask you: "Who are 'you'?" Q. How is it that you alone are in charge of creating a ballot, in the first place? Q. What authority do you have to edit the ballot?